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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Microeconomic Theory
by
Ce Liu
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Christopher P. Chambers, Co-Chair
Professor Joel Sobel, Co-Chair
The first chapter studies repeated matching markets, where in every period, a new genera-
tion of short-lived workers is matched to a fixed set of long-lived firms on the other. I characterize
self-enforcing arrangements for two types of environments. When wages are rigid, as in the
matching market for hospitals and medical residents, players can be partitioned into two sets:
regardless of patience level, some players can be assigned only according to a static stable
matching; when firms are patient, the other players can be assigned in ways that are unstable in
one-shot interactions. I also discuss these results’ implications for market design. When wages
can be flexibly adjusted, I show that repeated interaction resolves well-known non-existence
xi
issues: while static stable matchings may fail to exist with complementarities and/or peer effects,
self-enforcing matching processes always exist if firms are sufficiently patient.
The second chapter provides revealed preference characterizations for choices made under
various forms of costly information acquisition. We examine nonseparable, multiplicative, and
constrained costly information acquisition. In particular, this allows the possibility of unknown
time delay for acquiring information. The techniques we use parallel the duality properties in the
standard consumer problem.
The third chapter provides a universal condition for rationalizability by risk-averse ex-
pected utility preference in a demand-based framework with multiple commodities. Our test can
be viewed as a natural counterpart of a classical test of expected utility, due to Fishburn (1975),
in a demand setting.
xii
Chapter 1
Stability in Repeated Matching Markets
1.1 Introduction
Summary: College admission, hospital-resident matching, and entry-level hiring are
all ongoing matching processes that take place every year. One side of these markets—the
institutions—are long-lived players, whereas the other side—namely the students, residents, or
workers—participate in the matching process on only a few occasions (sometimes only once).
Yet, much of our theoretical analysis of matching environments treats both sides of the market as
being short-lived, ignoring the possibility for dynamic incentives that could be used to motivate
long-lived players. To understand the scope for such dynamic interactions, this paper develops a
framework to study ongoing matching processes in repeated matching markets, where one side of
the market is long-lived while the other is short-lived. In each period, every long-lived institution
is matched to multiple short-lived agents on the other side of the market.
In this environment, I define and study a solution concept called self-enforcing matching
process. A matching process is a complete contingent plan specifying a current matching outcome
as a function of past histories. A matching process is self-enforcing if it is immune to not only
unilateral deviations by institutions or agents, but also blocking coalitions that simultaneously
1
involve an institution and groups of agents over a possibly infinite horizon. A self-enforcing
matching process therefore represents self-fulfilling market expectations that are immune to
both individual and coalitional deviations. A central theme of my analysis is that in repeated
matching markets, long-lived coalition members—the institutions— can be disciplined through
continuation play. In other words, dynamic incentives can enforce matching outcomes that are
not stable in one-shot interactions. The goal of my paper is to characterize what can be supported,
both with and without flexible wages between institutions and their employees.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide a framework and solution concept that
takes into account the possibility of institutions’ dynamic interactions. In two-sided matching
markets, any appropriate stability notion must allow for joint deviations that are carried out
by coalitions of agents from opposite sides of the market. Modeling these deviations through
a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, however, would inevitably anchor the analysis to
specific extensive-form assumptions on the coalition formation process. Instead, I adopt a
cooperative approach consistent with the analysis of static matching environments. I assume that
any deviation involving coalitions of players must be profitable for all its members, and study
matching processes that admit no such deviations. By meshing coalitional reasoning directly into
a repeated matching environment, the resulting framework explicitly accounts for the institutions’
intertemporal tradeoffs, while relying only on assumptions on the players’ primitive payoff
structure.
In Section 1.3, I analyze markets where wages are fixed, as in Gale and Shapley (1962).
This is the canonical assumption for the labor market of medical residents. I show that there is
a dichotomy of players in this environment: in every self-enforcing matching process, players
in the top coalition sequence, identified through an algorithm, must be matched according to a
static stable matching, regardless of institutions’ patience level; by contrast, when institutions
are patient, it is possible to assign players outside of the top coalition sequence in ways that
are unstable in one-shot interactions—I characterize the set of self-enforcing arrangements with
2
patient institutions. In an extreme case, when all agents share a common ordinal ranking over
institutions, every player is in the top coalition sequence. As a result, no self-enforcing matching
process can enforce any outcome beyond the unique static stable outcome—dynamic enforcement
is completely powerless. In the motivation section, I discuss these results’ implication for the
matching market of medical residents.
Section 1.4 turns to the environment where institutions and their employees can redis-
tribute match surplus through wages—this is the case considered in Kelso and Crawford (1982). I
show that in contrast to the findings from the static matching literature, self-enforcing arrange-
ments always exist when institutions are patient, despite complementarities and peer effects in
preferences. In particular, treating groups of agents as objects, a Random Serial Dictatorship
among the the institutions is always self-enforcing when they are sufficiently patient.
Motivation: The interest in repeated matching markets and self-enforcing matching
processes is motivated by both normative and positive considerations.
From a normative standpoint, in the matching market for medical residents, dynamic
incentives can be harnessed as an instrument for enforcing matching outcomes that favor rural
hospitals. In the U.S., rural communities typically feature more elderly patients, higher rate
of accidental injuries, and lower average income; the closure of rural hospitals has also been
associated to significant changes in medical utilization and the health status of local population.
See, for example, Bindman, Keane, and Lurie (1990), Hadley and Nair (1991) and Rosenbach
and Dayhoff (1995). These have motivated the interests in policy intervention (U.S. Government
Accountability Office 1991); nevertheless, the lack of complete medical facilities, excessive
workloads, and cultural and geographic isolation make it difficult for rural hospitals to attract
healthcare providers.
According to the Rural Hospital Theorem (Roth 1986), static market incentives are
completely powerless for the purpose of allocating more residents to rural hospitals: regardless of
what a (static) matching program may propose, a rural hospital failing to fill its vacancies will end
3
up with the exact same matches across all stable market outcomes. A history-dependent matching
program, however, can tap into hospitals’ dynamic incentives, and propose matching processes
that sustain more favorable outcomes for rural hospitals. One particular way of exploiting
history dependence is to excludes hospitals that go against the program’s proposed matchings
from future participation, effectively recommending empty matches to the deviating hospitals in
subsequent periods—this is the method used by the Japanese medical resident matching program
(JRMP) (Kamada and Kojima 2015). However, in both the U.S. and Japanese markets, matchings
proposals are not externally enforced: hospitals can circumvent the program and hire through
direct negotiation (see also, for example, Roth 1991). The proposed matching process must then
be self-enforcing in order not to create incentives for defection.
The results in Section 1.3 are valuable for understanding what can be sustained by a history-
dependent matching program. In particular, Theorem 2 suggests that even in the complete absence
of coercive power, a history-dependent matching program can alleviate the staffing shortages faced
by rural hospitals—this should be implemented by targeting hospitals outside of the top coalition
sequences. Theorem 1, on the other hand, indicates that residents in the top coalition sequence can
only be allocated to rural hospitals through alternative means of intervention: existing measures
to help rural hospitals, such as student loan repayment/forgiveness programs, should prioritize
residents in the top coalition sequence. In fact, as indicated in Corollary 1, if medical residents
have highly homogenous preferences over hospitals, no changes in the assignment of residents
can be achieved through history-dependence alone.
This results in Section 1.4 make a methodological contribution. Complementarities and
peer effects are important features in labor market. But the matching literature has found it
difficult to establish existence once such features are incorporated. Theorem 4 fills this gap by
identifying a new channel that stabilizes the market, namely the firms’ collusive motives and fear
of retaliation. Such incentives have previously been overlooked by static stability notions (see,
for example, Gale and Shapley 1962, Kelso and Crawford 1982 and Hatfield and Milgrom 2005).
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There are real-life examples for such collusive motives in matching markets. For instance,
in a 2010 antitrust litigation, the Department of Justice alleged that Adobe, Apple, Google,
Intel, Intuit and Pixar had reached unwritten agreements that “eliminated a significant form of
competition” in order to suppress the wages paid to their matched employees. In particular,
according to the DOJ, these agreements were “not ancillary to any legitimate collaboration”, and
“much broader than reasonably necessary for the formation or implementation of any collaborative
effort”, but instead aimed at “disrupting the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in the
labor setting” (Department of Justice 2010).
In the next section, I illustrate the framework and results of this paper through a stylized
example based on the NRMP.
1.1.1 Motivating Example:
Three hospitals I1, I2 and Ir each has 2 positions to fill every year. Each year, five medical
students {a1,a2,a3,a4,a5} enter the market looking for internship. In the NRMP, wages are
non-negotiable, so players’ payoffs are determined by the identity of their match partners.
Students are short-lived players, so only their ordinal preferences are relevant. The left
panel of Table 1.1 lists every student’s preference ranking over hospitals. Observe that hospital
Ir is the least favorite for every student. In the matching literature, Ir is usually interpreted as a
hospital located in the rural area that faces difficulties in filling its vacancies.
Hospitals’ Bernoulli utility from matched students are shown in the right panel of Table 1.1.
Assume each hospital has additively separable utility from matched students, and derives zero
utility from unfilled positions. Observe that a5 is every hospital’s least preferred student.
Static Stability: There are only two static stable matchings in this market: as is shown in
Fig. 1.1, the matchings mI and mA correspond, respectively, to the hospital-optimal and student-
optimal matchings. Both these matchings leave the rural hospital Ir with an unfilled position,
while the other position is filled by the worst student a5.
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Table 1.1: Preferences of Students and Hospitals

a1 I2 I1 Ir
a2 I2 I1 Ir
a3 I1 I2 Ir
a4 I1 I2 Ir
a5 I1 I2 Ir
uI(a) 5 4 3 2 1
I1 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
I2 a3 a2 a4 a1 a5
Ir a2 a4 a3 a1 a5
For the welfare of rural population, the matching m0, shown in Fig. 1.2, is a more desirable
outcome: Ir still has one unfilled position, but its situation is improved compared to mI or mA ,
as it gets to hire the more desirable resident a2. However, m0 is unstable: I1 and a2 will form a
blocking pair. This phenomenon is known more generally as the Rural Hospital Theorem:
I1
I2
Ir
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
mI
I1
I2
Ir
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
mA
Figure 1.1: Static Stable Matchings
Rural Hospital Theorem. (Roth 1986). When preferences over individuals are strict,
any hospital that does not fill its quota at some (static) stable matching is assigned precisely the
same set of students at every (static) stable matching. According to the Rural Hospital Theorem,
reallocating physicians to rural hospitals will inevitably create unstable matches.
A Self-Enforcing Matching Process: Now suppose the matching program can vary
proposed matches based on past history. Consider the matching process µ0 depicted in Fig. 1.3:
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I1
I2
Ir
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
Figure 1.2: m0: An Unstable Matching
hospitals and students start off by matching according to m0. So long as no blocking involving
a hospital has been observed in the past, players are repeatedly matched at m0; if any blocking
involving a hospital is observed, players will be matched according to mA forever. Hospitals’
per-period cardinal payoffs from mA and m0 are also listed in the diagram for easy reference.
If the market evolves according to µ0, then in every period the static matching m0 is
realized. It remains to check that µ0 is self-enforcing.
Figure 1.3: A Self-Enforcing Matching Process Implementing m0
Students are short-lived players. The only deviation a student can do unilaterally is to
sever the match with his hospital.
Hospitals, on the other hand, are long-lived players. Hospital I1 can contemplate a
deviation plan d1, which is a complete contingent plan specifying a group of students, d1(h),
that I1 intends to be matched with at every possible future history h. Recall that the matching
process µ0 is also a complete contingent plan. At history h, µ0 also specifies a group of students,
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denoted µ0(I1|h), for I1. Whenever d1(h) and µ0(I1|h) are in conflict, I1 can unilaterally fire
everyone in µ0(I1|h)\d1(h). Students in d1(h)\µ0(I1|h), however, need to be poached from other
hospitals. Since poaching involves joint deviations by both hospital and student, we say d1(h)
is feasible when everyone in d1(h)\µ0(I1|h) finds I1 more desirable than their matched hospital
recommended by µ0.
For the matching process µ0 to be self-enforcing, it must be immune to both the unilateral
and joint deviations outlined above. A one-shot deviation principle, established in the Appendix,
implies that in markets with fixed wages like the NRMP, a matching process is self-enforcing if
and only if at every possible history of the market:
1. no student wishes to unilaterally sever her match, and
2. no hospital finds it profitable to deviate once with a feasible group of student, and perma-
nently revert to following µ0.
Suppose no deviation involving hospitals has occurred. Every student is getting a strictly
positive payoff, so no students would want to unilaterally leave their match. By following µ0, I1
receives a payoff of 6 every period from matching with {a1,a5}. If I1 were to fire a5 and block
with a2, it would enjoys a one-period payoff of 9, but subsequently receive per-period payoff of 5.
As long as I1’s discount factor δ satisfies
(1−δ)9+δ5 < 6,
or δ> 34 , such blocking will not be profitable. A similar argument rules out any profitable joint
deviations involving I2.
Now suppose a hospital-deviation has occurred. According to µ0, they should expect to
be matched at mA forever. Again, no students are willing to individually break off from their
matches. For hospitals, current period blocking no longer carries any future consequences—the
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market is permanently stuck at mA regardless of what transpires in the matching market. Since
mA is statically stable, by definition, a hospital’s matched partners in mA are more desirable than
any other students that are feasible, so no hospital has any profitable one-shot blocking either.
In light of the one-shot deviation principle, µ0 is a self-enforcing matching process. Note
that in a static world, pairwise blocking between I1 and a2 would have rendered the matching
m0 unstable. In the matching process µ0, however, one-shot blockings like this will permanently
throw the market into a less desirable matching, mA , for I1. Such blocking is no longer jointly
profitable.
The Problem with Common Ranking over Hospitals: The analysis so far has demon-
strated the possibility of using history dependence to enforce outcomes that are not stable in
one-shot interactions. Now I illustrate the limitation of dynamic enforcement when all students
share a common preference over hospitals.
Table 1.2: A Market with Aligned Preferences

a1 I1 I2 Ir
a2 I1 I2 Ir
a3 I1 I2 Ir
a4 I1 I2 Ir
a5 I1 I2 Ir
uI(a) 5 4 3 2 1
I1 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
I2 a3 a2 a4 a1 a5
Ir a2 a4 a3 a1 a5
Consider the market in Table 1.2, where everything is identical to the one in Table 1.1,
except now all students share a common ranking I1  I2  Ir over hospitals.
There is a unique static stable matching m∗ in this market, as depicted in Fig. 1.4. I will
show that regardless of how patient the hospitals are, no self-enforcing matching process can
implement any matching other than m∗.
9
I1
I2
Ir
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
Figure 1.4: m∗: The Unique Stable Matching
To see why, first observe that as the top choice for all the students, I1 always finds its most
preferred students {a1,a2} feasible: in any matching process µ and at any history h, {a1,a2} are
either already matched to I1, or matched to a hospital that they find less desirable than I1. If I1 is
matched with any other students at a history h, then I1 has a feasible deviation plan: match with
{a1,a2} at every future history, including h. This is profitable because it offers I1 an immediate
improvement at h, as well as the highest possible continuation value in any matching process. To
rule out profitable deviations like this, all self-enforcing matching processes must match I1 with
{a1,a2} regardless of the history of the market.
Since a1 and a2 are always matched to I1 in a self-enforcing matching process, there is no
way to reward I2 with a better match than {a3,a4}. On the other hand, the only way to punish I2
with a match worse than {a3,a4} is to match a3 or a4 with I1—otherwise I2 can simply poach
them back. This is, again, impossible because the hiring quota for I1 is always filled by a1 and a2
at every possible history of the market. It follows that in any self-enforcing matching process, I2
is always matched precisely with {a3,a4}, on and off equilibrium path.
A similar “peeling” argument along students’ shared preference list ensures Ir is matched
with a5 in any self-enforcing matching process. The only self-enforcing matching process
therefore always has players matched according to m∗.
In the above example, depending on players’ preference configuration, history dependence
may or may not expand the set of stable outcomes. It is also worth pointing out that the uniqueness
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of static stable outcome is not responsible for the collapse of dynamic enforcement: in fact, if the
hospitals share a common (cardinal or ordinal) preference over residents, the market will also
have a unique static stable matching; nevertheless, it is still possible to expand the set of stable
outcomes through history dependence. The results in Section 1.3 characterizes how the scope of
this expansion relates to players’ preferences.
1.1.2 Related Literature
There is now a growing interest in dynamic interactions in matching markets. The existing
literature can largely be divided into two strands, based on the nature of the matching environment
being investigated.
The first strand focuses on matching markets where players leave the market permanently
once matched: this is the natural assumption for organ transplant or child adoption. In such
context, players optimally trade off the cost of waiting against the arrival of better matching
opportunities. U¨nver (2010), Anderson et al. (2015), Baccara, Lee, and Yariv (2015), Leshno
(2017), and Akbarpour, Li, and Oveis Gharan (2017) investigate the welfare implications of
various matching algorithms; Du and Livne (2016) and Doval (2018) consider the existence of
self-enforcing matching arrangements.
Another strand of the literature investigates matching between long-lived players, where
matching arrangements can be revised over time. Depending on the application, Corbae,
Temzelides, and Wright (2003), Damiano and Lam (2005), Kurino (2009), Newton and Sawa
(2015), Kotowski (2015), Kadam and Kotowski (2018a) and Kadam and Kotowski (2018b)
propose and analyze different solution concepts in this environment. The most closely related
paper to mine is Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2003), which allows full history dependence in
directed matching, and considers applications in monetary theory.
My paper differs from the above papers in that I consider a different kind of matching
environment: a fixed set of long-lived players on one side of the market repeatedly match with
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new generations of short-lived players from the other. This is the environment that arises naturally
from college admission and various entry-level labor markets. Dynamic incentives also play
a different role in such environments: they can be used as carrots and sticks for disciplining
long-lived players.
My analysis builds on the techniques from the repeated games literature. In particular,
the environment I consider bears many similarities to repeated games with perfect monitoring;
I also adapt the techniques for equilibrium construction in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and
Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994). The main difference of my paper is that I consider a two-sided
cooperative environment, where the basic unit of analysis is not actions for individual players,
but moves by coalitions. This introduces novel features that are not present in standard repeated
games: regardless of patience level, the matching environment can impose severe restrictions on
the payoffs of long-lived players. This is in sharp contrast to the “anything goes” result from folk
theorems.
The top coalition sequence, featured prominently in the analysis in Section 1.3, is closely
related to, but different from the top coalition property. The top coalition property is first
introduced in Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez (2001) in the context of coalition formation, and
subsequently used in a variety of cooperative game settings. See, for example, Niederle and
Yariv (2009) and Doval (2018) for the use in matching settings. The top coalition property is
an assumption which requires that every subset of players to have a top coalition; top coalition
sequence, by contrast, is not an assumption about the underlying game, but is instead the collection
of top coalitions that can be found through iterative eliminations.
The current paper is not the first attempt to mesh coalitional reasoning with dynamic
consideration. Bernheim and Slavov (2009) considers the dynamic extension of Condorcet
Winner in majoritarian voting settings; Ali and Liu (2018) consider coalition moves in a general
repeated cooperative environments. Both these papers allow full history dependence—the most
important difference of my approach from these papers is in the form of effective coalitions: in
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both these papers, the effective coalitions consist of subsets of long-lived players; in the matching
environment I consider, however, the effective coalitions are those that consist of a single long-
lived player and multiple generations of short-lived players. There is also an extensive literature
on farsighted coalition formation: Chwe (1994), Ray and Vohra (1997), Ray and Vohra (1999),
Konishi and Ray (2003), Gomes and Jehiel (2005), and Ray (2007), among others, consider the
(implicit or explicit) coalition formation process among forward-looking players. My approach
is different from these papers in that I allow full history dependence in a specialized matching
environment, where there is no persistent state variable.
Finally, the dynamic interactions analyzed in this paper speak to two strands literature on
static matching markets. The first strand is the literature on matching with complementarities or
externalities. See, for example, Sasaki and Toda (1996), Dutta and Masso´ (1997), Echenique and
Yenmez (2005), Kominers (2010), Pycia (2012), Flanagan (2015), and Pycia and Yenmez (2017).
In particular, Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017) and Azevedo and Hatfield (2018) consider existence
of stable matching in large markets, where institution preferences may exhibit complementarities.
My results complement the existing literature by pointing out a novel channel for maintaining
stability, when market size is not necessarily large. The second strand is the literature on
matching with constraints. See, for example, Kamada and Kojima (2015), Fragiadakis and Troyan
(2017), Goto et al. (2017), Kamada and Kojima (2017), and Kamada and Kojima (2018). This
literature focuses on understanding and improving the welfare properties of a variety of real-life
matchings markets, which are subject to restrictions other than those covered by standard capacity
constraints. My paper complements this literature by providing a framework for understanding the
enforceability of these restrictions, when the matching authority can exploit institutions’ dynamic
incentives.
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1.1.3 Structure of the Paper
Section 1.2 introduce the model and discuss the solution concept, making minimal
assumptions on players’ preferences and allowing for flexible wages between the institutions and
their matched agents. In Section 1.3, I focus on the canonical model for the matching market
of medical residents: I assume that wages are held at an exogenously fixed level, and impose
standard restrictions on preferences. Section 1.4 analyzes the flexible-wage model with general
preferences. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes. All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
1.2 Model and Solution Concept
1.2.1 Repeated Matching Market
Time is discrete. In every period t = 0,1,2 . . ., a new generation of agentsA ≡{a1, . . . ,aJ}
enter a matching market to match with the institutions I ≡ {I1, . . . , IK}. Institutions are long-
lived players that persist through time. Agents are short-lived, and remain in the market for only
one period.
Each institution Ik has a per-period hiring quota qk > 0, and Bernoulli utility function
uk : 2A → R over the sets of agents it matches with in every period, where 2A is the set of all
subsets of A . The utility of staying unmatched, uk( /0), is normalized to 0. Institutions’ preferences
are not assumed to satisfy the gross substitutes condition (see, for example, Kelso and Crawford
1982). Institutions share a common discount factor δ, and evaluate a sequence of flow utilities
(u1,u2, . . .) through discounting:
(1−δ)
∞
∑
t=0
δtut
Agents are allowed to care about not only the institution they are matched with, but also
their colleagues. Each agent a j has utility function v j :
(
I ×2Aa j
)∪{( /0, /0)}→ R over institutions
and colleagues, where 2Aa j is the set of subsets of A that contain a j, while ( /0, /0) represents staying
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unmatched. For every agent a j, v j( /0, /0) is normalized to 0.
Finally, I assume players have quasilinear utilities over money.
1.2.2 Stage-Game Matchings:
In this section, I introduce the static matching game that is played repeatedly in every
period. As a point of comparison for the dynamic solution concept, I then review what it means
for a matching to be stable in one-shot interactions.
In each period, a single institution can recruit multiple agents who are currently in the
market—institutions and agents are matched according to a static one-to-many matching. A
stage-game matching is described by a static assignment of players along with wage vectors from
institutions.
Definition 1.2.1. A static assignment φ is a mapping defined on the set I ∪A which satisfies for
all Ik ∈ I and a j ∈ A :
1. agents are either unmatched, or matched to institution and peers: φ(a j) ∈ (I × 2Aa j)∪
{( /0, /0)};
2. institutions are either unmatched, or matched to agents: φ(Ik) ∈ 2A and |φ(Ik)| ≤ qk; and
3. consistency requirements for the mapping φ: if a j ∈ φ(Ik) then φ(a j) = (Ik,φ(Ik)); if
φ(a j) = (Ik,A) then φ(Ik) = A.
Let Φ denote the set of all static assignments.
A wage vector ζk ∈ RJ from institution Ik describes the wages paid by institution to each
agent. Any non-zero wage payments can be made from an institution only to its employees.
Definition 1.2.2. A static matching is a pair m = (φ,{ζk}Kk=1), where φ is a static assignment,
and each ζk = [ζk j]Jj=1 is a vector of wages from institution Ik to agents. Together φ and {ζk}Kk=1
satisfy ζk j 6= 0 only if a j ∈ φ(Ik).
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I use M to denote the set of all static matchings.
Players’ preferences over static matchings are induced by their preferences over their
assigned partners and the payments. For m = (φ,{ζk}Kk=1), I write
uk(m) = uk(φ(Ik))− ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
ζk j,
and
v j(m) = v j(φ(a j))+ζk j
for all a j ∈ φ(Ik).
In canonical models of static matching markets, stability is defined in a symmetric way
for institutions and agents. For example, as in Gale and Shapley (1962) and Kelso and Crawford
(1982), the set of possible deviations consist of those that can be carried out by an institution, an
agent, or a coalition involving players from both sides of the market.
In my model, institutions are long-lived while agents are short-lived. Due to this inherent
asymmetry between two sides of the market, it is convenient to define stability in a way that
emphasizes the role played by institutions, which is still consistent with the canonical stability
notions.
Definition 1.2.3. A feasible deviation by institution Ik from static matching m = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1) is
a vector (A′k,ζ
′
k) where A
′
k is a set of agents that satisfies
∣∣A′k∣∣≤ qk, and ζ′k ∈RJ a vector of wages
from institution Ik. Together A′k and ζ
′
k satisfy:
1. institutions can make non-zero wage payments only to their employees: ζ′k j = 0 for all
a j /∈ A′k; and
2. a deviation is feasible only if all involved agents find it profitable: v j(Ik,A′k)+ζ
′
k j > v j(m)
for all a j ∈ A′k.
16
I use Dk(m) to denote the set of all feasible deviations from m by institution Ik.
A feasible deviation thus encodes both an institution’s ability to fire any subset of its
employees, as well as its ability to organize a blocking coalition with agents from the other side
of the market: such coalitions are available to Ik as long as every member of A′k finds it profitable.
A feasible deviation (A′k,ζ
′
k) is profitable for Ik if
uk(A′k)− ∑
a j∈A′k
ζ′k j > uk(m).
A player is said to be autarkic in the stage game if it is not matched to any other player.
The following definition of static stability extends that of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to the
current environment.
Definition 1.2.4. A static matching m = (φ,{ζk}Kk=1) is stable if
1. no agent prefers autarky: v j(m)≥ 0 for every a j ∈ A ; and
2. no institution has any profitable feasible deviation: if Ik has a feasible deviation (A′k,ζ
′
k)
from m, then (A′k,ζ
′
k) is not profitable for Ik.
Notice that this definition allows for peer effects. I use M∗ to denote the set of all static
stable matchings.
1.2.3 Matching Processes
I now turn to repeated matching markets, and introduce the dynamic counterparts for
the concepts reviewed in the previous section. In particular, a matching process is the dynamic
extension of a static matching; self-enforcing matching process replaces stable matching outcome
as the stability notion in this dynamic environment.
In a repeated matching market, a matching process specifies a proposed or anticipated
stage-game matching today based on the history of the market.
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At any time t = 0,1, . . ., a period t ex ante history records past realizations of the
public randomization device and the ensuing matching outcomes up to the beginning of period
t. Formally, let H 0 ≡ /0; for t > 0, the set of period t ex ante histories is H t ≡ (Ω×M)t , where
Ω is the state space of the arbitrary public randomization device. I use H ≡ ∪∞t=0H t to denote
the set of all possible ex ante histories. Ht ≡H t×Ω is the set of period t ex post histories, and
H ≡ H ×Ω the set of all ex post histories. Let H ∞ = (Ω×M)∞ be the set of outcome paths
of the game. For each h ∈H ∪H ∪H ∞, let ωt(h) and mt(h) denote the period t realization of
public randomization device and stage-game matching in h, respectively. For each ω̂ ∈Ω, I use
H (ω̂) ≡ {h ∈ H : ω0(h) = ω̂} to denote the set of ex post histories with ω̂ as the initial draw
from the public randomization device.
Definition 1.2.5. A matching process µ is a mapping µ :H → ∆(M).
Equivalently, making explicit the realization from the public randomization device, a matching
process is also a mapping µ :H →M.
In what follows, I will often write µ = (ψ,{ξk}Kk=1). ψ : H → Φ is an assignment
process, which maps an ex post history h to the static assignment in the stage-game matching
µ(h); for each institution Ik ∈ I , ξk is a wage plan ξk :H →RJ such that ξk(h) is the wage vector
from institution Ik in µ(h).
For an assignment process ψ, ex post history h, and institution Ik, I use ψ(Ik|h) to denote
the (possibly empty) set of agents matched to Ik in the static assignment ψ(h), and ψ(a j|h) for
the institution and peers matched to agent a j.
A matching process can capture various ways in which players coordinate their expecta-
tions. In markets like the NRMP, one can interpret a matching process as a matching protocol
that proposes a (lottery over) stage-game matchings in every period based on the market’s history.
In labor markets without an explicit coordination mechanism, a matching process represents a
shared understanding among players on how hiring outcomes in the past impact the market’s
future employment decisions.
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A matching process µ, together with the public randomization device, induces a probability
measure over H ∞. Institutions’ preferences over matching processes are induced from the
distribution over the sequences of stage-game matchings. That is, institutions evaluate matching
processes by
uk(µ)≡ EµH ∞
[
(1−δ)
∞
∑
t=0
δtuk(mt(h∞))
]
.
For every t ≥ 0, a matching process µ also induce a probability measure over the period t
ex post histories Ht . Let utk(µ)≡ EµHt
[
uk
(
µ(h)
)]
denote institution Ik’s expected payoff in period
t from the matching process µ. We have
uk(µ) =
∞
∑
t=0
δtutk(µ).
As long-lived players, in a repeated matching market, institutions can conceive a feasible
deviation plan from a matching process. A feasible deviation plan for an institution is a complete
contingent plan, which specifies a static feasible deviation for the same institution after every
possible history of the market.
Definition 1.2.6. A feasible deviation plan from the matching process µ = (ψ,{ξl}Kl=1) by
institution Ik is a vector (d′k,ξ
′
k). d
′
k : H → 2A is a mapping from ex post histories to sets of
agents, and ξ′k :H →RJ is a wage plan. Together d′k and ξ′k satisfy that (d′k(h),ξ′k(h)) is a feasible
deviation from µ(h) for Ik, at every ex post history h.
A feasible deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) from matching process µ = (ψ,{ξl}Kl=1) is a one-shot
deviation if there is a unique ex post history h˜ in the domain of (d′k,ξ
′
k), such that
d′k(h) = ψ(Ik|h) and ξ′k(h) = ξk(h) for all h ∈H \{h˜}.
I will refer to a one-shot deviation (d′k,ξ
′
k) by (d
′
k(h˜),ξ
′
k(h˜)).
Similar to Definition 1.2.3, the feasibility of a deviation plan encodes the constraint that
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participation in a coalitional deviation must be voluntary: for a coalitional deviation to be available
to institution Ik at history h, every participating agent must find the deviation profitable.
A feasible deviation plan can be thought of as an institution’s plan for how to manipulate
a matching process, in every possible contingency of the market. If the plan is carried out,
it generates, together with the matching process, a path of realized stage-game matchings.
Institutions evaluate a feasible deviation plan through the discounted sum of utilities collected
from this path of manipulated stage-game matchings.
A conceptual question needs to be resolved in order to determine an institution’s payoff
from a feasible deviation plan: if institution Ik were to commit a stage-game deviation (A′k,ζ
′
k)
when players anticipate the stage-game outcome to be matching m, what is the resulting stage-
game matching? Since the matching process adjusts future expectations based on past realized
matchings, without an answer to the question above, it will be impossible to determine how a
matching process responds to a deviation as history unfolds.
To this end, I assume that in a stage-game, if institution Ik were to commit a deviation,
other players do not further deviate, and remain matched according to m whenever possible.
Formally, given a static matching m = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1) and a feasible deviation (A′k,ζ′k) from m
by institution Ik, let [m,(Ik,A′k,ζ
′
k)] denote the manipulated matching. I make the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. Suppose m = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1). The static matching [m,(Ik,A′k,ζ′k)] = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1)
satisfies
1. φ(Ik) = A′k; φ(Il) = φ(Il)\A′k for all l 6= k; and φ(a) = ( /0, /0) for all a ∈ φ(Ik)\A′k.
2. ζk = ζ′k; ζl j = ζl j for l 6= k, a j ∈ φ(Il); and ζl j = 0 for l 6= k, a j /∈ φ(Il).
Most static matching models are silent about what happens in the wake of a deviation
because in one-shot interactions, the profitability of a deviation does not depend on how other
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players react.1
The only role Assumption 1 plays in my model is in establishing identification: any
deviation involving a single institution can be unequivocally attributed to the said institution. One
can adopt alternative assumptions on how other players may further deviate in the stage-game
upon seeing an initial deviation. As long as players understand which institution was involved in
the initial deviation, all results in this paper remain unaffected.
I now define the manipulated matching process resulting from a feasible deviation plan,
as well as the profitability of a feasible deviation plan.
Definition 1.2.7. Given a matching process µ and a feasible deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) by institution
Ik, the manipulated matching process [µ,(Ik,d′k,ξ
′
k)] :H →M is a matching process defined by
[µ,(Ik,d′k,ξ
′
k)](h) = [µ(h),(Ik,d
′
k(h),ξ
′
k(h))] ∀h ∈H
A feasible deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) is profitable for institution Ik if uk([µ,(Ik,d
′
k,ξ
′
k)])> uk(µ).
To state what it means for a matching process to be self-enforcing, it is convenient to
define the continuation of a matching process and a deviation plan, at both ex ante and ex post
histories.
Definition 1.2.8. Fix a matching process µ. At ex ante history ĥ∈H , the continuation matching
process µ|ĥ :H →M is defined by
µ|ĥ(h) = µ(ĥ,h) for all h ∈H ;
At ex post history h˜ = ĥ× ω̂ ∈H , the continuation matching process µ|h˜ :H (ω̂)→M is defined
1There are a few exceptions in the literature on matching with externailities, where the utility from a deviation
depends on how other players are matched. In these static models, the reactions of other player are often built
implicitly into the players’ choice functions. See, for example, Sasaki and Toda (1996), Bando (2012), Pycia and
Yenmez (2017).
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by
µ|h˜(h) = µ(ĥ,h) for all h ∈H (ω̂);
The continuation of a feasible deviation plan is defined analogously.
Definition 1.2.9. Fix a feasible deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k). At ex ante history ĥ∈H , the continuation
deviation plan (d′k|h,ξ′k|h) :H → 2A ×RJ is defined by
d′k|h(h) = d′k(h,h) and ξ′k|h(h) = ξ′k(h,h) for all h ∈H .
At ex post history h˜ = ĥ× ω̂ ∈H , the continuation deviation plan (d′k|h˜,ξ′k|h˜) :H (ω̂)→ 2A ×RJ
is defined by
d′k|h˜(h) = d′k(ĥ,h) and ξ′k|h˜(h) = ξ′k(ĥ,h) for all h ∈H (ω̂).
At an ex post history, the continuations of a matching process and a deviation plan have
to follow the most recent realization from the public randomization device, which imposes the
restriction on their domains. To reduce the notational burden, however, I will suppress this
dependence on the realization of ω whenever it causes no confusion.
As the dynamic counterpart to static stable matching, a self-enforcing matching process
represents players’ self-fulfilling expectations over how the repeated matching market evolves.
Such expectations must be robust against both individuals and coalitional deviations.
Definition 1.2.10. A matching process µ :H →M is self-enforcing if at every ex post history h,
1. no agent prefers autarky: v j(µ(h))≥ 0 for every a j ∈ A ; and
2. no institution has any profitable feasible deviation plan from the continuation matching
process µ|h.
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The lack of profitable deviation is imposed on the continuation matching processes after
every possible ex post history: this essentially imposes the same sequential rationality requirement
that subgame perfection does in a non-cooperative environment.
1.3 Markets with Fixed Wages
In this section, I first specialize the general environment introduced in Section 1.2 to
markets where wages are fixed. This case is considered in Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth and
Sotomayor (1992), and is the canonical environment to study the NRMP. I characterize the set of
self-enforcing assignment processes in this environment, and discuss how these results provide
insights and caveats on using dynamic enforcement to redistribute medical residents.
1.3.1 Model
In the fixed-wage model, players’ utilities are determined by the identity of their match:
there are no flexible transfers that adjust matching payoffs. Institutions’s preferences over agents
satisfy the gross substitutes condition. In addition, agents are indifferent about which other agents
are matched to the same institution. Finally, all players’ preferences in the stage-game are strict.
Market: Formally, in a fixed-wage environment, a stage-game matching m= (φ,{ζk}Kk=1)
must satisfy ζk = 0 for all 1≤ k ≤ K, where 0 ∈ RJ is the zero wage vector. This is without loss
of generality, as the fixed wages’s impacts can be incorporated into the functions uk(.) and v j(.).
I will suppress the redundant wage vectors—instead of stage-game matchings, I will focus on
stage-game assignments in this section.
Instead of matching processes, it is without loss to focus on assignment processes
ψ : H
F → ∆(Φ), where H F ≡ ∪∞t=0(Ω×Φ)t is the set of ex ante histories under fixed-wage
environment. The set of ex post histories, H F , and outcome paths, H
F
∞, are also modified
accordingly to reflect the restriction on wages.
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In the matching market for medical residents, an assignment process represents a matching
program that can suggest different future assignments based on past history. For example, the
matching program can exclude certain hospitals from the matching program in response to a past
violation, which is equivalent to suggesting an assignment that leaves these hospitals unmatched.
The wage offer in any feasible deviation (A′l,ζ
′
l) must also be held at ζ
′
l = 0. I will also
suppress the wage offer here and use DAk (φ) to denote the subsets of agents that, combined with a
zero wage offer, constitute a feasible deviation from the assignment φ:
DAk (φ)≡ {B⊆ A : (B,0k) ∈ Dk(φ,{0l}Kl=1)}
where 0l ∈RJ is the zero wage vector for all 1≤ l ≤ K. A feasible deviation plan (d′k,ζ′k) reduces
to the mapping d′k :H
F → 2A .
Preferences: For each institution Ik, the utility from matched agents, uk : 2A →R is strict:
uk(.) satisfies uk(A) 6= uk(A′) for different sets of agents A 6= A′. The gross substitutes condition,
when specialized to the fixed-wage environment, requires that for all A⊆ A and all a j,a j′ ∈ A ,
a j ∈ argmax
B⊆A∪{a j,a j′},|B|≤qk
uk(B) ⇒ a j ∈ argmax
B⊆A∪{a j},|B|≤qk
uk(B)
For each agent a j, the utility function v j : I → R is only a function of his matched
institution, and satisfies v j(I) 6= v j(I′) for all I 6= I′ ∈ I . Without concerns for peer effects, there
is no need to keep track of agents’ peers when describing an assignment: instead of writing
φ(a j) ∈ I ×2Aa j , I use φ(a j) ∈ I to denote agent a j’s matched institution.
1.3.2 The Scope of Dynamic Enforcement
In this section, I explore the possibility of using assignment processes to redistribute
medical residents to rural hospitals. Before stating the main results, it is well known that static
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stable assignment exists when institutions’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition and
agents’ preferences are absent of peer effects (see, for example, Roth and Sotomayor (1992),
Theorem 6.5). The following result guarantees the existence of self-enforcing assignment process
for any patience level, since the infinite repetition of a static stable matching is a self-enforcing.
Lemma 1. When institutions’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition and agents do
not care about peer effects, self-enforcing assignment processes exist for every discount factor
0≤ δ< 1.
I first define the “top coalition sequence” in the matching market. Fix an arbitrary subset
of institutions and agents I ′∪A ′ ⊆ I ∪A . An institution Ik ∈ I ′ and a set of agents Âk ⊆ A ′ form
a top coalition of I ′∪A ′ if
uk(Âk)≥ uk(B) for all B⊆ A ′ and v j(Ik)≥ v j(I) for all I ∈ I ′.
Players in a top coalition find each other to be the most desirable match, given that I ′∪A ′
are the potential pool of players to be matched with. A top coalition sequence generalizes this
notion by iteratively finding and eliminating top coalitions in the remaining players, until no new
top coalition can be found.
Definition 1.3.1. 2 The top coalition sequence is the ordered set T = {(Ikg , Âkg)}Gg=1 produced
by the following algorithm:
1. Set g = 0 and T0 = /0;
2. For g≥ 1:
• If (I ∪A)\Tg−1 has a top coalition (Ikg, Âkg): set Tg = Tg−1 ∪{(Ikg , Âkg)} and g =
g+1. If there are multiple top coalitions, break ties in favor of the institution with the
smallest index;
2Whenever it causes no confusion, I will use T and Tg to denote the (I,A) pairs or the set of players that are
contained therein without distinction.
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• If (I ∪A)\Tg−1 has no top coalition: set T = Tg−1 and stop;
For each top coalition (I,A) in T , I will refer to I and A as each other’s top coalition partners.
I use ΦT to denote the set of static assignments that assign players in T to their top
coalition partners, and are individually rational for all the agents:
ΦT = {φ ∈Φ : φ(Ik) = Âk ∀Ik ∈ T , and v j(φ)≥ 0 ∀a j ∈ A}
All static stable assignments must be contained in ΦT . In particular, in a static stable
assignment, players in the top coalition sequence must be matched to their top coalition partners.
Lemma 2. If φ is a static stable assignment, then φ ∈ΦT .
Let κ(I\T )≡{k : Ik ∈ I\T } denote the indices for the institutions not in the top coalition
sequence. For every k ∈ κ(I\T ), the fixed-wage minmax payoff, uTk , captures the institution’s
participation constraint, and is defined as
uTk = minφ∈ΦT
max
B∈DAk (φ)
uk(B).
Theorem 1. For every 0≤ δ< 1 and in every self-enforcing assignment process ψ:
1. regardless of history, players in the top coalition sequence must be matched with their top
coalition partners; all agents must obtain at least their autarkic payoffs:
ψ(h) ∈ΦT ∀h ∈H F ;
2. all institutions must obtain at least their fixed-wage minmax payoffs:
uk(ψ)≥ uTk ∀Ik ∈ I\T .
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Together with Lemma 2, Theorem 1 implies that in the matching market for medical
residents, a history-dependent matching program can never alter the assignments for T beyond
what is static stable. In addition, the worst possible continuation value for each hospital cannot be
lower than uTk .
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is that in a top coalition sequence T = {(Ikg , Âkg)}Gg=1,
Ik1’s favorite agents Âk1 is always a feasible deviation, so there is no credible way to vary Ik1’s
continuation value. As the result, Ik1 must always behave in the myopically optimal way— being
matched to Âk1 . By induction, the only credible way to vary Ikg’s continuation value is to match
agents in Âkg to institutions in {Iki}i≤g−1. This is impossible because {Iki}i≤g−1 must always be
matched to their own top coalition partners. Accordingly, Ikg must always be matched to Âkg . For
the second half of the theorem, since players have to be matched according to some assignment in
ΦT , every Ik ∈ I\T can ensure a long-run payoff of uTk by blocking with a coalition of feasible
agents in every period.
When all agents share a common ranking over institutions, every player is in the top
coalition sequence. In particular, if medical residents’ preferences over hospitals are highly
homogenous, it is impossible to enforce any assignment than the (unique) static stable assignment—
history dependent matching programs offer no room for improvement compared to static ones.
Corollary 1. When agents share a common ranking over institutions, there is a unique self-
enforcing assignment process, where players match according to the unique static stable assign-
ment at every ex post history of the market.
Theorem 2 complements Theorem 1, and shows that with patient hospitals, if a random-
ization over assignments in ΦT gives hospitals in I\T payoffs higher than uTk , then it can be
supported as the time-invariant outcome of a self-enforcing assignment process.
Define Λ∗ ≡ {λ ∈ ∆(ΦT ) : Eλ[uk(φ)]> uTk ∀k ∈ κ(I\T )}.
Theorem 2. For every λ ∈ Λ∗, there is a δ such that for every δ ∈ (δ,1), there exists a self-
enforcing assignment process that randomizes over stage-game assignments according to λ in
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every period.
The proof for Theorem 2 adapts the “Folk Theorem” equilibrium construction from
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994). To see the connection,
note that the condition Eλ[uk(φ)] > uTk ∀k ∈ κ(I\T ) in the definition of Λ∗ ensures that the
equilibrium payoffs for all players in I\T are above their respective minmax levels. I then
construct a matching process by varying continuation play within ΦT , and using the analogues
for “player-specific punishments” and “minmax punishment” in the matching environment.
To wrap up, the findings in this section suggest that in repeated matching markets,
history dependence can substantially expand the set of feasible allocations. However, the scope
of dynamic enforcement is tempered by the presence of top coalition sequence. As a result,
caution should be exercised when a dynamic matching program attempts to enforce outcomes
beyond those that are static stable—this is especially relevant when there are reasons to suspect
homogeneity in agents preferences.
1.4 Markets with Flexible Wages
In this section, I return to the model introduced in Section 1.2: wages can be flexibly
adjusted; in addition, I allow institutions to have complementary preferences over agents, and
agents to have non-trivial preferences over colleagues.
Let χ(Ik,A) denote the total surplus Ik can extract from matching with agents A. That is,
χ(Ik,A)≡ uk(A)+ ∑
a j∈A
v j(Ik,A).
In particular, this leaves every agent in A with 0 payoff. Use Q≡∑ll∈I ql to denote all institutions’
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combined hiring capacity. For Ik,
pik ≡ min{A⊆A :|A|≤Q} maxB⊆A\A
χ(Ik,B)
is the most severe punishment that can be imposed on Ik, in a bidding war for employees, by
I\{Ik} and Ik’s employees.
To understand the definition of pik, notice that in a bidding war for employees, I\{Ik}
can conspire to bid away a total of (Q−qk) agents from Ik; meanwhile, Ik itself is matched to qk
agents, all of whom are employed at premium wages. If Ik were to rejects such an arrangement,
its best alternative is to abandon the current employees, and hire from outside of the combined Q
agents. The minmax operator in pik captures Ik’s best response to the most effective punishment.
Define
M◦ ≡ {m ∈M : v j(m)≥ v j( /0, /0) ∀a j ∈ A}.
Matchings in M◦ ensure that no players in A have static incentive to deviate. Define
Λ◦ ≡ {λ ∈ ∆(M◦) : Eλ[uk(m)]> pik ∀Ik, supp(λ) is bounded}.
Λ◦ is the set of lotteries over M◦ with bounded support, which gives each institution an expected
payoff higher than its punishment payoff pik.
As Theorem 3 demonstrates, the sets M◦ and Λ◦ provide a tight characterization for
the set of self-enforcing matching processes: every element in Λ◦ can be sustained as the
stationary outcome in a self-enforcing matching process with patient institutions; on the other
hand, matchings in M◦ are the only ones that can be played in any self-enforcing matching process
for any patience level.
Theorem 3. For every λ ∈ Λ◦, there is a δ such that for every δ ∈ (δ,1), there exists a self-
enforcing matching process that randomizes over stage-game matchings according to λ in every
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period.
For every 0≤ δ< 1 and in every self-enforcing matching process µ, institutions are no
worse off than when targeted in a bidding war:
uk(µ)≥ pik ∀Ik.
The proof for Theorem 3 adapts the techniques in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and
Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994): note that the condition Eλ[uk(m)]> pik ∀Ik in the definition of
Λ◦ ensures that the equilibrium payoffs for all institutions are above their respective minmax
levels.
Theorem 4. The sets M◦ and Λ◦ are non-empty.
Theorem 4 is proved by considering a Random Serial Dictatorship among institutions: let
institutions randomize over priorities, then take turns to extract full surplus from their favorite
agents according to the realized priority. The remainder of the proof is to show that in expectation,
the Random Serial Dictatorship gives every Ik a payoff higher than pik.
Together with Theorem 3, Theorem 4 delivers the existence result.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper considers stability in two-sided matching markets, where one side is long-lived
and the other is short-lived. The analysis builds on elements from both the matching literature
and the repeated games literature. In the fixed-wage environment, some players can be motivated
through intertemporal tradeoffs, while others are immune to dynamic enforcement. These
results have normative implications for the design of matching programs. In the flexible-wage
environment, the results show that dynamic incentives constitute a new channel for sustaining
stability even if static stable matchings fails to exist.
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The current paper provides a framework for understanding history dependence in repeated
matching markets, but much remains unanswered about these environments. For future work,
more study is merited in order to better understand matching processes under fixed patience
levels, or when players may have a restricted class of preferences that reflect the specific matching
environment being analyzed. Another important avenue for future research is the communication
of private information in matching processes. In static environments, the deferred acceptance
algorithm is strategy-proof for one side of the market. In repeated matching markets, if a matching
algorithm goes beyond proposing static stable outcomes, it remains an open question whether
such algorithms can still be made strategy-proof, or have to rely on weaker incentive-compatibility
conditions. I hope to address these questions in future research.
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Chapter 2
Costly Information Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
Acquiring information is an integral part of decisions under uncertainty. Most existing
research on costly information acquisition studies costs that are additively separable from the
expected payoff. This assumes the cost incurred acquiring information is independent of expected
payoff. One can interpret these preferences as an individual having a fixed production technology
to acquire information. However, the cost structures of information acquisition can be more
complicated.
For example, there may be significant costs incurred from the time delay waiting for
information to arrive. Consider when an oil company is deciding between locations to drill for
oil. To acquire information, in addition to the monetary expenses to finance geological surveys,
there are also significant costs incurred from delayed realization of profits. Suppose the payoff
from drilling at a site for each state of the world is given by a net-present-value from the time
drilling begins. If the oil sites have a higher net-present-value, then this translates into higher
costs incurred through discounting. Importantly, costs from time delay now interact with the
expected payoff.
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In this paper, we study a general model of costly information acquisition that allows for
interactions between the information cost and the expected payoff from the decision problem.
Apart from the standard assumptions of expected utility maximization and Bayesian updating,
the only additional assumption of the model is that the decision maker prefers higher expected
payoffs. As special cases of the model, we characterize a representation with multiplicative costs
of information and a representation with a constrained information set.
2.1.1 Why does this matter?
The paper of Caplin and Dean (2015) investigates the particular case of the model studied
here, in which costs are additive. Our model should be viewed as a direct generalization of this
contribution. This being said, the work is motivated by classical economic environments. There
are several standard economic frameworks in which we would not expect costs to be additive.
The multiplicative cost model is a particularly interesting case. There are several standard
economic environments in which we would expect costs to arise multiplicatively, rather than
additively. Let us state three particularly compelling environments:
1. The cost associated with the acquired information may be ascribed directly to a time delay.
In standard models of discounting, delay enters payoffs multiplicatively. Thus, in a model
where different information arises with different delays, we would expect the behavior
under consideration to approximately match the the multiplicative model.
2. The cost associated with the acquired information may accrue because of some probability
of an absolute breakdown. For example, eliciting the information may involve some type
of illegal activity; if the acquirer is caught, she gets nothing. In this case, the probability of
not being caught enters multiplicatively into a (risk-neutral) individual’s utility.
3. A more straightforward example involves the individual directly contracting with an outside
provider of information, who insists on a profit-sharing agreement with the individual,
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where the share of profits asked for can depend on the information sold. In such a setup,
costs obviously enter multiplicatively.
More broadly, the class of nonseparable costly information acquisition models nest
behavior generated when there are potentially multiple components of the cost of information
acquisition. For example, the decision maker may incur both an additively separable cost to access
an information structure, as well as a discounting cost from time delay.1 Caplin and Dean (2015)
provide a revealed preference test for costly information acquisition when costs are additively
separable. When there is only a cost from discounting, we show that behavior is characterized by
a condition basically derived from the Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference (See Varian
(1983a)).
2.1.2 Methods and related literature
We take a revealed preference approach that builds on the recent contribution of Caplin
and Dean (2015). In particular, the model considers a decision maker facing actions with
state-contingent payoffs. The decision maker chooses an information structure and makes
stochastic choices conditioning on the signal received from the information structure. Using state
dependent stochastic choices, there is a natural revealed information structure that facilitates the
analysis. Our main result characterizes the general model of costly information acquisition with
an axiom on expected payoffs that resembles the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference2.
To emphasize the potential interaction between expected utility and cost, we refer to such model
as a nonseparable costly information acquisition model.
Our results generalize the No Improving Attention Cycles condition of Caplin and Dean
(2015) in the same way that the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference generalizes the cyclic
monotonicity condition of Rockafellar (1966) or the condition of Koopmans and Beckmann
1The exact content of this particular example remains unknown.
2See Houthakker (1950), Richter (1966), Varian (1982), and Chambers and Echenique (2016).
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(1957). 3 Importantly cyclic monotonicity is equivalent to rationalization via a quasi-linear
utility function, which imposes cardinal restrictions on consumption data. Thus, Caplin and Dean
(2015) reflects a type of cardinal model, while the model here is ordinal. Using the intuition
from the consumer problem, we show that data consistent with nonseparable costly information
preferences can be taken to satisfy quasiconcavity and weak Blackwell monotonicity without loss
of generality.
The characterizations here exploit results and intuition from classical consumer theory.
An experiment, or signal, is a probability distribution over posteriors (as in Blackwell (1953)).
Mathematically, up to a normalization, probability measures and normalized price vectors can
be viewed as the same object. In the consumer setting, expenditure is computed as the inner-
product of price and quantity demanded. Similarly, the ex-ante payoff from the experiment can
be computed as the inner-product of the information structure and posterior value function. Thus,
the ex-ante payoff can be treated as wealth.
The similarity between standard consumer theory and costly information acquisition
extends beyond the correspondence of primitives. The nonseparable model of costly information
acquisition is defined as a preference that is increasing in ex-ante payoff and depends on the
information structure. Using the relation above, one notes the similarity to the indirect utility
function that is increasing in wealth and depends on prices. In standard consumer theory, the
direct utility of a consumption bundle is obtained from indirect utility through minimization
over price vectors. The setting of costly information differs since the direct utility of a decision
problem is defined through maximization over information structures. While the optimization
principle differs, the same underlying duality holds which leads to the characterization by a
condition resembling the General Axiom of Revealed Preference.
While we have highlighted the similarity to standard consumer theory, there are some
technical differences. Most importantly, the information structures and posterior value functions
3See also Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) and Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016) for variants of this condition
in an explicit revealed preference framework.
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are objects in infinite dimensional vector spaces. Thus, our proofs utilize the general results
on quasi-concave duality that have been fruitfully studied by Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) and
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011a, 2011b). However, once one makes this connection the results follow
by leveraging existing revealed preference and duality techniques. As such, the paper also serves
as a didactic exercise.
This paper is related to other works on costly information acquisition and boundedly
rational behavior. Costly information acquisition has received study from a revealed preference
perspective in Caplin and Martin (2015) and Caplin and Dean (2015). Boundedly rational behavior
has been studied with revealed preference conditions in Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015),
and Allen and Rehbeck (2016).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the notation and some useful facts.
Section 2.3.1 introduces and characterizes the nonseparable costly information acquisition model.
Section 2.3.3 presents a variant of the model whereby choice of information structure is costless,
but is constrained to lie in some unknown set. Section 2.3.2 presents a model with a multiplicative
cost of information acquisition. Section 2.4 relates the conditions to those in Caplin and Dean
(2015), provides examples of behavior allowed by the various models, provides guidance on out
of sample prediction, and discusses some limitations. Finally, Section 2.6 contains our concluding
remarks. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Notation
We study a decision maker facing actions with state-contingent payoffs.4 Notation is
consistent with Caplin and Dean (2015) whenever possible for ease of comparison. We study
a variety of models that are increasing in ex-ante payoff and satisfy Bayes’ law. A decision
4The ideas discussed here are broader if one considers general mappings over posteriors.
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maker chooses actions whose outcome depends on a finite number of states of the world. Let
Ω denote a finite set of states. Let X denote a set of outcomes. Therefore, the set of all actions
(state-contingent outcomes) is XΩ.
The set of all finite decision problems is given by A = {A⊂ XΩ | |A|< ∞}. As in Caplin
and Dean (2015) we investigate the situation in which a researcher has a state dependent stochastic
choice dataset from decision problems in A . For A ∈ A , ∆(A) refers to the set of probability
distributions over actions in A.
Definition 2.2.1. A state dependent stochastic choice dataset is a finite collection of decision
problems D ⊂ A and a related set of state dependent stochastic choice functions P = {PA}A∈D
where PA : Ω→ ∆(A). Denote the probability of choosing an action a conditional on state ω in
decision problem A as PA(a | ω).
We assume that the prior beliefs of the decision maker µ∈Γ=∆(Ω) are known. Moreover,
we assume that the utility index u : X → R is a known function.
The following example illustrates the notations and primitives of the model. Throughout
the paper, we will build on this example in order to illustrate the different testable implications
for various models of costly information acquisition.
Example 1. The set of states is Ω= {ω1,ω2}, and the prior is given by µ =
(1
2 ,
1
2
)
. There are
two menus A = {a,b} and A′ = {a′,b′}. Let the utilities from actions in menu A and A′ take the
following values:
u(a(ω)) =

0 if ω= ω1
2 if ω= ω2
u(b(ω)) =

2 if ω= ω1
0 if ω= ω2
u(a′(ω)) =

0 if ω= ω1
10 if ω= ω2
u(b′(ω)) =

10 if ω= ω1
0 if ω= ω2
.
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The choice probabilities are given by
PA(a | ω1) = 210 PA(a | ω2) =
8
10
PA′(a
′ | ω1) = 310 PA′(a
′ | ω2) = 710
where the choice of b and b′ are given by the complementary probabilities.
We take an abstract approach to modeling the choice of an information structure. Each
subjective signal is identified with its associated posterior beliefs γ ∈ Γ. Thus, an information
structure is given by a finite support distribution over Γ that satisfies Bayes’ law.
Definition 2.2.2. The set of information structures, Π, comprises all Borel probability distri-
butions over Γ, pi ∈ ∆(Γ), that have finite support and satisfy Bayes’ law. A distribution over
posteriors satisfies Bayes’ law if the distribution over posteriors is a mean-preserving spread of
the prior µ denoted as
Epi[γ] = ∑
γ∈Supp(pi)
γpi(γ) = µ
where pi(γ) = Pr(γ | pi) = ∑ω∈Ω µ(ω)pi(γ | ω). 5
We now provide definitions necessary to discuss the ex-ante payoff. The ex-ante payoff
is the utility an individual expects to receive for a given information structure. Given a utility
index, each decision problem A ∈ A induces a posterior value function, fA : Γ→ R, which maps
posterior beliefs γ to the maximal utility possible from A under posterior γ. Formally, for any
decision problem A and posterior belief γ
fA(γ) = max
a∈A ∑ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω)).
5A similar notion of Bayesian plausibility is commonly used in the Bayesian persuasion literature. See, for
example, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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Definition 2.2.3. We denote the ex-ante payoff induced by an information structure pi ∈Π as
pi · fA = ∑
γ∈Supp(pi)
pi(γ) fA(γ)
where pi(γ) = Pr(γ | pi) = ∑ω∈Ω µ(ω)pi(γ | ω).
This inner-product representation of ex-ante payoff is intuitive since fA is a continuous
function on Γ and the set of continuous functions on Γ is topologically dual to the set of countably
additive Borel measures on Γ (Aliprantis and Border (2006), Theorem 14.15).
2.2.2 Revealed Information Structures
While we present several models of costly information acquisition, the analysis relies
on the recovery of a revealed information structure from the state dependent stochastic choice
data. Using the procedure from Caplin and Dean (2015), we associate each chosen action to a
subjective information state. The revealed information structure may not be identical to the true
information structure. However, the revealed information structure is a garbling (as defined in
Blackwell (1953)) of the true information structure. The relationship between the true information
structures and revealed information structures allows us to order the information structures and
deduce conditions on revealed information. Without further delay, we define revealed posteriors
and revealed information structures.
Definition 2.2.4. Given µ ∈ Γ , A ∈D , PA ∈ P , and a ∈ Supp(PA), the revealed posterior γ¯aA ∈ Γ
is defined as
γ¯aA(ω) = Pr(ω | a is chosen from A)
=
µ(ω)PA(a | ω)
∑ν∈Ω µ(ν)PA(a | ν)
.
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Definition 2.2.5. Given µ ∈ Γ , A ∈D , and PA ∈ P , the revealed information structure p¯iA ∈Π is
defined by
p¯iA(γ | ω) = ∑
{a∈Supp(PA)|γ¯aA=γ}
PA(a | ω)
and induces a revealed distribution on posteriors p¯iA such that
p¯iA(γ) = ∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)p¯iA(γ | ω).
The revealed information structure for decision problem A is a finite probability measure
over the revealed posteriors.
Example 1 (Continued). The choices in Example 1 generate the following revealed posteriors
γ¯aA =
(
2
10
,
8
10
)
; γ¯bA =
(
8
10
,
2
10
)
γ¯a
′
A′ =
(
3
10
,
7
10
)
; γ¯b
′
A′ =
(
7
10
,
3
10
)
.
Each revealed posterior has the same probability of occurring so that
p¯iA(γ¯aA) = p¯i(γ¯
b
A) = p¯i(γ¯
a′
A′) = p¯i(γ¯
b′
A′) =
1
2
.
The optimal decision rules for these posteriors give
fA(γ¯aA) = fA(γ¯
b
A) = 1.6 ; fA(γ¯
a′
A′) = fA(γ¯
b′
A′) = 1.4
fA′(γ¯a
′
A′) = fA′(γ¯
b′
A′) = 7 ; fA′(γ¯
a
A) = fA′(γ¯
b
A) = 8
As mentioned before, we use the notion of garbling to partially order information struc-
tures.
Definition 2.2.6. The information structure pi ∈ Π (with posteriors γ j) is a garbling of ρ ∈ Π
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(with posteriors ηi) if there exists a |Supp(ρ)|× |Supp(pi)| matrix B with non-negative entries
such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |Supp(ρ)|} we have ∑γ j∈Supp(pi) bi, j = 1 and for all γ j ∈ Supp(pi) and
ω ∈Ω that
pi(γ j | ω) = ∑
ηi∈Supp(ρ)
bi, jρ(ηi | ω).
In other words, pi a garbling of ρ if there is a stochastic matrix B that can be applied to ρ
that yields pi. We present two important properties about garblings that we use extensively in the
analysis.
Lastly, an information structure pi is consistent with stochastic choice function PA, if PA
can be generated by the decision maker making optimal choice under information structure pi.
Definition 2.2.7. For pi ∈Π and PA ∈ P , we say pi is consistent with PA if there exists a choice
function CA : Supp(pi)→ ∆(A) such that for all γ ∈ Supp(pi),
CA(a | γ)> 0 ⇒ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) for all b ∈ A
and for all ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A
PA(a | ω) = ∑
γ∈Supp(pi)
pi(γ | ω)CA(a | γ).
The next three intermediate results regarding revealed information structures will be used
extensively in the analysis.
Lemma 3. If pi is consistent with PA, then p¯iA is a garbling of pi.
Lemma 3 is proved in Caplin and Dean (2015). The lemma says that if an information
structure is consistent with the state dependent stochastic choice dataset, then the revealed
information structure is a garbling.
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Lemma 4. Given a decision problem A ∈ A and pi,ρ ∈Π with pi a garbling of ρ, then
ρ · fA ≥ pi · fA.
Lemma 4 follows straightforwardly from Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell 1953). Black-
well’s theorem establishes the notion that some information structures are “more valuable” than
others. In particular, if pi is a garbling of ρ, then ρ yields weakly higher ex-ante payoff in any
decision problem.
Lemma 5. For all decision problems A,B ∈D if piA is an information structure consistent with
choice data PA, then fB ·piA ≥ fB · p¯iA and fA ·piA = fA · p¯iA
Lemma 5 follows since the two information structures piA and p¯iA induce the same state
dependent choices, so their ex ante payoffs should be identical.
2.3 Characterizing Costly Information Models
In this section, we introduce three models of costly information acquisition. The non-
separable information cost model is the most general: it assumes only that the decision maker
prefers higher expected payoffs from choices, and that more informative signals are more costly.
Both the multiplicative cost model and the constrained information model are special cases of the
nonseparable model.
2.3.1 Nonseparable Information Cost
We place minimal restrictions on a decision maker’s preferences on information structures.
The only condition we impose is that preferences are monotone increasing in ex-ante payoff.
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Definition 2.3.1. Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R, a state dependent stochastic choice dataset (D,P )
has a nonseparable costly information representation if there exists a function V : R×Π→
R∪{−∞}, information structures {piA}A∈D , and choice functions {CA}A∈D such that:
1. Monotonicity: For all pi ∈Π and for all t,s ∈ R, if t < s and V (t,pi)>−∞, then V (t,pi)<
V (s,pi).
2. Non-triviality: For all t ∈ R, there exists pit ∈Π such that V (t,pit)>−∞.
3. Information is optimal: For all A ∈D , piA ∈ argmaxpi∈ΠV (pi · fA,pi) .
4. Choices are optimal: For all A ∈D , the choice function CA : Supp(piA)→ ∆(A) is such that
given a ∈ A and γ ∈ Supp(piA) with CA(a | γ) = PrA(a | γ)> 0, then
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) for all b ∈ A.
5. The data are matched: For all A ∈D , given ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A,
PA(a | ω) = ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ).
The above definition is a large class of preferences. However, it allows for the presence
of unknown discounting and additively separable information costs. We give some examples of
functions nested in this class below.
Example 2. We give a special case of V that allows for both unknown discounting from acquiring
information and unknown additively separable costs. Consider when the function V takes the
form
V (pi · fA,pi) = δ(pi)(pi · fA)−K(pi)
where δ(pi) ∈ [0,1] gives the fraction of expected utility lost from discounting and K(pi) specifies
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the cost of accessing the information. We note the similarity to the polar form from Gorman
(1953) which has been characterized using revealed preference by Cherchye et al. (2016).
Example 3. We consider the special case of a non-separable costly information acquisition given
by
V (pi · fA,pi) =Φ(pi · fA)−K(pi)
where Φ : R→ R is an increasing transformation of the expected utility and K(pi) is the cost of
accessing information. This example takes the utils from expected utility and transforms them to
the same units as the cost function. While this is cosmetically similar to the model by Caplin and
Dean (2015), the characterization there does not apply.
Example 4. A transformation of utils from expected utility may also be pertinent in the presence
of discounting. This is represented as
V (pi · fA,pi) = δ(pi)Φ(pi · fA)−K(pi)
where Φ : R→ R is an increasing transformation of the expected utility, δ(pi) ∈ [0,1] gives the
fraction of utils lost from acquiring information, and K(pi) is the cost of accessing information.
We now define the properties that completely characterize the model. The first condition
is similar to the generalized axiom or revealed preference.
Condition 1 (Generalized Axiom of Costly Information (GACI)). We say the dataset (D,P )
satisfies GACI if for all sequences (p¯iA1, fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) with Ai ∈ D for which p¯iAi · fAi ≤
p¯iAi · fAi+1 for all i (with addition modulo k), then equality holds throughout.
Comparing this condition to GARP, we see that the p¯i play a role similar to prices and the
f terms play a role similar to consumption bundles albeit with the inequality reversed. The GACI
condition rules out the possibility of cycles in ex-ante payoff across different decision problems.
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Using this condition, we invoke a version of Afriat’s theorem (see Chambers and Echenique
(2016)).
Lemma 6 (Afriat’s Theorem). Let D be finite. For all (A,B) ∈D2, let αA,B ∈R. If for all A ∈D
one has αA,A = 0 and for any sequence A1,A2, . . . ,Ak ∈D with αAi,Ai+1 ≤ 0 (with addition mod
k) for all i it follows that αAi,Ai+1 = 0 for all i, then there exist numbers UA and λA > 0 such that
for all (A,B) ∈D2, UA ≤UB+λBαB,A.
The other condition that characterizes the nonseparable costly information representation
is the no improving action switches (NIAS) condition. This condition was first examined in the
study of Bayesian decision makers in Caplin and Martin (2015).
Condition 2 (No Improving Action Switches (NIAS)). Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R, a dataset
(D,P ) satisfies NIAS if, for every A ∈D , a ∈ Supp(PA), and b ∈ A,
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)PA(a | ω)(u(a(ω))−u(b(ω)))≥ 0
As we show in Theorem 5 below, the combination of GACI and NIAS completely
characterizes the model of nonseparable costly information acquisition; moreover, one can impose
additional properties on the nonseparable costly information representation. These conditions are
monotonicity, quasiconcavity, and a normalization property on the function V (·, ·).
Condition 3. The function V : R×Π→ R∪{−∞} satisfies weak monotonicity in information if
for any t ∈ R and pi,ρ ∈Π with pi a garbling of ρ, then
V (t,ρ)≤V (t,pi).
The monotonicity condition says that if one adds noise to a signal ρ, then the noisier signal
is cheaper. This is one definition of monotonicity and it agrees with the notion of informativeness
introduced in Blackwell (1953).
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Condition 4. The function V : R×Π→ R∪{−∞} is quasiconcave if for any (t1,pi1),(t2,pi2) ∈
R×Π and λ ∈ [0,1],
V (λt1+(1−λ)t2,λpi1+(1−λ)pi2)≥min{V (t1,pi1),V (t2,pi2)}.
This condition says if there is a mixture between two ex-ante payoffs and information
structures, then the utility of the mixture is weakly higher than the worst case of the two environ-
ments. In particular, this implies quasiconcavity in information structures if one sets t1 = pi1 · f
and t2 = pi2 · f .
Condition 5. Define pi0 as the information structure with pi0(µ|ω) = 1 for all ω∈Ω. The function
V : R×Π→ R∪{−∞} satisfies the normalization if V (0,pi0) = 0.
The normalization condition says that utility is normalized to zero when the ex-ante payoff
is zero and an individual does not update their prior.
Theorem 5. Given µ∈Γ and u : X→R, the dataset (D,P ) has a nonseparable costly information
representation if and only if it satisfies GACI and NIAS. Moreover, if GACI and NIAS are satisfied,
then one can find a V that rationalizes the data that satisfies Conditions 3, 4 and 5.6
While we characterize a general model, we show that it is without loss to assume an
individual’s payoff is quasiconcave in the information structure for a fixed level of expected
utility. Quasiconcavity might be interpreted as an informal statement that more informative
structures are more costly to achieve. This is not meant in a Blackwell sense. Rather, given two
information structures with known costs, taking a convex combination of them leads to a structure
which is less costly than the highest cost of the two. The combination structure is intuitively less
6As an obvious consequence of Theorem 5, the model is also empirically equivalent to a model in which there
is an endogenous (possibly singleton) set H of hidden actions. In particular, the model pi ∈ maxh∈H V (u ·pi,h,pi)
is equivalent to ours since one could choose a set H to be a singleton. Thus, unlike Machina (1984), adding the
potential for hidden actions does not change the content of observable behavior, and hence is non-testable. This is
also true of the model in Caplin and Dean (2015).
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informative. While this property is certainly intuitive, the result is mathematical and owes to
the structure of data and the same phenomenon whereby Afriat determined that convexity (as a
property of preferences over consumption space) is non-testable.
Example 1 (Continued). One can verify from this information that NIAS holds. To test whether the
stochastic choice pattern can be rationalized by the nonseparable costly information acquisition
model, it remains to verify that GACI holds. To this end, observe that
p¯iA · fA = 1.6 ; p¯iA′ · fA = 1.4
p¯iA′ · fA′ = 7 ; p¯iA · fA′ = 8.
Now, since
p¯iA · fA < p¯iA · fA′ and p¯iA′ · fA < p¯iA′ · fA′,
there are no cycles that violate GACI. The stochastic choice pattern can be rationalized by the
nonseparable costly information acquisition model.
2.3.2 Multiplicative Information Cost
We now study a multiplicative costly information representation. In this representation,
the cost is interpreted as losing a fraction of the ex-ante payoff. We interpret this cost as resulting
from discounting due to unobserved delay when acquiring information.
Definition 2.3.2. Given µ∈ Γ and u : X→R+, a state dependent stochastic choice dataset (D,P )
has a multiplicative costly information representation if there exists a function R : Π→ R+,
information structures {piA}A∈D , and choice functions {CA}A∈D such that:
1. Non-triviality: There exists pi ∈Π such that R(pi)> 0.
2. Information is optimal: For all A ∈D ,
piA ∈ argmaxpi∈Π [R(pi)(pi · fA)].
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3. Choices are optimal: For all A ∈D , the choice function CA : Supp(piA)→ ∆(A) is such that
given a ∈ A and γ ∈ Supp(piA) with CA(a | γ) = PrA(a | γ)> 0, then
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) for all b ∈ A.
4. The data are matched: For all A ∈D , given ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A,
PA(a | ω) = ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ).
We note that one difference in the statement of the multiplicative costly information
representation is that the utility index u is required to be non-negative. While this is more
restrictive than the other cases, this is a common property of multiplicative representations.
For example, Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) make such an assumption. The condition that
characterizes the multiplicative costly information representation is a version of the homothetic
axiom of revealed preference; see Varian (1983a).7
Condition 6 (Homothetic Axiom of Costly Information (HACI)). Given data set (D,P ), define
D0 = {A∈D |∑ω∈Ω µ(ω)u(a(ω)) = 0 for all a∈ A}. We say the dataset (D,P ) satisfies HACI if
for all sequences (p¯iA1, fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) with Ai ∈D\D0, that ∏ki=1
p¯iAi · fAi+1
p¯iAi · fAi ≤ 1 (with addition
modulo k).
HACI is essentially the homothetic axiom of revealed preference restricted to decision
problems that give positive ex-ante payoff. The decision problems that give zero ex-ante payoff
are removed since they can be trivially rationalized and they would create an indeterminate
fraction.
As in the case of the nonseparable costly information representation, we are able to put
additional properties on the function R. We find that R respects monotonicity with respect to the
7It can also be derived as a relatively easy corollary from the work of Rochet (1987).
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Blackwell partial order, is concave, and satisfies a normalization property. We now define these
properties and then give a statement of the theorem.
Condition 7. The function R : Π→ R+ satisfies weak monotonicity in information if ρ,pi ∈ Π
with pi a garbling of ρ,
R(pi)≥ R(ρ).
Condition 8. The function R : Π→ R+ is concave in information structures if for for any
pi1,pi2 ∈Π and λ ∈ [0,1],
R(λpi1+(1−λ)pi2)≥ λR(pi1)+(1−λ)R(pi2).
Condition 9. Define pi0 as the information structure with pi0(µ|ω) = 1 for all ω∈Ω. The function
R satisfies normalization if R(pi0) = 1 and R : Π→ [0,1].
Theorem 6. Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R+, the dataset (D,P ) has a multiplicative costly infor-
mation representation if and only if it satisfies HACI and NIAS. Moreover, if HACI and NIAS are
satisfied, then one can find an R that rationalizes the data and satisfies Conditions 7, 8, and 9.
Example 1 (Continued). In additional to the general nonseparable cost model, the stochastic
choice data in Example 1 can also be rationalized by the multiplicative cost model, which is a
special case of the nonseparable cost model. In fact, the data satisfies HACI since
(
p¯iA · fA′
p¯iA · fA
)(
p¯iA · fA′
p¯iA · fA
)
=
(
80
16
)(
14
70
)
= 1.
Lastly, note that one could re-parameterize R(pi) to be (1−K(pi)) where K : Π→ [0,1] to
interpret the costs as a fraction of ex-ante payoff. Alternatively, one could re-parameterize R(pi)
to a function δT (pi) where T (pi)≥ 0 represents time delay.
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2.3.3 Constrained Information Acquisition
The previous section studies nonseparable costly information acquisition, but there are
other structures on preferences that are of interest. We consider when an individual is constrained
to choose an information structure from a fixed set of information structures. The interpretation
is that the decision maker does not have access to the full set of information structures when
updating the prior, but all available information structures are costless.
Definition 2.3.3. Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R, a state dependent stochastic choice dataset (D,P )
has a constrained costly information representation if there exists a set Πc ⊆ Π of available
information structures, information structures {piA}A∈D , and choice functions {CA}A∈D such that:
1. Non-triviality: The set Πc 6= /0.
2. Information is optimal: For all A ∈D , piA ∈ argmaxpi∈Πc pi · fA .
3. Choices are optimal: For all A ∈D , the choice function CA : Supp(piA)→ ∆(A) is such that
given a ∈ A and γ ∈ Supp(piA) with CA(a | γ) = PrA(a | γ)> 0, then
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) for all b ∈ A.
4. The data are matched: For all A ∈D , given ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A,
PA(a | ω) = ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ).
A constrained costly information structure is characterized by a condition similar to the
Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (Varian 1984). Using this intuition, the revealed information
structures are analogous to inputs of production and fA are analogous to prices of inputs. To avoid
confusion with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, we call this the Binary Axiom of Costly
Information.
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Condition 10 (Binary Axiom of Costly Information (BACI)). The dataset (D,P ) satisfies BACI
if for all A,B ∈D , it follows that
p¯iA · fA ≥ p¯iB · fA.
Similar to the nonseparable case, additional structure can be placed on a constrained costly
information representation without restricting observable behavior. Using standard arguments,
the constraint set Πc can be made convex.
Theorem 7. Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X →R, the dataset (D,P ) has a constrained costly information
representation if and only if it satisfies BACI and NIAS. Moreover, if BACI and NIAS are satisfied,
then one can find a convex set Πc that rationalizes the data with a constrained costly information
representation.
Example 1 (Continued). The stochastic choice data in Example 1 cannot be rationalized by the
constrained costly information model, since the dataset violates BACI: p¯iA′ · fA′ < p¯iA · fA′ .
2.4 Relationship Among Models
The nonseparable information cost model generalizes all three alternative models of costly
information acquisition. The constrained model, by contrast, is the most special one, and is a
special case of both the additive and multiplicative models: it can be regarded as a multiplicative
model with function R(.) equals to 1 on Πc and 0 everywhere else; alternatively, it can also be
regarded as an additive model where the additive cost function K(.) equals to 0 on Πc and +∞
everywhere else. Figure 2.1 below summarizes the relationship among various models of costly
information acquisition.
As a point of reference, next we examine in details how the nonseparable costly informa-
tion representation relates to the additive costly information representation in Caplin and Dean
(2015).
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Nonseparable
Additive MultiplicativeConstrained
Figure 2.1: Relationship Among Models
We first review the definition of an additive costly information model, and show that the
nonseparable model generalizes the additive model. We then show that one particular limitation
of the additive model is that it forbids individuals from choosing less information whenever the
menu provides more return to information, even if menus that generate higher returns might also
entails higher costs for information.
2.4.1 Additive Information Cost Model
Definition 2.4.1. Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R, a state dependent stochastic choice dataset (D,P )
has an additive costly information representation if there exists a function K : Π→ R¯∪{∞},
information structures {piA}A∈D , and choice functions {CA}A∈D such that:
1. Non-triviality: There exists pi ∈Π such that K(pi)< ∞.
2. Information is optimal: For all A ∈D , piA ∈ argmaxpi∈Π [pi · fA−K(pi)].
3. Choices are optimal: For all A ∈D , the choice function CA : Supp(piA)→ ∆(A) is such that
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given a ∈ A and γ ∈ Supp(piA) with CA(a | γ) = PrA(a | γ)> 0, then
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) for all b ∈ A.
4. The data are matched: For all A ∈D , given ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A,
PA(a | ω) = ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ).
Caplin and Dean (2015) showed that an additive costly information representation is
characterized by the NIAS condition and a no improving attention cycles (NIAC) condition. The
NIAC condition is defined below.
Condition 11 (No Improving Attention Cycles (NIAC)). Given µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R, a dataset
(D,P ) satisfies NIAC if for all sequences (p¯iA1, fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) with Ai ∈D , then
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi · fAi ≥
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi+1 · fAi
where addition of the indices is modulo k.
The interpretation of NIAC is that one cannot cycle through the information structures
and improve the ex-ante payoff. From the definition of NIAC and GACI, it is easy to see that if a
dataset satisfies NIAC, then the dataset also satisfies GACI with equality.
Proposition 1. If the dataset (D,P ) satisfies NIAC, then it also satisfies GACI.
The proof, which is provided in the appendix, is standard: a violation of GACI implies the
existence of a sequence p¯iAi · fAi ≤ p¯iAi · fAi+1 , where, say, p¯iAk · fAk < p¯iAk · fA1 . Subtracting obtains
that for each i, p¯iAi · ( fAi− fAi+1)≤ 0, with one inequality strict, whereby ∑i p¯iAi · ( fAi− fAi+1)< 0.
Rearranging terms now obtains a violation of NIAC. We come back to Example 1 again as an
illustration.
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Example 1 (Continued). Observe that the stochastic choice function cannot be rationalized by
the additive cost model:
p¯iA · fA+ p¯iA′ · fA′ = 8.6 < 9.4 = p¯iA · fA′+ p¯iA′ · fA
so that NIAC fails.
2.4.2 Gross Return from Information
We note that an additively separable model forbids an individual from choosing a less
informative information structure when there are “higher gross return from information”, while
this is allowed under the nonseparable cost model: this flexibility may be relevant if a menu
generating higher gross return from information may at the same time entail more cost to
information (for example, when the cost of information is the discounting incurred from waiting).
We formally define “higher returns to information” below.
Definition 2.4.2. Menu A provides a higher gross return from information than menu B if for any
information structure pi and pi′ a garbling of pi with pi′ 6= pi, we have 8
pi · fA−pi′ · fA > pi · fB−pi′ · fB.
We establish that an individual with an additive costly information representation can
never choose a less informative information structure when faced with a menu that has a higher
gross return from information.
Proposition 2. Suppose D = {A,B} for dataset (D,P ) with menu A providing a higher gross
return from information than menu B. If p¯iA is a garbling of p¯iB, then the choice data violates
NIAC and thus cannot be generated by an additive costly information representation.
8This definition is non-vacuous. In fact, it can be shown that menu A provides a higher gross return from
information than menu B if and only if fA = fB+g where g is a strictly convex function.
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The next result shows that a nonseparable model, on the contrary, always accommodates
this behavior if the menu that provides a higher gross return from information also yields higher
utility for any posterior.
Proposition 3. Suppose D = {A,B} for dataset (D,P ) with menu A providing a higher gross
return from information than menu B. If p¯iA is a garbling of p¯iB, NIAS is satisfied, and fA > fB9,
then this dataset is rationalized by a nonseparable costly information representation.
2.5 Out of Sample Prediction
One may wonder what type of data will violate GACI, or in other words, the extent to
which the nonseparable model puts meaningful constraints on choice behavior. In this section, we
first demonstrate the restrictions on choice probabilities for a specific two state environment, with
a uniform prior and menus of two acts. This simple environment allows us to obtain a closed-form
expression for the restrictions on choice probabilities. We then provide a numerical example as a
further illustration.
2.5.1 The 2×2 Case
Let the states be given by Ω = {ω1,ω2}. Let the menus be denoted A = {a,b} and
A′= {a′,b′}. Assume without loss that u(a(ω1))> u(b(ω1)) and u(b(ω2))> u(a(ω2)). Similarly,
assume that u(a′(ω1))> u(b′(ω1)) and u(b′(ω2))> u(a′(ω2)).
As is shown in Caplin and Dean (2015), NIAS on menu A in this environment is equivalent
to
PA(a | ω1)≥max

u(b(ω2))−u(a(ω2))
u(a(ω1))−u(b(ω1))PA(a | ω2),
u(b(ω2))−u(a(ω2))
u(a(ω1))−u(b(ω1))PA(a | ω2)+
u(a(ω1))+u(a(ω2))−u(b(ω1))−u(b(ω2))
u(a(ω1))−u(b(ω1))
.
9We say fA > fB if fA(γ)> fB(γ) for all γ ∈ Γ.
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A similar condition for menu A′ is equivalent to the satisfaction of NIAS there.
We focus on the case when decisions are aligned: we say the decisions are aligned if
a = argmax
c∈{a,b}
∑
ω∈{ω1,ω2}
γ¯a
′
A′(ω)u(c(ω)),
b = argmax
c∈{a,b}
∑
ω∈{ω1,ω2}
γ¯b
′
A′(ω)u(c(ω)),
and similar conditions hold for choices from A′ using the revealed information structure p¯iA.
Essentially, decisions are aligned if the decision maker will choose action a from menu A,
if he used the information structure from A′ and received the signal that would have led him to
choose a′. This assumption is made to make the algebra tractable. The same assumption is also
implicitly assumed in Caplin and Dean (2015).
Now, there is a violation of GACI if
p¯iA · fA ≤ p¯iA · fA′ and p¯iA′ · fA′ ≤ p¯iA′ · fA
with one inequality strict. Under the above assumptions of NIAS and aligned choices, a violation
of GACI is equivalent to the choice probabilities simultaneously satisfying the following two
inequalities:
PA(a | ω1)∆1+PA(a | ω2)∆2 ≤ β
PA′(a
′ | ω1)∆1+PA′(a′ | ω2)∆2 ≥ β
(2.1)
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where
∆1 = u(a(ω1))−u(a′(ω1))+u(b′(ω1)−u(b(ω1))
∆2 = u(a(ω2))−u(a′(ω2))+u(b′(ω2)−u(b(ω2))
β= u(b′(ω1))+u(b′(ω2))−u(b(ω1))−u(b(ω2)).
Therefore, any probabilities that satisfy these inequalities with at least one strict inequality violate
a nonseparable costly information representation.
In general, suppose one has a menu M ∈ A such that M /∈D. If the dataset D satisfies
NIAS and GACI, we can use the information to place bounds on the information structures that
are consistent with the model using the restrictions of GACI and NIAS. The full set of restrictions
is given by a supporting set as defined in Varian (1984).
Denote the set of information structures that support the menu M that are consistent with
GACI and NIAS by
SGACI(M) = {piM ∈Π | {(p¯iA, fA)}A∈D ∪ (piM, fM) satisfies NIAS and GACI}.
This set places restrictions on piM that can be translated to restrictions on individual state dependent
stochastic choices. It is easy to define supporting sets for multiplicatively separable, additively
separable, and constrained costly information representation. While the supporting set is often
difficult to compute, it provides the full set of piM consistent with a given representation.
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2.5.2 Numerical Example: GACI vs NIAC
Let the actions’ payoffs in menus A and A′ take the following values:
u(a(ω)) =

5 if ω= ω1
1 if ω= ω2
u(b(ω)) =

0 if ω= ω1
4 if ω= ω2
u(a′(ω)) =

4 if ω= ω1
2 if ω= ω2
u(b′(ω)) =

1 if ω= ω1
3 if ω= ω2
.
Substituting the above utility numbers into inequalities (2.1), we can see that the choice
probabilities from A and A′ violate GACI if and only if:
PA(a | ω1)+PA(b | ω2)≤ 1 and PA′(a′ | ω1)+PA′(b′ | ω2)≥ 1. (2.2)
On the other hand, substituting the above utility numbers into inequality (5) from Caplin
and Dean (2015), we see that a violation of NIAC for this decision problem is equivalent to
PA(a | ω1)+PA(b | ω2)− [PA′(a′ | ω1)+PA′(b′ | ω2)]≤ 0. (2.3)
By comparing (2.2) and (2.3) above, it is straightforward to see that in this numerical example, a
violation of GACI implies a violation of NIAC, but not the other way around.
2.5.3 Limitations
The revealed preference conditions for costly information acquisition often provide
interesting bounds and intuition for these models. Moreover, we note that an additive costly
information representation has the property of being translation invariant in ex-ante payoff.
Similarly, a multiplicative costly information representation has the property of being scale
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invariant in ex-ante payoff.
One may want to look at choices from menus of this type to violate an additively separable
or multiplicatively separable costly information representation respectively. However, a dataset
with menus that are additive utility translations of one another always satisfy NIAC. Similarly,
a dataset with menus that are scale shifts of one another always satisfy HACI. To study these
questions, we provide two definitions. For a menu A = {a1, . . . ,an} ∈ A and c ∈ R let A+ c =
{a′1, . . . ,a′n} be the menu that adds a constant utility c to each act. That is, u(a′i(ω)) = u(ai(ω))+c
for i = 1, . . . ,n and all ω ∈Ω. Similarly, let cA = {ca1, . . . ,can} be the menu where the utility of
all acts is multiplied by c, so u(a′i(ω)) = cu(ai(ω)) for i = 1, . . . ,n and all ω ∈Ω.
Proposition 4. Let µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R. If the dataset (D,P ) satisfies NIAS, D = {A+ c1,A+
c2, . . . ,A+ cM}, and for all m = 1, . . . ,M that cm ∈ R, then the dataset is rationalized by the
additive costly information representation.
Proposition 5. Let µ ∈ Γ and u : X → R+. Suppose the dataset (D,P ) satisfies NIAS, D =
{c1A,c2A, . . . ,cMA}, and and for all m = 1, . . . ,M that cm ∈ R+, then the dataset is rationalized
by the multiplicative costly information representation.
2.5.4 Unknown utility, unknown prior
The model we fleshed out requires utility and the prior to be known (in fact, we use a
“reduced-form” model where signals can be written as they are only because the prior is known).
That said, even if the utility is unknown, some implications may be derived. As a general
rule, if utility is totally unrestricted, the model has no content. This is a relatively standard
observation, and owes to the fact that complete indifference can rationalize everything. On the
other hand, in our abstract model, it makes sense to ask that utility lies in some set, U. The notion
of a value function fA now necessarily also depends on u ∈U.
Then an obvious violation of our model occurs when GACI is violated for each u ∈U.
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There are nontrivial examples of such violations; simply fix some u and find a violation of GACI
for that u. Then by continuity, there is an open neighborhood U for which GACI is also violated.
Working out the more complete implications is a nontrivial task, but one we feel may bear
some fruit.
On the other hand, suppose the prior is not known. This problem appears to be much more
complicated. It is plausible that we may be able to address this question via duality techniques,
but this is not certain. Two things are certain: we would require a more general model of signal
structures (in which case the “reduced form” of the distribution over distributions is not observed),
and, we can no longer use our knowledge of u and µ to guide us as to whether the expected utility
of A is larger than the expected utility of B; these must be inferred. An interesting study of a
related question is due to De Oliveira and Lamba (2018).
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide revealed preference characterizations for several models of costly
information acquisition. The most general form allows for costs from time delay in addition to an
additively separable cost. The characterization of these models follows directly from classical
revealed preference theory. We also provide examples showing how the information acquisition
differs across models.
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Chapter 3
A Test for Risk-Averse Expected Utility
3.1 Introduction
The recent contribution of Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) provides a GARP-like test
for risk-averse expected utility maximization in a contingent-consumption environment. In an
environment with a single consumption good and finite states of the world, they establish an
acyclicity condition on observed data which is both necessary and sufficient for a finite list of
observed price and consumption pairs to be consistent with the hypothesis of expected utility
maximization. Thus, their paper provides a counterpart of the classical work of Afriat (1967)
with the added restriction that rationalizations be risk-averse expected utility.
As Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) note, their test is universal in nature, removing all
existential quantification. Their test amounts to verifying that the product of certain cycles of
risk-neutral prices be bounded above by one. Our aim in this note is to provide a different
universal test. Our test should be distinguished from the Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) test
in three ways. First, it applies to any finite number of consumption goods, whereas the test of
Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) only applies for a single consumption good. Secondly, our test is
intimately tied to the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of expected utility theory, and
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thus has a simple economic intuition. On the other hand, our test involves universal quantification
over a potentially infinite number of objects, while the test in Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) can
be reduced to universal quantification over a finite set.
We emphasize that what we mean by test is a method for falsifying the model with directly
observable data. In other words, we say a model is testable if whenever data are inconsistent
with the model, they can be demonstrated to be inconsistent. In this sense of the term test, a
demonstration is distinct from an algorithm which would find this falsifying certificate. Hence,
a test in our sense is not intended to be useful from a computational perspective, and as far as
we can tell, ours is not in general. Indeed; there are already practical algorithms for determining
when the expected utility model is falsified in our context. Rather, such a test is important for
understanding the economic content of the model, by specifying a condition stated in terms of
data alone, which does not reference unobservable concepts such as utilities or marginal rates of
substitution. As a point of comparison, the work of Richter (1966) can be understood as providing
the testable restrictions of the preference maximization hypothesis; however, no general algorithm
would exist in Richter’s case either.1
Our test is perhaps most closely related to an early revealed preference test of expected
utility due to Fishburn (1975). Fishburn constructs a test for an abstract environment of choice
over lotteries with finite support. In his setting, one observes a finite set of binary comparisons;
some are weak, and some are strict. Fishburn provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for there to exist an expected utility ranking which extends the observed binary comparisons.
Imagine that we observe lottery lk weakly preferred to lottery l′k for k = 1, . . . ,g, and lk strictly
preferred to l′k for k= g+1, . . . ,K. Fishburn establishes that these observations are consistent with
expected utility maximization if there is no probability distribution over {1, . . . ,K} which puts
positive probability on {g+1, . . . ,K}, and for which the mixture of the lk’s under this probability
distribution is equal to the mixture of the l′k’s. Fishburn’s test can be viewed as claiming that the
1In the special case where budgets are given by linear inequalities and preference satisfies monotonicity, an
algorithm exists for Richter’s test, namely the Afriat test. Here we refer to the abstract budget environment.
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smallest possible extension of the observed relations satisfying both independence and transitivity
leads to no contradiction. We stress that Fishburn’s test also presents with no algorithm: no recipe
is given for finding the probability distribution.
In our case, we have n commodities, and a finite set of states Ω = {ω|1,2 . . . ,S}. We
observe a finite list of prices and contingent consumption bundles chosen at those prices
(xk, pk), k ∈ {1, . . .K}. Consumption in state ω at observation k is of the form xkω ∈ Rn+. Proba-
bilities over Ω are known and are given by the full support distribution pi.
We first ask: What could reveal a violation of the joint hypothesis of expected utility
and risk aversion in this context? There are only a finite set of states of the world, with known
probabilities, but if the choices were rationalizable by an expected utility preference, there would
be a natural extension to a preference over the set of all simple lotteries. One such violation
would look like the following: suppose that for each xk, there is some yk which is feasible at
prices pk. In other words, the induced lottery lxk is revealed preferred to the induced lottery
lyk . And suppose that there is some g for which y
g is strictly cheaper than xg at prices pg. In
other words, the induced lottery lxg is revealed strictly preferred to the induced lottery lyg . Now,
suppose we can find, for each k, a lottery l′k which is a mean-preserving spread of lyk . If the data
were rationalizable by a risk-averse expected utility preference, the lottery lxk would be preferred
to l′k for all k (and lxg would be strictly preferred to l
′
g).
We now have a set of K pairs of lotteries (lxk , l
′
k) which could be obtained in the preceding
fashion. These data can be tested with Fishburn’s condition. If, in fact, they violate Fishburn’s
condition, then we know that the original data cannot be expected utility rationalizable.
So far this is very simple. However, in the demand setting, for each observation (pk,xk),
there are usually infinitely many candidates for the above yk, and for each yk, an infinite number
of possible mean-preserving spreads l′k. This would result in an infinite number of possible
{(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1 sets. While the Fishburn condition is sufficient to ensure each {(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1 set
has its own preference extension, it has nothing to say about whether or not there is a single
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preference extension for the infinitely many revealed preference relations.
In fact, what we show is the following: If the data are not risk-averse expected utility
rationalizable, then there exists at least one set, {(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1, as above, that violates Fishburn’s
condition. In addition, they can be chosen to violate Fishburn’s condition in a very stark way:
one must only test the uniform lottery over {1, . . . ,K}.
Moreover, the support of each l′k can be chosen to consist only of consumption that was
actually observed demanded at some state; i.e. the support can be chosen amongst elements of
the form xkω. This resonates with the idea from Polisson et al. (2015), who observe that in order to
rationalize data, it is both necessary and sufficient to maintain consistency on the set of minimally
extended “imaginary” data, constructed from those actually observed. However, while Polisson
et al. (2015) is concerned with developing Afriat-style algorithms (see Afriat (1967)) for testing
decision models with money lotteries, our focus is developing universal statements about data
from lotteries of general consumption bundles, which provides direct falsification of the expected
utility model under risk aversion.
It is important to note that due to the infinite nature of our test, our contribution lies not
in providing a procedure to be implemented to check actual data; for such a test, the readers are
directed to the work by Green and Srivastava (1986). Instead, the main contribution of our test
is that it extends the intuition of the Fishburn test to demand-based observations: whenever the
smallest possible extension of the observed relations satisfying both independence and transitivity
leads to no contradiction, the data are rationalizable by risk-averse expected utility preference.
In addition, the test by Green and Srivastava involves theoretical objects that are not directly
observable, while our conditions directly characterize exactly which types of data are ruled out
by the hypothesis of expected utility maximization, and thus can be interpreted as its UNCAF
axiomatization, when observations are made in a demand-based framework.2
2UNCAF stands for universal negation of conjunction of atomic formulas. Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya
(2014) demonstrate that theories which make no non-empirical predictions are exactly those which have UNCAF
axiomatizations.
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The idea of the proof is remarkably simple, and is a simple restatement of the dual set of
linear inequalities stemming from the Afriat-style inequalities of Green and Srivastava (1986) or
Varian (1983b).
A host of other interesting papers have recently studied choice data in the context of ex-
pected utility maximization. In particular, Echenique and Saito (2015) investigates the subjective
expected utility version of the model, which forms a kind of analogue of the Kubler, Selden,
and Wei (2014) test. It would be interesting to propose a test of our structure in the subjective
expected utility framework. Epstein (2000) investigates the empirical content of the notion of
probabilistic sophistication (due to Machina and Schmeidler (1992)), providing a test which can
refute the hypothesis.
3.2 The Model
We assume that there is a finite state space Ω= {ω|1,2, . . . ,S} and a finite collection of
consumption goods, labeled 1,2, . . . ,N. The agent is given an objective probability distribution
over states pi ∈ ∆(Ω), where for all ω ∈ Ω, Pr(ω) = piω > 0. An observation is a pair (p,x),
where p ∈ RSN++ is a list of the prices of all N consumption goods under all S possible states, and
x ∈ RSN+ details the purchased amount of each consumption good under each state of the world.3
We assume that our data set D consists of a K tuple of (x, p) pairs, i.e. D = {(xk, pk)Kk=1}. K is
assumed finite.
3As usual, R++ denotes the positive reals, and R+ the nonnegative reals.
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In particular,
xk =

xk1
...
xkω
...
xkS

pk =

pk1
...
pkω
...
pkS

and
xkω =

xkω,1
...
xkω,N
 pkω =

pkω,1
...
pkω,N

where for all ω,k,n, xkω,n ≥ 0 and pkω,n > 0. Each xk is referred to as a contingent consumption
bundle, and xkω a state-specific consumption bundle. We use C = RNS+ to denote the set of all
contingent consumption bundles.
We say that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable if there exists a concave,
continuous, and increasing u : RN+→ R for which for all k, xk solves
max
x∈RSN+
∑
ω
piωu(xω)
subject to pk · x≤ pk · xk.4
Given a data set D, we collect all the state-specific consumption bundles xkω observed in
the data:
X = {x ∈ RN+|x = xkω for some k and ωwhere (xk, pk) ∈D}.
Denote the set of all simple lotteries on RN+ with finite support by ∆s(RN+). Denote the set of all
4We take increasing to mean that if x≥ y and x 6= y, then u(x)> u(y).
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lotteries on X by ∆(X ). Note that ∆(X )⊆ ∆s(RN+).
Any contingent consumption bundle xk ∈C induces an element lxk ∈ ∆(X ), which places
probability piω on xkω. As such, a pair of revealed preference relations C and C can be defined
on ∆(X ):
For x,y∈C, lxC ly if x= xk for some (xk, pk)∈D and pk ·y≤ pk ·x. For x,y∈C, lxC ly
if x = xk for some (xk, pk) ∈D and pk · y < pk · x. C is intended to represented a revealed weak
preference and C a revealed strict preference.
Moreover, to test the hypothesis of risk aversion, it is natural to extend the above revealed
preference relations to ∆s(RN+). For example, suppose that lx C ly, and l ∈ ∆s(RN+) can be
obtained by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads of ly.5 If our decision maker’s behavior
is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization, it follows that lx should also be
preferred to l. These ideas motivate the following definitions.
For l, l′ ∈ ∆s(RN+), l m.p.s. l′ if l′ can be obtained by a series of mean-preserving spreads
of l. Define the pair of binary relations R and R on ∆s(RN+) by
l R l′′ if there exists l′ such that l C l′ m.p.s. l′′
and
l R l′′ if there exists l′ such that l C l′ m.p.s. l′′
If the agent’s behavior is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization, the
pair of relationsR,R will necessarily satisfy Fishburn’s condition on ∆s(RN+); i.e. if lk R l′k for
k= 1, . . . ,g, and lk R l′k for k= g+1, . . . ,K, then there are no {µi}Ki=1⊆RK+, with∑Kk=g+1 µk > 0,
and ∑K1 µklk = ∑
K
1 µkl
′
k. As we show in our main result, it turns out that a sufficient condition for
the data D to conform with risk aversion and expected utility maximization is that the restriction
5That is, if there exists a random variable ε such that l d= ly+ ε with E(ε|ly) = 0. “ d=” here means “has the same
distribution as”. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for more details.
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of R,R to ∆(X ) satisfies Fishburn’s condition.
Theorem 1. For every data set D = {(xk, pk)Kk=1}, the following are equivalent:
I For any {l′k}Kk=1 ⊆ ∆(X ) for which lxk R l′k for all k, there is no {µk}Kk=1 ⊆ RK+ for which
∑{k:lkRl′k} µk > 0 and ∑
K
1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl
′
k.
II Suppose that for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ω ∈Ω, Skω : {1, . . . ,K}×Ω→ R+ is a function,
such that for all k,ω, ∑g,τ Skω(g,τ) = piω = ∑g,τ S
g
τ(k,ω). If, in addition, for all k,
pk · xk ≥ pk ·
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
then there is no k for which pk · xk > pk ·
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
.6
III For all ω,τ ∈ Ω and k,g ∈ {1, ...,K} there exist ukw,ugτ ≥ 0 and λk,λg > 0 s.t. ukω ≤
ugτ+λg p
g
τ
piτ · (xkω− x
g
τ).7
IV Data set D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable.
Before proceeding, we comment on cases I and II, which are our contribution. Case I
considers the smallest possible preference extension “consistent” with the data, risk-aversion, and
the expected utility hypothesis. It claims that if this extension is meaningfully defined; in that
we cannot derive that a lottery l is strictly preferred to itself, then the data are expected utility
rationalizable. Importantly, we only need to consider lotteries whose support are actual observed
consumption bundles. This can be seen as a natural analogue of Fishburn’s condition as applied
to lxk and l
′
k.
6
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
=
(
∑g∑τ Sk1(g,τ)x
g
τ
pi1
, . . . ,
∑g∑τ SkS(g,τ)x
g
τ
piS
)
i.e. ∑g∑τ S
k
ω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω is the consumption in state ω.
7Green and Srivistava’s proof of this statement assumes the non-emptyness of u’s superdifferential over Rn+;
however, it is easy to modify their proof even with empty superdifferential on the boundary. Essentially, whenever xg
is known to be a utility maximizer, we can always find ∇u(xgτ) in the superdifferential of u for which ∇u(x
g
τ) = λg p
g
τ
piτ
(see Theorem 28.3 in Rockafellar (1997)). So ukω ≤ ugτ +∇u(xgτ) · (xkω− xgτ) = ugτ +λg p
g
τ
piτ · (xkω− x
g
τ).
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Case II demonstrates a dual system of linear inequalities to the inequalities of case III,
which was derived previously by Green and Srivastava (1986). The interpretation of the terms
Skω is as a system of probability weights. To obtain some intuition on Case II, suppose that the
inequalities therein are satisfied, then one can find a contradiction as follows: For each k, by
demand behavior, the inequalities in Case II imply that the lottery lyk induced by the contingent
consumption bundle
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
is revealed weakly worse than the lottery lxk induced by
xk, with strict preference for at least one k. Observe that lyk is a lottery that places probability piω
on ∑g∑τ S
k
ω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω . Since ∑g,τ S
k
ω(g,τ) = piω, simple algebra (included in the proof) shows that the
lottery l′k, which places probability weight S
k
ω(g,τ) on x
g
τ , is a mean-preserving spread of lyk . If
the data were really consistent with the hypothesis of risk-averse expected utility maximization,
transitivity would imply that for each k, the lottery l′k should be worse than the lottery lxk , strictly
so for at least one k. We now have in total K revealed preference relations between the pairs of
lotteries lxk and l
′
k. As we demonstrate in the proof, the condition ∑g,τ S
g
τ(k,ω) = piω then allows
us to find a violation by applying the condition from Fishburn (1975) on the lotteries lxk and l
′
k
across all k.
The following example illustrates the theorem.
Example 5. Consider the case k ∈ {1,2}, Ω= {1,2} and N = 2: There are 2 observations, each
consisting of the price and purchased quantity for the consumptions good under 2 possible states
of the world. Suppose each of the two states are equally likely; pi1 = pi2 = .5. Suppose we observe:
(x1, p1) =


0
0
10
5

,

5
10
5
10


(x2, p2) =


4
2
6
3

,

4
8
5
10


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In this case there is no violation of GARP. However, since the hypothesis of risk-averse
EU preference is stronger than than GARP, we show that this case still violates our conditions.
Violation of Statement I: The induced lotteries by x1 and x2 are lx1 =((10,5),1/2;(0,0),1/2)
and lx2 = ((4,2),1/2;(6,3),1/2), respectively. To see that this is a violation of statement I,
consider contingent consumption bundles y1 = y2 = ((5,2.5);(5,2.5)) which induce ly1 = ly2 =
((5,2.5),1). Clearly p1 ·x1 ≥ p1 ·y1, and p2 ·x2 > p2 ·y2. So by definition lx1 C ly1 and lx2 C ly2 .
Observe that the lottery l′1 = ((4,2),1/2;(6,3),1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of ly1
and the lottery l′2 = ((10,5),1/2;(0,0),1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of ly2 . By definition
lx1 R l′1 and lx2 R l′2. However,
1
2
lx1 +
1
2
lx2 =
1
2
l′1+
1
2
l′2
This constitutes a violation of Statement I.
Violation of Statement II:
Set S11(2,1)= S
2
1(1,1)=
1
5 , S
1
1(2,2)= S
2
2(1,1)=
3
10 , S
1
2(2,1)= S
2
1(1,2)=
3
7 , and S
1
2(2,2)=
S22(1,2) =
1
14 .
To solve:

0
0
10
5

·

5
10
5
10

> 2 ·

5
10
5
10

·

S11(2,1)∗4+S11(2,2)∗6
S11(2,1)∗2+S11(2,2)∗3
S12(2,1)∗4+S12(2,2)∗6
S12(2,1)∗2+S12(2,2)∗3

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
4
2
6
3

·

4
8
5
10

≥ 2 ·

4
8
5
10

·

S21(1,1)∗0+S21(1,2)∗10
S21(1,1)∗0+S21(1,2)∗5
S22(1,1)∗0+S22(1,2)∗10
S22(1,1)∗0+S22(1,2)∗5

S11(2,1)+S
1
1(2,2) = S
1
2(2,1)+S
1
2(2,2) =
1
2
A couple of observations are in order. It can be shown that both (I) and (II) of our
properties imply GARP. Suppose by means of contradiction that GARP is violated, i.e. that
there are contingent consumption bundles zk1, . . . ,zkm such that pk1 · zk1 ≥ pk1 · zk2, pk2 · zk2 ≥
pk2 · zk3 , . . . , pkm · zkm > pkm · zk1 , where without loss we may assume there is no repetition in the
cycle. This implies lzk1 C lzk2 C . . .C lzkm C lzk1 .
To see that (I) implies GARP, observe that since C implies R and C implies R, we
have lzk1 R lzk2 R . . . lzkm R lzk1 . Let lxi = lzki and l′i = lzki+1 as in property (I), then a uniform
distribution µ over the indices i = 1,2, ...m constitutes a violation of (I).
For (II), consider the following set of Skω(g,τ)’s in property II: For k = ki for some i (that
is, if k shows up in the cycle)
Skiω(g,τ) =

piω if g = ki+1 and τ= ω
0 otherwise
and for k 6= ki for any i (k not in the cycle)
Skω(g,τ) =

piω if g = k and τ= ω
0 otherwise
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Then the cycle condition gives a violation of property (II), a contradiction.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the result is by no means a trivial consequence of
Fishburn (1975). In his paper, he also considers the issue of testing the consistency of revealed
preference relations with functional restrictions on the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index (as
we wish to test for concavity and monotonicity). Specifically, he wants to test when observed data
are consistent with the utility index u belonging to some convex coneU. Again, he assumes a finite
number of relations (which does not hold in our context). A natural guess is that if lk is revealed
weakly preferred to l′k for k = 1, . . . ,g and revealed strictly preferred to l
′
k for k = g+1, . . . ,K,
then if there is µ ∈ ∆(K) for which µ({g+1, . . . ,K})> 0 and u · (∑k µkl′k)≥ u · (∑k µklkß) for all
u ∈U, then the observed data are inconsistent with expected utility maximization with utility
index u ∈U 8. In our case, for example, we would consider the cone of concave, nondecreasing
and locally non-satiated functions; the claim would then be that∑k µkl′k second order stochastically
dominates ∑k µklk. Of course, the existence of such a µ refutes the hypothesis of expected utility
rationalization with u ∈U, but for technical reasons, the converse statement need not hold in
general (it would hold, for example, if the cone U were polyhedral, which is not the case here).
However, we are able to show that owing to the special structure of linear pricing, a converse
statement along the lines of this idea does in fact hold in the demand-based environment. In fact,
it holds even though observed revealed preference relations are infinite.
Proof. (III⇔ IV)
The equivalence of III and IV is due to Green and Srivastava (1986).
8Here we continue to use x and z for lotteries, and dot product for integration with respect to measures.
72
(II⇔ III)
We proceed to show that II and III are equivalent. To this end, observe that III does not
hold if and only if there is no solution to the following linear system.9 Ab≥ 0 and λ 0, where
b =

u11
u12
...
uKS
λ

λ=

λ1
...
λK

and A is equal to the top two quadrants of the matrix below:
T =

u11 ... u
k
ω ... u
g
τ ... uKS λ1 ... λk ... λK
η1,1,1,1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
ηk,ω,g,τ 0 . . . 1 . . . −1 . . . 0 0 . . . p
k
ω
pik · (x
g
τ− xkω) . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
η′k 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

By construction of T and a standard theorem of the alternative (see for example Man-
gasarian (1994) p. 30), the nonexistence of b,λ such that Ab≥ 0 and λ 0, is equivalent to the
existence of η≥ 0 such that T ′η≤ 0, where
9Vector inequalities are x≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i and x y if xi > yi for all i.
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η=

η1,1,1,1
...
ηK,S,K,S
η′

η′ =

η′1
...
η′K

such that at least one η′k > 0.
This is equivalent to
∑
ω
∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ− xkω)≤ 0 ∀k (3.1)
with strict inequality for at least one k, and
∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηk,ω,g,τ = ∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηg,τ,k,ω ∀k,ω (3.2)
We claim that a solution to systems (3.1) and (3.2), implies the existence of γk,ω,g,τ ≥ 0 so
that
∑
ω
∑
(g,τ)
γk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ− xkω)≤ 0 ∀k (3.3)
∑
(g,τ)
γk,ω,g,τ = ∑
(g,τ)
γg,τ,k,ω = piω ∀k,ω (3.4)
with at least one inequality in (3.3) being strict, effectively showing (3.3) and (3.4) are equivalent
to (3.1) and (3.2).
To see this, list the ηk,ω,g,τ’s from systems (3.1) and (3.2) as in Figure 3.1 (Notice that
system (3.2) ensures that columns and rows passing through the same diagonal element, like
the column and row in red and blue boxes, sum up to the same number.) We now construct a
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
1,1 1,ω 1,S k,ω K,S
1,1 η1,1,1,1 · · · η1,1,1,ω · · · η1,1,1,S · · · η1,1,k,ω · · · η1,1,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
1,ω η1,ω,1,1 · · · η1,ω,1,ω · · · η1,ω,1,S · · · η1,ω,k,ω · · · η1,ω,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
1,S η1,S,1,1 · · · η1,S,1,ω · · · η1,S,1,S · · · η1,S,k,ω · · · η1,S,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
k,ω ηk,ω,1,1 · · · ηk,ω,1,ω · · · ηk,ω,1,S · · · ηk,ω,k,ω · · · ηk,ω,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
K,S ηK,S,1,1 · · · ηK,S,1,ω · · · ηK,S,1,S · · · ηK,S,k,ω · · · ηK,S,K,S

Figure 3.1: η matrix
new matrix, say, Λ, with generic element λk,ω,g,τ by raising all diagonal entries of the η matrix,
leaving all remaining entries the same, so that there is some M > 0 for which ∑(g,τ)ηk,ω,g,τ =
∑(g,τ)ηg,τ,k,ω = Mpiω.10 Since pkω · (xkω− xkω) = 0, and since the diagonal element shows up both
in the column and and row, the resulting η matrix satisfies (3.3) (with λ’s in place of η’s), and the
first equality in system (3.4). Finally, the γ terms are constructed by dividing each element of the
matrix Λ by M.
Rearranging inequalities (3.3) gives
∑
ω
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ− xkω) =∑
ω
pkω ·
(
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τx
g
τ
piω
−∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τxkω
piω
)
=∑
ω
pkω ·
(
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τx
g
τ
piω
− xkω
)≤ 0
with at least one strict inequality. The second equality follows from (3.4). This together with
(3.4) establishes the equivalence of II and III, by taking Skω(g,τ) = γk,ω,g,τ.
10One simple way of doing this is to pick M large enough so that minωpiωM > maxω∑(g,τ)6=(k,ω)ηk,ω,g,τ.
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(IV⇒ I)
That IV implies I is straightforward. Let u : RN+→ R be any concave, nondecreasing
and locally non-satiated utility function. For lottery l, let u · l denote the expected utility of l,
∑x∈l l(x)u(x).
Suppose that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable by u, and suppose by means
of contradiction that statement I is not true
For all l′k ∈ ∆s(RN+), lxk R l′k implies u · · · lxk ≥ u · l′k, and lxk R l′k implies u · lxk > u · l′k.
Since expected utility is linear in lottery mixtures, we have that u · (∑K1 µklxk)> u · (∑K1 µkl′k), a
contradiction to ∑K1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl
′
k.
(I⇒ II)
We now show that I implies II. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is a solution
to the system listed in II. We will show that this implies I is false. Let
yk =
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
By II, we have pk · xk ≥ pk · yk ∀k with > for at least one k. By definition of C, lxk C lyk , with
C for at least one k.
Next, observe that lyk places probability piω at
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω for each ω. Let l
′
k be the
lottery that puts probability ∑ω Skω(g,τ) on x
g
τ . Since ∑g,τ Skω(g,τ) = piω, l′k can be obtained from
lyk by spreading, for each ω, the probability piω placed on
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω to probabilities S
k
ω(g,τ)’s
on xgτ’s, (g,τ) ∈ {1, · · · ,K}×Ω. Moreover, ∑g∑τ S
k
ω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω is a weighted average of the x
g
τ’s by
weights Skω(g,τ)’s. So for each ω the spread described above is a mean-preserving spread in the
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and l′k can be obtained from lyk by a finite number of
mean-preserving spread.
By definition of R, we have obtained lotteries lxk and l′k such that lxk R l′k ∀k, with R
76
for at least one k. In order to contradict I, it only remains now to find {µk}Kk=1 such that µk ≥ 0,
∑{k:lkRl′k} µk > 0 and ∑
K
1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl
′
k. As it turns out, it suffices to take µk =
1
K for each k:
The lottery∑Kk=1
1
K l
′
k places probability
1
K ∑k∑ω S
k
ω(g,τ)=
piτ
K on each x
g
τ , (g,τ)∈{1, · · · ,K}×
Ω, while the lottery ∑Kk=1
1
K lxk , places
piτ
K on each x
g
τ . So ∑Kk=1
1
K l
′
k = ∑
K
k=1
1
K lxk . This constitutes
a contradiction to I (in particular, the contradiction comes in the form of a uniform distribution
over the observations 1, . . . ,K).
3.3 Conclusion
We have developed a universal test for the risk-averse expected utility environment with
many commodities. Of interest for future research would be an analogous test in the subjective
expected utility context, following the work of Echenique and Saito (2015). The difficulty inherent
in this approach rests in the fact that the inequalities in III of Theorem 1 are polynomial, rather
than linear. While we have some conjectures on what might be an appropriate test, these are very
speculative.
A final remark is in order. Observe that when |Ω|= 1 (and hence piω = 1 for ω for which
Ω= {ω}), we are back to the environment of Afriat (1967). In such an environment, the function
S referenced in Theorem 1, condition II can be taken to be a function of {1, . . . ,K} alone. And
condition II in this case tells us that ∑k Sk(l) = ∑k Sl(k) = 1 for each l; in other words, viewing
S as a matrix, the matrix is bistochastic. Now, one of the contributions of Afriat (1967) is that
condition II is necessary and sufficient for concave rationalization when the matrix S is restricted
to be a permutation matrix; that is, a matrix consisting solely of zeroes and ones. Of course,
it is well-known that the permutation matrices are the extreme points of the set of bistochastic
matrices (this is the celebrated theorem of Birkhoff (1946) and Neumann (1953)). A natural
conjecture is that a similar statement may hold here; that it is enough to check the extreme points
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of the set of S functions satisfying condition II of Theorem 1.
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Appendix A
Proofs in Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs in Section 1.2
Lemma 7. Let µ be a self-enforcing matching process. For any institution Ik, the set of recom-
mended stage-game payoffs from µ across all possible ex post histories, {uk(µ(h)) : h ∈H }, is
bounded.
Proof. Fix an institution Ik and let µ = (ψ,{ξl}Kl=1) be a self-enforcing matching process.
I first show the set {uk(µ(h)) : h ∈H } is bounded from above. Note that by the definition
of self-enforcing matching process, at every ex post history h ∈H , the recommended matching
µ(h) must satisfy v j(µ(h)) ≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A . In particular, v j(Ik,ψ(Ik|h))+ ξk j(h) ≥ 0 for all
a j ∈ ψ(Ik|h). This implies that, at every ex post history h ∈H ,
uk(µ(h)) = uk(ψ(Ik|h))− ∑
a j∈ψ(Ik|h)
ξk j(h)
≤ uk(ψ(Ik|h))+ ∑
a j∈ψ(Ik|h)
v j(Ik,ψ(Ik|h))
≤max
B⊆A
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)≡ b̂k
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So {uk(µ(h)) : h ∈H } is bounded above by b̂k.
In order to show {uk(µ(h)) : h ∈H } is bounded from below. I will first establish that the
set of continuation values for Ik across all ex ante histories is bounded from above, while the set
of continuation values following ex post histories is bounded from below, which then delivers the
desired claim.
Fix any ex ante history ĥ ∈H , the continuation matching process at µ|ĥ satisfies
uk(µ|ĥ(h)) = uk(µ(ĥ,h))≤ b̂k
for all ex post histories h ∈H . Since the above inequality holds for all h, it must hold for every
stage-game matching along every possible outcome path generated by µ|ĥ. So the continuation
value uk(µ|ĥ), as an expectation over the discounted sum of these stage-game payoffs, must satisfy
uk(µ|ĥ)≤ b̂k. Since this holds uniformly for every ĥ ∈H , the set {uk(µ|h) : h ∈H } is bounded
above.
Next I show the set {uk(µ|h) : h ∈H } is bounded from below. In particular, I will show
that for all h ∈H ,
uk(µ|h)≥ min
{A⊆A :|A|≤∑Kl=1 ql}
max
B⊆A\A
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)≡ bk
Suppose by contradiction that uk(µ|h˜)< bk for some h˜ ∈H . We will show that Ik has a feasible
profitable deviation plan from µ|h˜, which is a contradiction to µ being a self-enforcing matching
process.
Consider the following deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) from µ|h˜ = (ψ˜,{ξ˜l}Kl=1) : for any h ∈H ,
d′k(h) = argmax
B⊆A\(∪Kl=1ψ˜(Il |h))
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B).
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If d′k(h) 6= /0, then
ξ′k j(h) =

−v j(Ik,d′k(h))+ 12|d′k(h)| [bk−uk(µ|h˜)] if a j ∈ d
′
k(h);
0 otherwise.
If d′k(h) = /0, define
ξ′k j(h) = 0 ∀a j ∈ A .
Note that by construction,
uk(d′k(h))+ ∑
a j∈d′k(h)
v j(Ik,d′k(h))
= max
B⊆A\(∪Kl=1ψ˜(Il |h))
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
≥ min
{A⊆A :|A|≤∑Kl=1 ql}
max
B⊆A\A
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B) = bk.
(A.1)
The inequality above follows from
∣∣(∪rl=1ψ˜(Il|h))∣∣≤ ∑Kl=1 ql .
We first verify that the deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) is feasible. By construction, at every
ex post history h ∈ H , d′k(h) ⊆ A\(∪Kl=1ψ˜(Il|h)). Since every agent in a j ∈ A\∪Kl=1 ψ˜(Il|h))
is unmatched, we have v j(µ|h˜(h)) = 0 for all a j ∈ A\∪Kl=1 ψ˜(Il|h)). So v j(µh˜(h)) = 0 for all
a j ∈ d′k(h).
Meanwhile, at every ex post history h and for all a j ∈ d′k(h),
v j(Ik,d′k(h))+ξ
′
k j(h)
= v j(Ik,d′k(h))− v j(Ik,d′k(h))+
1
2
∣∣d′k(h)∣∣ [bk−uk(µ|h˜)]
=
1
2
∣∣d′k(h)∣∣ [bk−uk(µ|h˜)]> 0 = v j(µ|h˜(h))
So at every possible ex post history h, every agent in d′k(h) finds himself strictly better off by
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joining the deviation, which ensures the feasibility of the deviation (d′k,ξ
′
k).
To see that (d′k,ξ
′
k) is profitable, observe that at every ex post history h, institution Ik’s
stage-game payoff from the manipulated static matching [µ|h˜(h),(d′k(h),ξ′k(h))] is
uk(d′k(h))− ∑
a j∈d′k(h)
ξ′k j(h)
= uk(d′k(h))+ ∑
a j∈d′k(h)
v j(Ik,d′k(h))−
1
2
[bk−uk(µ|h˜)]
≥ bk−
1
2
[bk−uk(µ|h˜)]
=
1
2
bk +
1
2
uk(µ|h˜)> uk(µ|h˜).
The second inequality above follows from inequality (A.1). Since this is true for every ex post
history h, it must hold along every possible outcome paths generated by the manipulated matching
[µ|h˜,(d′k,ξ′k)]. Therefore, Ik’s total expected discounted payoff from the deviation plan satisfies
uk([µ|h˜,(d′k,ξ′k)]) =
1
2
bk +
1
2
uk(µ|h˜)> uk(µ|h˜).
The deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) is both feasible and profitable for institution Ik, which is a contradiction
to the self-enforcement of µ. So uk(µ|h)≥ bk for all h ∈H . The set {uk(µ|h) : h ∈H } is bounded
from below.
Now, at every ex post history h˜ ∈H , we have
uk(µ|h˜) = (1−δ)uk(µ(h˜))+δuk(µ|h˜,µ(h˜)),
or
uk(µ(h˜)) =
uk(µ|h˜)−δuk(µ|h˜,µ(h˜))
1−δ .
uk(µ|h˜) is an element in {uk(µ|h) : h ∈ H }, which is bounded from below by bk; uk(µ|h˜,µ(h˜)) is
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an element in {uk(µ|h) : h ∈ H }, which is bounded from above by b̂k. {uk(µ(h)) : h ∈ H } is
therefore bounded uniformly from below.
Lemma 8. Let µ be a matching process that satisfies v j(µ(h))≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A and all h ∈H .
If Ik has a profitable, feasible deviation plan from µ, then Ik must have one such plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) that
has bounded per-period payoffs, i.e. the set
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is bounded.
Proof. Let (d′k,ξ
′
k) be a feasible, profitable deviation plan from µ for institution Ik. First we show
that
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is bounded from above.
By the feasibility of the deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k), we have, for all h ∈H ,
v j(Ik,d′k(h))+ξ
′
k j(h)≥ v j(µ(h))≥ 0 for all a j ∈ d′k(h)∩ψ(Ik|h)
and
v j(Ik,d′k(h))+ξ
′
k j(h)> v j(µ(h))≥ 0 for all a j ∈ d′k(h)\ψ(Ik|h).
So
v j(Ik,d′k(h))+ξ
′
k j(h)≥ 0 for all a j ∈ d′k(h).
for all h ∈H . This implies
uk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)](h)
)
= uk(d′k(h))− ∑
a j∈d′k(h)
ξ′k j(h)
≤ uk(d′k(h))+ ∑
a j∈d′k(h)
v j(Ik,d′k(h))
≤max
B⊆A
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)≡ b̂k
for all h ∈H , so
utk([µ,(d
′
k,ξ
′
k)]) = E
µ
Ht
[
uk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)](h)
)]≤ b̂k for all t.
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The set
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is bounded from above by b̂k.
If
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is also bounded from below, there is nothing left to prove. If,
however,
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is not bounded from below, I will show that it is possible to
construct another feasible, profitable deviation plan (d′′k ,ξ
′′
k ) such that
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )]
)
: t ≥ 0}
is bounded from below.
Suppose
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is not bounded from below, then the set
{
t ≥ 0 : utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
<− δb̂k
1−δ
}
must be nonempty. Set
t = min
{
t ≥ 0 : utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
<− δb̂k
1−δ
}
.
By construction,
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)≥− δb̂k
1−δ
for all 0≤ t < t, and
(1−δ)utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+δb̂k < 0, (A.2)
Inequality (A.2) implies that if institution Ik follows the stage-game matchings prescribed by
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)] in period t, even if Ik obtains its highest possible continuation payoff b̂k from period
(t+1) onwards, it would still be better off to instead remain autarkic from period t. Therefore, Ik
must have a feasible and even more profitable deviation plan from µ by enforcing autarky from
period t. Formally, define the deviation plan (d′′k ,ξ
′′
k ) by
d′′k (h) =

d′k(h) if h ∈ ∪t−1t=0Ht
/0 if h ∈ ∪∞t=tHt
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and
ξ′′k (h) =

ξ′k(h) if h ∈ ∪t−1t=0Ht
0 if h ∈ ∪∞t=tHt
By construction, (d′′k ,ξ
′′
k ) is feasible. Moreover,
uk([µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )]) = (1−δ)
[ t−1
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )]
)
+δt ·0
]
> (1−δ)
[ t−1
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )]
)]
+δt
[
(1−δ)utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+δb̂k
]
= (1−δ)
[ t−1
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)]
+δt
[
(1−δ)utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+δb̂k
]
= (1−δ)
[ t−1
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+δtutk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+δt+1
b̂k
1−δ
]
= (1−δ)
[ t
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
+
∞
∑
t=t+1
δt b̂k
]
≥ (1−δ)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
δtutk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)]
= uk([µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)])
The second line above follows from inequality (A.2), the third from the construction of (d′′k ,ξ
′′
k ),
the last from the fact that
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′k,ξ
′
k)]
)
: t ≥ 0} is bounded above by b̂k. Since (d′k,ξ′k) is
profitable, it follows that uk([µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )])> uk([µ,(d
′
k,ξ
′
k)])> uk(µ), so (d
′′
k ,ξ
′′
k ) is both feasible
and profitable.
Lastly, by construction,
{
utk
(
[µ,(d′′k ,ξ
′′
k )]
)
: t ≥ 0} is bounded from below by min{− δb̂k1−δ ,0}.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 9. Automaton representation
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A.2 Proofs in Section 1.3
Lemma 10. Let U∗ =
{
Eλ[u(φ)] : λ ∈ Λ∗
}
. For every vector u ∈U∗, there exist vectors {uk : k ∈
κ(I\T )} ⊆U∗ such that
ukk < uk
for all k ∈ κ(I\T ), and
ukk < u
k′
k
for all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(I\T ).
Proof. The proof relies on similar techniques as in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994). Whenever
possible, I will cite intermediate results in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) without reproducing
their proofs. Compared to Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994), the main difference is that instead of
imposing NEU, it is shown that a matching environment always satisfies NEU.
I will first establish that the set ΦT satisfies what Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) called
the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition for institutions in I\T . For every k ∈ κ(T ), there
exists a j(k) ∈ A\T such that v j(k)(Ik)> 0. Define the assignment φ0 by
φ0(Il) =

Âl if Il ∈ T
/0 otherwise
For each k ∈ κ(I\T ), define the assignment φk by
φk(Il) =

Âl if Il ∈ T
{a j(k)} if Il = Ik
/0 otherwise
Clearly φ0 ∈ΦT . Since v j(k)(Ik)> 0 for all k∈ κ(I\T ), it follows that φk ∈ΦT for all k∈ κ(I\T )
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as well.
There are at least two elements in κ(I\T ). For each pair of k 6= k′ ∈ κ(I\T ), uk(φ0) =
uk(φk
′
) = 0, while by strictness of institution preferences, uk′(φ0) = 0 6= uk′({a j(k′)}) = uk′(φk′).
Therefore, for each pair k 6= k′ ∈ κ(I\T ), there do not exist scalars α > 0 and β such that
uk(φ) = αuk′(φ)+β for all φ ∈ΦT . This verifies the NEU condition in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith
(1994) for indices in κ(I\T ).
Since co(UT ) = co({u(φ) : φ∈ΦT }), Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith
(1994) then ensure the existence of vectors {ûk : k ∈ κ(I\T )} ⊆ co(UT ) that satisfy ûkk < ûk
′
k for
all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(I\T ). Since {u(φ) : φ ∈ΦT } is a finite set, for each k ∈ κ(I\T ), there exists an
element uk in {u(φ) : φ ∈ΦT } that minimizes Ik’s payoff.
For an arbitrary vector u ∈U∗, define
uk = ε(1−η)uk +ηεûk +(1− ε)u
for each k ∈ κ(I\T ). Observe that if εη > 0, then ukk < uk
′
k ; for all 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < η < 1,
uk ∈ co(UT ); for small enough ε> 0, ukk > uTk ; and finally, for small enough η> 0, it must be
true that ukk < uk. Therefore, there must exist {uk : k ∈ κ(I\T )} ⊆U∗ such that
ukk < uk
for all k ∈ κ(I\T ), and
ukk < u
k′
k
for all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(I\T ).
Lemma 11. For each institution Ik ∈ I\T , there exists φk ∈ΦT such that uk(φk) = uTk , and
max
B∈DAk (φk)
uk(B) = uTk
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Lemma 12. For each institution Ik ∈ T and every φ ∈ΦT ,
max
B∈DAk (φ)
uk(B) = uk(φ)
Lemma 13. Let Φ′ ⊆Φ be a subset of static assignments, and ψ :H F →Φ′ be a self-enforcing
assignment process. Fix an institution Ik ∈ I . If for every φ ∈Φ′, there exists a subset of agents
Aφ ∈ DAk (φ) that satisfies uk(Aφ)≥ uk, then
uk(ψ)≥ uk
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that ψ is a self-enforcing assignment process, but uk(ψ)< uk.
I will show that institution Ik has a feasible profitable deviation plan from ψ, so ψ must not
be self-enforcing. Consider the following deviation plan d′k from ψ: for every ex post history
h ∈H F , define
d′k(h) = A
ψ(h).
By assumption, ψ(h) ∈ Φ′ for all h ∈ H F , so d′k is well-defined and feasible. To see that d′k is
profitable, observe that at every ex post history h, institution Ik’s stage-game payoff from the
manipulated static assignment [ψ(h),(Ik,d′k(h))] is uk(A
ψ(h))≥ uk > uk(ψ). Since this is true for
every ex post history h, Ik’s total discounted payoff from the deviation plan satisfies
uk([ψ,(Ik,d′k)])> uk(ψ).
The deviation plan d′k is both feasible and profitable for institution Ik, which is a contra-
diction to the self-enforcement of ψ. So uk(ψ)≥ uk.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let {φ
k
: k ∈ κ(I\T )} be the static assignments as constructed in
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Lemma 11. Fix λ0 ∈ Λ∗ and define u0 = Eλ0[u(φ)]. By Lemma 10, there exist vectors {uk : k ∈
κ(I\T )} ⊆U∗, such that
ukk < u
0
k
for every k ∈ κ(I\T ), and
ukk < u
k′
k
for all k,k′ ∈ κ(I\T ), k 6= k′. For each k ∈ κ(I\T ), let λk ∈ Λ∗ be the distribution over ΦT that
give rise to the payoff vectors uk.
By Lemma 9, it suffices to consider the matching process represented by the automaton
(Θ, p0, f ,γ), where
• Θ = {θ(e,φ) : e ∈ κ(I\T )∪{0},φ ∈ ΦT }∪{θ(k, t) : k ∈ κ(I\T ), 0 ≤ t < L} is the set
of all possible states;
• p0 is the initial distribution over states, which satisfies p0(θ(0,φ)) = λ0(φ) for all φ ∈ΦT ;
• f : Θ→Φ is the output function, where f (θ(e,φ)) = φ and f (θ(k, t)) = φ
k
;
• γ : Θ×Φ→ ∆(Θ) is the transition function. For states {θ(k, t)|0≤ t < L−1}, γ is defined
as
γ
(
θ(k, t),φ′
)
=

θ(k′,0) if φ′ 6= φ
k
; φ′ = [φ
k′,(Ik′,B)] for some k
′ ∈ κ(I\T )
and B ∈ DAk′ (φk′)
θ(k, t+1) otherwise
95
For states θ(k,L−1), the transition is defined as
γ
(
θ(k,L−1),φ′)=

θ(k′,0) if φ′ 6= φ
k
; φ′ = [φ
k′,(Ik′ ,B)] for some k
′ ∈ κ(I\T )
and B ∈ DAk′ (φk′)
pk otherwise
where pk is the distribution over states that satisfies pk(θ(k,φ)) = λk(φ) for all k ∈ κ(I\T )
and φ ∈ΦT .
For states θ(e,φ), the transition is
γ
(
θ(e,φ),φ′
)
=

θ(k′,0) if φ′ 6= φ; φ′ = [φ,(Ik′,B)] for some k′ ∈ κ(I\T ) and B ∈ DAk′ (φ)
pe otherwise
Note that owing to the identifiability of deviating institution, for any θ ∈ Θ and assignment
φ′ 6= f (θ) which can result from an institution’s deviation, we can uniquely identify the institution,
so the transition above is well-defined. Any φ′ 6= f (θ) that cannot possibly result from a deviation
by an institution is ignored by the transition.
The assignment process represented by the above automaton randomizes over ΦT accord-
ing to λ0 in every period. It remains to check that it is self-enforcing, or equivalently,
1. every agent’s payoff is greater than or equal to 0 in all automaton states,
2. no institution has any profitable one-shot deviation in any automaton state,
3. for every institution, the stage-game payoffs across all automaton states are bounded.
Point 3 above follows because the set of states Θ is finite. In every state θ ∈ Θ, the
recommended assignment f (θ) ∈ΦT is individually rational for all agents, so point 1 follows as
well. It remains to verify point 2.
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For every state θ, I use U(θ) = (U1(θ), . . . ,UK(θ)) to denote the discounted expected
payoff profile for the institutions in state θ. By construction,
U(θ(e,φ)) = (1−δ)u(φ)+δue, for all e ∈ κ(I\T )∪{0},
and
U(θ(k, t)) = (1−δL−t)u(φ
k
)+δL−tuk, for all k ∈ κ(I\T ),0≤ t ≤ L−1.
In addition, since ul(φ) = ul(Âl) for every Il ∈ T and all φ ∈ΦT , the above equalities simplify to
Ul(θ(e,φ)) =Ul(θ(k, t)) = ul(Âl) (A.3)
for every Il ∈ T .
I now verify no institution has profitable one shot deviations in any automaton states.
For states
{
θ(e,φ) : e ∈ κ(I\T )∪{0},φ ∈ΦT
}
: there are three cases to consider.
Case 1: Ik′ ∈ T . By A.3, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By Lemma 12, no
feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any profitable one
shot deviation.
Case 2: Ik′ ∈ I\T , k′ 6= e. Choose a number Z > sup{φ∈Φ,k∈κ(I\T )} uk(φ). For any assignment
φ∈ΦT , the manipulated assignment resulting from a feasible deviation must still be an assignment
in Φ. So Z is larger than the payoff any institution can obtain in any feasible deviation from an
assignment in ΦT .
Consider a one-shot deviation (Ik′,B) by institution Ik′ . Without deviation, Ik′ has value
(1−δ)uk′(φ)+δuek′ . After deviation, Ik′ yields less than
(1−δ)Z+δUk′(θ(e,0)) = (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′
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There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δ)uk′(φ)+δuek′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′
As δ→ 1, the LHS converges to uek′ while the RHS converges to uk
′
k′ . By construction, u
e
k′ > u
k′
k′ . It
follows that such deviations are not profitable for δ high enough.
Case 3: Ik′ ∈ I\T , k′ = e. Without deviation, Ik′ has value (1−δ)uk′(φ)+δuk′k′ . After deviation,
Ik′ yields less than
(1−δ)Z+δUk′(θ(k′,0)) = (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′.
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δ)uk′(φ)+δuk
′
k′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′.
The inequality is equivalent to
Z−uk′(φ)≤ δ(1+ . . .+δL−1)[uk
′
k′−uTk′ ]
By construction, uk
′
k′−uTk′ > 0. Choose L large enough so that L(uk
′
k′−uTk′ )> Z−uk′(φ). As δ→ 1,
the LHS remains unchanged while the RHS converges to L(uk
′
k′−uTk′ ), so such deviations are not
profitable for δ high enough.
For states
{
θ(k, t) : k ∈ κ(I\T ),0≤ t ≤ L−1}: there are three cases to consider.
Case 1: Ik′ ∈ T . By A.3, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By Lemma 12, no
feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any profitable one
shot deviation.
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Case 2: Ik′ ∈ I\T , k′ 6= k. Without deviation, institution Ik′ has payoff
(1−δL−t)uk′(φk)+δ
L−tukk′
With any deviation, Ik′ has payoff less than
(1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δL−t)uk′(φk)+δ
L−tukk′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′
Observe that as δ→ 1, the LHS converges to ukk′ for all t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ L, while the RHS
converges to uk
′
k′ . By construction u
k
k′ > u
k′
k′ . So the above inequality holds for sufficiently high δ.
Case 3: Ik′ ∈ I\T , k′ = k. Without deviation, institution Ik′ has payoff
(1−δL−t)uTk′ +δL−tuk
′
k′.
When deviating from φ
k′ , by Lemma 11, Ik’s stage-game payoff is at most u
T
k . So Ik′’s discounted
expected payoff from deviation is at most
(1−δ)uTk′ +δ(1−δL)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′ = (1−δL+1)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′
Institution Ik′ has no profitable deviation if
(1−δL−t)uTk′ +δL−tuk
′
k′ ≥ (1−δL+1)uTk′ +δL+1uk
′
k′, (A.4)
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or
uk
′
k′ ≥ uTk′ ,
which is true by construction. So Ik′ has no profitable one-shot deviation.
We have verified that there is no profitable one-shot deviation in any states of the automa-
ton. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the result, it is sufficient to show that if ψ is a self-enforcing
assignment process, then
1. ψ(h) ∈ΦA at every ex post history h ∈H F ;
2. ψ(Ik|h) = Âk for every Ik ∈ T at every ex post history h ∈H F ; and
3. uk(ψ)≥ uTk for every Ik ∈ I\T .
I now establish these claims in order.
1. This follows from the definition of self-enforcing matching process.
2. If T = /0, there is nothing to prove. Suppose T = {(Ik1, Âk1), . . . ,(IkG , ÂkG)}. The proof
proceeds by induction.
First I establish that in every self-enforcing assignment process ψ, ψ(Ik1|h) = Âk1 for all
h ∈H F . Suppose by contradiction that ψ(Ik1 |h˜) 6= Âk1 for some self-enforcing assignment
process ψ at some h˜ ∈H F .
By the construction of T , uk1(B)≤ uk1(Âk1) for all B⊆ A . By the strictness of institutions’
preferences, uk1(ψ(Ik1|h˜)) < uk1(Âk1). In addition, since uk1(Âk1) is the highest possible
stage-game payoff for Ik1 , uk1(ψ) ≤ uk1(Âk1) for every assignment process ψ. Together
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these imply
uk1(ψ|h˜) = (1−δ)uk1(ψ(Ik1|h˜))+δuk1(ψ|h˜,ψ(h˜))
< (1−δ)uk1(Âk1)+δuk1(Âk1) = uk1(Âk1)
(A.5)
Since ψ is a self-enforcing assignment process, ψ|h˜ must also be self-enforcing, so ψ|h˜(h)∈
ΦA at every h ∈ H F . In addition, for every φ ∈ ΦA , by the construction of T and the
strictness of agents’ preferences, v j(Ik1)> v j(φ) for every a j ∈ Âk1\φ(Ik1). So Âk1 ∈DAk1(φ)
for all φ ∈ΦA . By Lemma 13,
uk1(ψ|h˜)≥ uk1(Âk1) (A.6)
Inequalities (A.5) and (A.6) cannot be true at the same time, a contradiction. So ψ(Ik1|h) =
Âk1 for all h ∈H F .
Suppose it has been shown that in every self-enforcing assignment process ψ, ψ(Iki|h) = Âki
for i = 1, . . . ,g−1 at every ex post history h ∈H F . I show that this implies that in every
self-enforcing assignment process ψ, ψ(Ikg|h) = Âkg at every ex post history h ∈ H F .
Suppose by contradiction that ψ(Ikg|h˜) 6= Âkg for some self-enforcing assignment process
ψ and some h˜ ∈H F .
Since by the inductive hypothesis ψ(Iki|h) = Âki for all 1≤ i≤ g−1 and all h∈H F , it must
be that ψ(Ikg|h)⊆ A\∪g−1i=1 Âki at all h ∈H F . From the construction of T , ukg(ψ(Ikg|h))≤
ukg(Âkg) for all h ∈H F , it follows that at every ex post history h ∈H F ,
ukg(ψ|h)≤ Âkg
In addition, by the strictness of institutions preferences, ψ(Ikg|h˜) 6= Âkg implies that
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ukg(ψ(Ikg|h˜))< ukg(Âkg). Together these imply
ukg(ψ|h˜) = (1−δ)ukg(ψ(Ikg|h˜))+δukg(ψ|h˜,ψ(h˜))
< (1−δ)ukg(Âkg)+δukg(Âkg) = ukg(Âkg)
(A.7)
Since ψ is a self-enforcing assignment process, ψ|h˜ must also be self-enforcing. Let
Φg = {φ∈ΦA : φ(Iki) = Âki for i= 1, . . . ,g−1}. By the inductive hypothesis, ψ|h˜(h)∈Φg
at every h ∈H F . In addition, for every φ ∈Φg, by the construction of T and the strictness
of agents’ preferences, v j(Ikg)> v j(φ) for every a j ∈ Âkg\φ(Ikg). So Âkg ∈ DAkg(φ) for all
φ ∈Φg. By Lemma 13,
uk1(ψ|h˜)≥ uk1(Âk1) (A.8)
Inequalities (A.7) and (A.8) cannot be true at the same time, a contradiction. So ψ(Ikg|h) =
Âkg for all h ∈H F , completing the induction argument.
3. Let ψ be a self-enforcing assignment process. ψ(h) ∈ΦT for all ex post histories h ∈H F .
For every institution Ik ∈ I\T , from the definition of uTk , there exists Aφ ∈DAk (φ) for every
φ ∈ΦT such that
uk(Aφ)≥ uTk .
By Lemma 13, uk(ψ)≥ uTk for every Ik ∈ I\T .
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose all agents share a common ordinal ranking Ik1  Ik2  . . . IkK
over the institutions. For each institution Ikg , 1≤ g≤ K, define
Âkg = argmax
B⊆A\∪g−1i=1 Âki
ukg(B)
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Then T = {(Ik1, Âk1), . . . ,(IkK , ÂkK)} is the top coalition sequence of the matching market. Let
φT be the static assignment that satisfies φT (Ik) = Âk for k = 1, . . . ,K.
Claim 1. φT (Ik) = Âk is the unique static stable matching.
The proof is by induction. It is clear that in every static stable assignment, Ik1 must be
matched to Âk1 , otherwise Âk1 is a feasible profitable deviation for Ik1 . Suppose Ik1, . . . , Ikg−1 is
matched to Âk1 , . . . , Âkg−1 , respectively, in every static assignment. Let φ be an arbitrary static
stable assignment. I prove that φ(Ikg) = Âkg .
Suppose by contradiction that φ(Ikg) 6= Âkg , then by the inductive hypothesis, ψ(a j) ∈
I\{Ik1, . . . , Ikg−1} for every a j ∈ Âkg\φ(Ikg). By the definition of top coalition sequence and
the strictness of agents’ preferences, v j(Ikg)> v j(φ) for every a j ∈ Âkg\φ(Ikg), so Âkg ∈ DAkg(φ).
Similarly, by the inductive hypothesis, φ(Ikg)⊆A\∪g−1i=1 Âki , so ukg(Âkg)> ukg(φ) by the definition
of a top coalition sequence and the strictness of institutions’ preferences. This implies that Âkg is
a profitable and feasible deviation, a contradiction to φ being a stable assignment. So φ(Ikg) = Âkg .
This completes the inductive step.
Claim 2. There is a unique self-enforcing assignment process ψT , where ψT (h) = φT for all
h ∈H F .
Since I ⊆ T , ΦT = {φ : φ(Ik) = Âk ∀k = 1, . . . ,K}. So φT is the unique element of the
set ΦT . The claim then follows from Theorem 1.
A.3 Proofs in Section 1.4
Definition A.3.1. Fix the hierarchy O = {P1, . . . ,PG,R }. For each Ik ∈ Pg,g = 1, . . . ,G, define
P (Ik)≡ ∪Gi=g+1Pi∪{Il ∈ Pg : l < k}
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Definition A.3.2. Fix the hierarchy O = {P1, . . . ,PG,R } and a set of agents C. For each Ik ∈
Pg,g = 1, . . . ,G, the sets of agent AOk (C) is defined by
AOk (C) = argmax
B⊆A\
[
C∪
(
∪Il∈P (Ik)AOl (C)
)]{uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
Definition A.3.3. Fix the hierarchy O = {P1, . . . ,PG,R } and a set of agents C. For each Ik ∈
Pg,g = 1, . . . ,G, define
piOk (C) = uk(A
O
k (C))+ ∑
a j∈AOk (C)
v j(Ik,AOk (C))
Lemma 14. For each Ik ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg, and all C ⊆ A such that |C| ≤ Q(R ),
piOk (C) = p̂ik (A.9)
In addition, for every Ik ∈ R ,
p̂ik > pik(R )
Proof. Fix any Ik ∈ Pg for some g= 1, . . . ,G. By the construction of O, we have p̂ik = pik(I\∪g−1i=1
Pi). Recall that
piOk (C) = uk(A
O
k (C))+ ∑
a j∈AOk (C)
v j(Ik,AOk (C))
= max
B⊆A\
[
C∪
(
∪Il∈P (Ik)AOl (C)
)]{uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
≤max
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
= p̂ik
(A.10)
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Note that since C ≤ Q(R ) and AOl (C)≤ ql for all Il ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg, we have
∣∣∣C∪ (∪Il∈P (Ik) AOl (C))∣∣∣≤ Q(R )+ G∑
i=g
Q(Pi) = Q(I\∪g−1i=1 Pi)
So
piOk (C) = max
B⊆A\
[
C∪
(
∪Il∈P (Ik)AOl (C)
)]{uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
≥ min
{A⊆A :|A|≤Q(I\∪g−1i=1 Pi)}
max
B⊆A\A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
= pik(I\∪g−1i=1 Pi)
(A.11)
Combining inequalities (A.10) and (A.11), we have
p̂ik ≥ piOk (C)≥ pik(I\∪g−1i=1 Pi) = p̂ik,
so piOk (C) = p̂ik.
For every Ik ∈ R , p̂ik ≥ pik(R ). If p̂ik = pik(R ), then by the construction of O, Ik /∈ R , a
contradiction. So p̂ik > pik(R ).
I use κ(R )≡ {k : Ik ∈ R } to denote the indices of institutions that are in R , and Γ(R )≡{
σ : {1,2, . . . , |κ(R )|} → κ(R )} to denote the set of ordering of the numbers in κ(R ). For all
k ∈ κ(R ), define
Γ̂k(R ) = {σ ∈ Γ(R ) : σ(1) = k}.
Γ̂k(R ) is the set of permutations in Γ(R ) that ranks k in the first place.
Definition A.3.4. Given a permutation σ ∈ Γ(R ), the sets of agent {Aσk : k ∈ κ(R )} is defined by
Aσσ(l) = argmax
B⊆A\∪l−1i=1Aσσ(i)
{
uσ(l)(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Iσ(l),B)
}
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for each 1≤ l ≤ |κ(R )|.
Definition A.3.5. For each institution Ik ∈ R and σ ∈ Γ(R ), define
pik(σ) = uk(Aσk )+ ∑
a j∈Aσk
v j(Ik,Aσk )
Lemma 15. For any institution Ik ∈ R , and all σ ∈ Γ̂k(R ),
pik(σ) = p̂ik
Proof. For all σ ∈ Γ̂k(R ), we have σ(1) = k. By definition,
Aσk = A
σ
σ(1) = argmax
B⊆A\∪1−1i=1 Aσσ(i)
{
uσ(1)(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Iσ(1),B)
}
= argmax
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
,
so
pik(σ) = uk(Aσk )+ ∑
a j∈Aσk
v j(Ik,Aσk )
= max
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
= p̂ik
Lemma 16. For any σ ∈ Γ(R ) and any institution Ik ∈ R ,
pik(σ)≥ pik(R )
Proof. For every institution Ik and permutation σ ∈ Γ(R ), define Ck(σ) = ∪{1≤σ−1(l)<σ−1(k)}Aσl .
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Then
Aσk = argmax
B⊆A\Ck(σ)
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
By definition,
pik(σ) = uk(Aσk )+ ∑
a j∈Aσk
v j(Ik,Aσk )
= max
B⊆A\Ck(σ)
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
Note that for all σ ∈ Γ(R ) and k ∈ κ(R ), |Ck(σ)| ≤ Q(R ). So
pik(σ) = max
B⊆A\Ck(σ)
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
≥ min
{A⊆A :|A|≤Q(R )}
max
B⊆A\A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
= pik(R )
Proof of Theorem 4. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: R = /0. It suffices to check that M◦ is nonempty, as any degenerate lottery on M◦ will be
in Λ◦. Define the matching m∗ = (φ∗,{w∗k}Kk=1) by
φ∗(Ik) = AOk ( /0) ∀k = 1, . . . ,K
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and
w∗k j =

−v j(Ik,AOk ( /0)) if a j ∈ AOk ( /0)
0 otherwise
By construction,
uk(m∗) = piOk ( /0)
for all 1≤ k ≤ K.
Since R = /0, we have r = 0, and | /0|= 0 = Q(R ). By Lemma 14, uk(m∗) = piOk ( /0) = p̂ik
for all 1≤ k≤ K. In addition, all employed agents have zero payoff, so m∗ is individually rational
for agents. Therefore, m∗ ∈M◦.
Case 2: R 6= /0. First I show that M◦ is nonempty. For each k ∈ κ(R ), fix
σ̂k ∈ Γ̂k(R )
and define the matchings m̂k = (φ̂k,{ŵkl }Kl=1) by
φ̂k(Il) =

Aσ̂kl if Il ∈ R
AOl (∪i∈κ(R )Aσ̂ki ) if Il ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg
and
ŵkl j =

−v j(Il, φ̂k(Il)) if a j ∈ φ̂k(Il)
0 otherwise
By construction, for each m̂k and every Ik′ ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg,
uk′(m̂k) = piOk′(∪l∈κ(R )Aσ̂kl ) = p̂ik′
where the second equality follows from Lemma 14 and the fact that
∣∣∣∪l∈κ(R )Aσ̂kl ∣∣∣≤ Q(R ). In
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addition, in each m̂k, all agents are getting zero payoff. So {m̂k}k∈κ(R ) ⊆M◦.
To see Λ◦ is nonempty, first observe that for each k ∈ κ(R ),
uk(m̂k) = uk(A
σ̂k
k )− ∑
a j∈Aσ̂kk
ŵkk j
= uk(A
σ̂k
k )+ ∑
a j∈Aσ̂kk
v j(Ik,A
σ̂k
k )
= pik(σ̂k) = p̂ik > pik(R )
The first two equalities above follow from the definition of the matching m̂k, the third equality
follows from the definition of pik(.), the fourth follows from Lemma 15. Lastly, p̂ik > pik(R )
follows from Lemma 14.
Second, for all k,k′ ∈ κ(R ), k 6= k′,
uk′(m̂k) = uk′(A
σ̂k
k′ )− ∑
a j∈Aσ̂kk′
ŵkk′ j
= uk′(A
σ̂k
k′ )+ ∑
a j∈Aσ̂kk′
v j(Ik′,A
σ̂k
k′ )
= pik′(σ̂k)≥ pik′(R )
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 16.
Fix a set of weights {λl : l ∈ κ(R )} that satisfy
λl > 0 ∀l ∈ κ(R ), and ∑
l∈κ(R )
λl = 1.
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Let λ0 ∈ ∆(M◦) be the lottery over M◦ that is defined by
λ0 = ∑
l∈κ(R )
λlm̂l
I will show Eλ0[uk(m)]> pik(R ) ∀k ∈ κ(R ), which proves λ0 ∈ Λ◦ and therefore the nonempty-
ness of Λ◦.
Fix any k ∈ κ(R ), then uk(m̂l) ≥ pik(R ) for all l ∈ κ(R ). In addition, uk(m̂k) = p̂ik >
pik(R ). So Eλ0[uk(m)] = ∑l∈κ(R )λluk(m̂l)> pik(R ), and λ0 ∈ Λ◦.
Lemma 17. For every m ∈M◦ and every Ik ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg,
sup
(A′k′ ,ζ
′
k′)∈Dk′(m)
uk′(m, [A
′
k′,ζ
′
k′]) = uk′(m),
so no institution in ∪Gg=1Pg has profitable feasible deviations.
Proof. Consider any feasible deviation (A′k,ζ
′
k) ∈ Dk(m). For the deviation to be feasible, each
a j ∈ A′k must be individually rational, so v j(Ik,A′k)+ζ′k j ≥ 0. This implies
uk(A′k)− ∑
a j∈A′k
ζ′k j ≤ ul(A′k)+ ∑
a j∈A′k
v j(Ik,A′k)
≤max
A⊆A
uk(A)+ ∑
a j∈A
v j(Ik,A)
= p̂ik = uk(m)
Lemma 18. Suppose R = /0, then every matching in m ∈M◦ is a static stable matching
Proof. Since R = /0, ∪Gg=1Pg = I . By Lemma 17, no institutions in I has any profitable feasible
deviations. By construction, every agent a j ∈ A has utility v j(m) ≥ 0, so no agent has any
profitable deviation. The matching m is a static stable matching.
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Lemma 19. Suppose R 6= /0, then there exist static matchings {mk}k∈κ(R ) ⊆M◦ such that
1. for all k ∈ κ(R ), uk(mk)≤ pik(R );
2. for all k ∈ κ(R ),
sup
(A′k,ζ
′
k)∈Dk(mk)
uk(mk, [A
′
k,ζ
′
k])≤ pik(R );
Proof. For each k ∈ κ(R ), I use Ak to denote the set of agents
Ak = argmin
{A⊆A :|A|≤Q(R )}
max
B⊆A\A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
,
and bk to denote the value
bk = max
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
−pik(R ).
Note that bk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ κ(R ). For each institution k ∈ κ(R ), let {Alk}l∈κ(R ) be a partition of
Ak such that
∣∣Alk∣∣≤ ql for all l ∈ κ(R ). This is possible because |Ak| ≤ Q(R ) by construction.
Define the static matching mk = (φk,{ζkl }Kl=1) by
φk(Il) =

Alk if l ∈ R
AOl (Ak) if l ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg
and
ζk
l j
=

bk− v j(Il,φk(Il)) if l ∈ R , and a j ∈ φk(Il)
−v j(Il,φk(Il)) if l ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg, and a j ∈ φk(Il)
0 otherwise
By construction, ul(mk) = piOl (Ak) for all l ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg. Since |Ak| ≤ Q(R ), by Lemma 14, we
have ul(mk) = piOl (Ak) = p̂il for all l ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg, so mk ∈M◦.
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1. For each l ∈ R , if Akk = /0, then
uk(mk) = uk( /0)
≤ max
{B:B⊆A\A}
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
for all A such that |A| ≤ Q(R ). So
uk(mk)≤ min{A⊆A :|A|≤Q(R )} maxB⊆A\A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
= pik(R )
If Akk 6= /0, then
uk(mk) = uk(A
k
k)− ∑
a j∈Akk
ζk
k j
= uk(Akk)+ ∑
a j∈Akk
v j(Ik,Akk)−
∣∣∣Akk∣∣∣ ·bk
≤ uk(Akk)+ ∑
a j∈Akk
v j(Ik,Akk)−bk
= uk(Akk)+ ∑
a j∈Akk
v j(Ik,Akk)−maxB⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
+pik(R )
≤ pik(R )
The first two equalities above follow from the definition of the matching mk; the first
inequality follows from
∣∣Akk∣∣≥ 1 and the fact that bk ≥ 0.
2. Consider any feasible deviation (A′k,ζ
′
k) ∈ Dk(mk). Suppose A′k ⊆ A\Ak. By feasibility,
each a j ∈ A′k must at least find the deviation individually rational, so v j(Ik,A′k)+ζ′k j ≥ 0.
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This implies
uk(A′k)− ∑
a j∈A′k
ζ′k j ≤ uk(A′k)+ ∑
a j∈A′k
v j(Ik,A′k)
≤ max
B⊆A\Ak
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
= pik(R )
where the second inequality above follows from the fact that A′k ⊆ A\Ak, and the equality
follows the definition of Ak.
Suppose instead A′k * A\Ak. Fix ai ∈ A′k∩Ak. By the construction of mk, vi(mk) = bk. For
the deviation to be feasible, ai must obtain a payoff weakly higher than in mk (and strictly
higher than in mk if ai /∈ Akk) , so vi(Ik,A′k)+ζ′ki ≥ bk, or −ζ′k j ≤ vi(Ik,A′k)−bk; at the same
time, every other agent a j ∈ A′k needs to at least find the deviation individually rational, so
v j(Ik,A′k)+ζ
′
k j ≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A′k, a j 6= ai. We have
uk(A′k)− ∑
a j∈A′k
ζ′k j = uk(A
′
k)−ζ′ki− ∑
a j∈A′k,a j 6=ai
ζ′k j
≤ uk(A′k)+ ∑
a j∈A′k
v j(Ik,A′k)−bk
= uk(A′k)+ ∑
a j∈A′k
v j(Ik,A′k)−maxB⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
+pik(R )
≤ pik(R ).
We have shown that uk(mk, [A
′
k,ζ
′
k])≤ pik(R ) regardless of whether A′k ⊆ A\Ak, so
sup
(A′k,ζ
′
k)∈Dk(mk)
uk(mk, [A
′
k,ζ
′
k])≤ pik(R ).
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Lemma 20. Let U◦ =
{
Eλ[u(m)] : λ ∈ Λ◦
}
. If |R | ≥ 2, for every vector u ∈U◦, there exist
vectors {uk : k ∈ κ(R )} ⊆U◦ such that
ukk < uk
for all k ∈ κ(R ), and
ukk < u
k′
k
for all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(R ).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994). Compared to Abreu,
Dutta, and Smith (1994), the changes are:
1. instead of imposing NEU condition like Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994), it is shown that
the matching environment always satisfies NEU;
2. since the set M◦ can be potentially infinite, a different method of construction for uk is
needed;
3. the current proof operate in a cooperative game environment without action spaces; and
4. only a subset of indices, κ(R ), are concerned.
Whenever possible, I will cite intermediate results in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) without
reproducing their proofs. I will first establish that the set M◦ satisfies what Abreu, Dutta, and
Smith (1994) called the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition for institutions in R . Fix an
arbitrary m0 = (φ0,{ζ0l }Kl=1) ∈M◦ and define
bk = max
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
−pik(R ).
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Note that bk > 0 for all k ∈ κ(R ). For each k ∈ κ(R ), define the matching mk = (φk,{ζkl }Kl=1) by
φk = φ0, and
ζkl j =

ζ0k j +bk if l = k and a j ∈ φk(Ik)
ζ0l j otherwise
Now I establish a few properties about the matchings mk.
Clearly, v j(mk) = v j(m0) for all j ∈ A\φk(Ik), and v j(mk)> v j(m0) for all j ∈ φk(Ik), so
mk is individually rational for all agents. In addition, uk(mk) = uk(m0) = p̂ik for all Ik ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg.
It follows that mk ∈M◦ for all k ∈ κ(R ).
By the construction of {mk : k ∈ κ(R )}, for each k ∈ κ(R ),
uk(mk) = uk(φk(Ik))− ∑
a j∈φk(Ik)
ζkk j
= uk(φ0(Ik))− ∑
a j∈φ0(Ik)
ζ0k j−
∣∣φ0(Ik)∣∣ ·bk
≤ uk(φ0(Ik))− ∑
a j∈φ0(Ik)
ζ0k j−bk
≤ uk(φ0(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ0(Ik)
v j(Ik,φ0(Ik))−bk
= uk(φ0(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ0(Ik)
v j(Ik,φ0(Ik))−max
B⊆A
{
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
}
+pik(R )
≤ pik(R ).
(A.12)
The first two equalities follow from the definition of mk; the first inequality follows because
bk > 0; the second inequality follows m0 is individually rational for agents and therefore ζ0k j +
v j(Ik,φ0(Ik))≥ 0; the third equality follows from the definition of bk; the last inequality follows
by construction.
For each pair of k 6= k′ ∈ κ(R ), uk(m0) = uk(mk′), while uk′(m0)> uk′(mk′). Therefore,
for each pair k 6= k′ ∈ κ(R ), there do not exist scalars α> 0 and β such that uk(m) = αuk′(m)+β
115
for all m ∈M◦. This verifies the NEU condition in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) for indices in
κ(R ).
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) then ensure the existence of
vectors {ûk : k ∈ κ(R )} ⊆ {Eλ[u(m)] : λ ∈ ∆(M◦)} that satisfy ûkk < ûk
′
k for all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(R ).
For an arbitrary vector u0 ∈U◦, define
uk = ε(1−η)u(mk)+ηεûk +(1− ε)u
for each k ∈ κ(R ).
First observed that by the construction of {mk : k ∈ {0}∪κ(R )}, uk(mk) < uk(m0) =
uk(mk
′
), so ukk < u
k′
k if εη> 0. Second, since {mk : k ∈ κ(R )}⊆M◦, uk ∈ co(UT ) for all 0< ε< 1
and 0< η< 1. Third, for small enough ε> 0, ukk > pik(R ). Finally, by inequality (A.12), for small
enough η > 0, it must be true that ukk < uk. Therefore, there must exist {uk : k ∈ κ(R )} ⊆U◦
such that
ukk < uk
for all k ∈ κ(R ), and
ukk < u
k′
k
for all k 6= k′ ∈ κ(R ).
Lemma 21. If a matching m = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1) ∈ M is individually rational for all agents, then
uk(m)≤ p̂ik for all Ik ∈ I
Proof. Since m is individually rational for agents, it must be that v j(Ik,φ(Ik)) + ζk j ≥ 0, or
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equivalently, −ζk j ≤+v j(Ik,φ(Ik)) for all a j ∈ φ(Ik). So
uk(m) = uk(φ(Ik))− ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
ζk j
≤ uk(φ(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
v j(Ik,φ(Ik))
≤max
B⊆A
uk(B)+ ∑
a j∈B
v j(Ik,B)
= p̂ik.
Proof of Theorem 3. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: R = /0. By Lemma 18, all λ∈Λ◦ are lotteries over static stable matchings. The matching
process µ∗ defined by
µ∗(ĥ) = λ0 ∀ĥ ∈H
is a self-enforcing matching process.
Case 2: |R |= 1. Suppose R = {Ik}. Fix any λ0 ∈ Λ◦ and define u0 ≡ Eλ0[u(m)]. Let mk ∈M◦
be the static matching constructed in Lemma 19. Note that mk ∈M◦, and
uk(mk)≤ pik(R ) (A.13)
Let ρ ∈ (0,1) be such that
(1− ρ˜)uk(mk)+ ρ˜u0k > pik(R ), (A.14)
for all ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1]. When the post-minmaxing phase payoffs are discounted at ρ, inequality (A.14)
implies that compared to obtaining its minmax value forever, institution Ik would rather live with
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the lower payoff uk(mk) during the minmax phase, with the promise of transitioning back into the
lottery λ0;
The above inequalities holds at ρ= 1, so there exists a value of ρ ∈ (0,1) such that the
inequality holds for all ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1]. Let L(δ)≡
⌈
logρ
logδ
⌉
where d·e is the ceiling function. Below, we
use the property that limδ→1 δL(δ) = ρ.1
By Lemma 9, it suffices to consider the matching process represented by the automaton
(Θ, p0, f ,γ), where
• Θ= {θ(m) : m ∈M◦}∪{θ(t) : 0≤ t < L(δ)} is the set of all possible states;
• p0 is the initial distribution over states, which satisfies p0(θ(m)) = λ0(m) for all m ∈M◦;
• f : Θ→M is the output function, where f (θ(m)) = m and f (θ(t)) = mk;
• γ :Θ×M→ ∆(Θ) is the transition function. For states {θ(t)|0≤ t < L(δ)−1}, γ is defined
as
γ
(
θ(t),m′
)
=

θ(0) if m′ 6= mk; m′ = [mk,(Ik,A′k,ζ′k)]
θ(t+1) otherwise
For states θ(L(δ)−1), the transition is defined as
γ
(
θ(L(δ)−1),m′)=

θ(0) if m′ 6= mk; m′ = [mk,(Ik,A′k,ζ′k)]
p0 otherwise
For states θ(m), the transition is
γ
(
θ(m),m′
)
=

θ(0) if m′ 6= m; m′ = [m,(Ik,A′k,ζ′k)]
p0 otherwise
1To see why, observe that δL(δ) ∈ [δ
logρ
logδ ,δ
logρ
logδ+1] = [δρ,ρ]→{ρ} as δ→ 1
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Note that owing to the identifiability of deviating institution, for any θ∈Θ and matching m 6= f (θ)
which can (but not necessarily does) result from Ik’s deviation, we can uniquely identify Ik as the
deviating institution, so the transition above is well-defined. Any m 6= f (θ) that cannot possibly
result from a deviation by Ik is ignored by the transition.
The matching process represented by the above automaton randomizes over M◦ according
to λ0 in every period. It remains to check that it is self-enforcing, or equivalently,
1. every agent’s payoff is greater than or equal to 0 in all automaton states,
2. no institution has any profitable one-shot deviation in any automaton state,
3. for every institution, the stage-game payoffs across all automaton states are bounded.
Point 3 above follows by the construction of λ0. In every state θ ∈Θ, the recommended
assignment f (θ) ∈M◦ is individually rational for all agents, so point 1 follows as well. It remains
to verify point 2.
For every state θ, I use U(θ) = (U1(θ), . . . ,UK(θ)) to denote the discounted expected
payoff profile for the institutions in state θ. By construction,
Uk(θ(m)) = (1−δ)u(m)+δu0,
and
Uk(θ(t)) = (1−δL(δ)−t)u(mk)+δL(δ)−tu0
In addition, since ul(m) = p̂il for every Il 6= Ik and all m ∈M◦, the above equalities simplify to
Ul(θ(m)) =Ul(θ(t)) = p̂il (A.15)
for every Il 6= Ik.
I now verify no institution Ik′ has profitable one shot deviations in any automaton states.
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For states
{
θ(m) : m ∈M◦}: there are two cases to consider.
Case a: Ik′ 6= Ik. By A.15, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By Lemma 17,
no feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any profitable
one shot deviation.
Case b: Ik′ = Ik. Without deviation, Ik has value (1− δ)uk(m)+ δu0k . After deviation, Ik yields
less than
(1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1u0k .
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik if
(1−δ)uk(m)+δu0k ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1u0k .
The inequality is equivalent to
(1−δ)(Z−uk(m))≤ δ(1−δL(δ))[u0k−uk(mk)]
As δ→ 1, the LHS converges to 0 while the RHS converges to (1− ρ)(u0k − uk(mk)). By
construction, 0 < (1−ρ)(u0k−uk(mk)), so such deviations are not profitable for δ high enough.
For states
{
θ(t) : 0≤ t ≤ L(δ)−1}: there are two cases to consider.
Case a: Ik′ 6= Ik. By A.15, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By Lemma 17,
no feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any profitable
one shot deviation.
Case b: Ik′ ∈ R , k′ = k. Without deviation, institution Ik has payoff
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk(mk)+δL(δ)−tu0k
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With any deviation, Ik has payoff less than
(1−δ)pik(R )+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1u0k
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik if, for all 0≤ t ≤ L(δ),
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk(mk)+δL(δ)−tu0k ≥ (1−δ)pik(R )+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1u0k
Since uk(mk)≤ pi(R )< ukk, the LHS of the above inequality is monotonically increasing in t. As
a result, to show that the above inequality holds for all 0≤ t ≤ L(δ), it is sufficient to show that it
holds for t = 0.
When t = 0, the above inequality is equivalent to
(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)u0k ≥ uk(R )
By inequality (A.14), this is satisfied for δ suffifiently close to 1.
Case 3: |R | ≥ 2. Fix any λ0 ∈ Λ◦. Let {mk}k∈κ(R ) ⊆M◦ be the static matchings as constructed
in Lemma 19. Note that {mk}k∈κ(R ) ⊆M◦, and
uk(mk)≤ pik(R ) (A.16)
for k ∈ κ(R ). Define u0 ≡ Eλ0[u(m)]. By Lemma 20, there exist payoff vectors {uk}k∈κ(R ) ⊆U◦
such that ukk < u
0
k for all k ∈ κ(R ), and ukk < uk
′
k for all k 6= k′, k,k′ ∈ κ(R ). For each k ∈ κ(R ),
let λk ∈ Λ◦ be the distribution over M◦ that give rise to the payoff vector uk.
Given {uk}k∈κ(R ) and {mk}k∈κ(R ), let ρ ∈ (0,1) be such that
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1. for every k ∈ κ(R ) and every ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1],
(1− ρ˜)uk(mk)+ ρ˜ukk > pik(R ), (A.17)
and
2. for all k,k′ ∈ κ(R ), k′ 6= k, and every ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1],
(1− ρ˜)uk(mk′)+ ρ˜uk
′
k > (1− ρ˜)uk(mk)+ ρ˜ukk. (A.18)
When the post-minmaxing phase payoffs are discounted at ρ, inequality (A.17) implies
that compared to obtaining its minmax value forever, institution Ik would rather live with the lower
payoff uk(mk) during the minmax phase, with the promise of transitioning into its institution
specific punishment; inequality (A.18) implies that institution Ik′ is willing to bear the cost of
minmaxing institution Ik with the promise of transitioning into institution Ik’s specific punishment
rather than its own.
The above inequalities holds at ρ = 1 for each k and k′ 6= k. Since the set of players is
finite, there exists a value of ρ ∈ (0,1) such that the inequality holds for all ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1], k,k′ ∈ κ(R )
and k 6= k′. Let L(δ)≡
⌈
logρ
logδ
⌉
where d·e is the ceiling function. Below, we use the property that
limδ→1 δL(δ) = ρ.2
By Lemma 9, it suffices to consider the matching process represented by the automaton
(Θ, p0, f ,γ), where
• Θ= {θ(e,m) : e ∈ κ(R )∪{0},m ∈M◦}∪{θ(k, t) : k ∈ κ(R ), 0≤ t < L(δ)} is the set of
all possible states;
• p0 is the initial distribution over states, which satisfies p0(θ(0,m)) = λ0(m) for all m ∈M◦;
2To see why, observe that δL(δ) ∈ [δ
logρ
logδ ,δ
logρ
logδ+1] = [δρ,ρ]→{ρ} as δ→ 1
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• f : Θ→M is the output function, where f (θ(e,m)) = m and f (θ(k, t)) = mk;
• γ : Θ×M → ∆(Θ) is the transition function. For states {θ(k, t)|0 ≤ t < L(δ)− 1}, γ is
defined as
γ
(
θ(k, t),m′
)
=

θ(k′,0) if m′ 6= mk; m′ = [mk′,(Ik′,A′k′,ζ′k′)] for some
k′ ∈ κ(R ) and (A′k′,ζ′k′) ∈ Dk′(mk′)
θ(k, t+1) otherwise
For states θ(k,L(δ)−1), the transition is defined as
γ
(
θ(k,L(δ)−1),m′)=

θ(k′,0) if m′ 6= mk; m′ = [mk′,(Ik′,A′k′ ,ζ′k′)] for some
k′ ∈ κ(R ) and (A′k′,ζ′k′) ∈ Dk′(mk′)
pk otherwise
where pk is the distribution over states that satisfies pk(θ(k,m)) = λk(m) for all k ∈ κ(R )
and m ∈M◦.
For states θ(e,m), the transition is
γ
(
θ(e,m),m′
)
=

θ(k′,0) if m′ 6= m; m′ = [m,(Ik′,A′k′,ζ′k′)] for some
k′ ∈ κ(R ) and (A′k′,ζ′k′) ∈ Dk′(m)
pe otherwise
Note that owing to the identifiability of deviating institution, for any θ∈Θ and matching m 6= f (θ)
which can (but not necessarily does) result from an institution’s deviation, we can uniquely identify
the institution, so the transition above is well-defined. Any m 6= f (θ) that cannot possibly result
from a deviation by an institution is ignored by the transition.
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The matching process represented by the above automaton randomizes over M◦ according
to λ0 in every period. It remains to check that it is self-enforcing, or equivalently,
1. every agent’s payoff is greater than or equal to 0 in all automaton states,
2. no institution has any profitable one-shot deviation in any automaton state,
3. for every institution, the stage-game payoffs across all automaton states are bounded.
Point 3 above follows by the construction of λ0. In every state θ ∈Θ, the recommended
assignment f (θ) ∈M◦ is individually rational for all agents, so point 1 follows as well. It remains
to verify point 2.
For every state θ, I use U(θ) = (U1(θ), . . . ,UK(θ)) to denote the discounted expected
payoff profile for the institutions in state θ. By construction,
U(θ(e,m)) = (1−δ)u(m)+δue, for all e ∈ κ(R )∪{0},
and
U(θ(k, t)) = (1−δL(δ)−t)u(mk)+δL(δ)−tuk, for all k ∈ κ(R ),0≤ t ≤ L(δ)−1.
In addition, since ul(m) = p̂il for every Il ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg and all m ∈M◦, the above equalities simplify
to
Ul(θ(e,m)) =Ul(θ(k, t)) = p̂il (A.19)
for every Il ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg.
I now verify no institution Ik′ has profitable one shot deviations in any automaton states.
For states
{
θ(e,m) : e ∈ κ(R )∪{0},m ∈M◦}: there are three cases to consider.
Case a: Ik′ ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg. By A.19, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By
Lemma 17, no feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any
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profitable one shot deviation.
Case b: Ik′ ∈ R , k′ 6= e. Choose a number Z > supm∈M◦ supm′∈Dk(m) uk(m′). For any matching
m ∈M◦, the manipulated matching resulting from a feasible deviation must still be individually
rational. So Z is finite by Lemma 21, and is larger than the payoff any institution can obtain in
any feasible deviation from a matching in M◦.
Consider a one-shot deviation (Ik′,A′k′,ζ
′
k′) by institution Ik′ . Without deviation, Ik′ has
value (1−δ)uk′(m)+δuek′ . After deviation, Ik′ yields less than
(1−δ)Z+δUk′(θ(e,0)) = (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δ)uk′(m)+δuek′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′
As δ→ 1, the LHS converges to uek′ while the RHS converges to (1−ρ)uk′(mk′)+ρuk
′
k′ .
By construction, uek′ > u
k′
k′ and u
k′
k′ > pik′(R ) for all k
′ such that k′ ∈ κ(R ) and k′ 6= e. From A.16,
it follows that uek′ > u
k′
k′ > (1−ρ)pik′(R )+ρuk
′
k′ ≥ (1−ρ)uk′(mk′)+ρuk
′
k′ , so such deviations are
not profitable for δ high enough.
Case c: Ik′ ∈ R , k′ = e. Without deviation, Ik′ has value (1−δ)uk′(m)+δuk′k′ . After deviation, Ik′
yields less than
(1−δ)Z+δUk′(θ(k′,0)) = (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′.
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δ)uk′(m)+δuk
′
k′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′.
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The inequality is equivalent to
(1−δ)(Z−uk′(m))≤ δ(1−δL(δ))[uk
′
k′−uk′(mk′)]
As δ→ 1, the LHS converges to 0 while the RHS converges to (1− ρ)(uk′k′ − uk′(mk′)). By
construction, 0 < (1−ρ)(uk′k′−uk′(mk′)) for k ∈ κ(R ), so such deviations are not profitable for δ
high enough.
For states
{
θ(k, t) : k ∈ κ(R ),0≤ t ≤ L(δ)−1}: there are three cases to consider.
Case a: Ik′ ∈ ∪Gg=1Pg. By A.19, the continuation value of Ik′ is identical across states. By
Lemma 17, no feasible deviation for Ik′ can improve its stage-game payoff. Ik′ does not have any
profitable one shot deviation.
Case b: Ik′ ∈ R , k′ 6= k. Without deviation, institution Ik′ has payoff
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk′(mk)+δL(δ)−tukk′
With any deviation, Ik′ has payoff less than
(1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik′ if
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk′(mk)+δL(δ)−tukk′ ≥ (1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′ (A.20)
We prove that this inequality is satisfied if δ is sufficiently high. Examining the LHS of
126
inequality (A.20), observe that for all t such that 0≤ t ≤ L(δ),
lim
δ→1
[
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk′(mk)+δL(δ)−tukk′
]
= lim
δ→1
[(
1− ρ
δt
)
uk′(mk)+
ρ
δt
ukk′
]
= (1− ρ˜)uk′(mk)+ ρ˜ukk′
for some ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1].3
Examining the RHS of inequality (A.20), observe that
lim
δ→1
[
(1−δ)Z+δ(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)+1uk
′
k′
]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1−δL(δ))uk′(mk′)+δL(δ)uk
′
k′
]
= (1−ρ)uk′(mk′)+ρuk
′
k′
≤ (1− ρ˜)uk′(mk′)+ ρ˜uk
′
k′,
where the first equality follows from taking limits, the second from limδ→1 δL(δ) = ρ, and the
weak inequality follows from ρ˜ ≥ ρ and uk′(mk′) ≤ pik′(R ) < uk
′
k′ . Since ρ˜ ∈ [ρ,1], inequality
(A.18) delivers that (1− ρ˜)uk′(mk)+ ρ˜ukk′ is strictly higher than (1− ρ˜)uk′(mk′)+ ρ˜uk
′
k′ . This
guarantees that inequality (A.20) holds for sufficiently high δ.
Case c: Ik′ ∈ R , k′ = k. Without deviation, institution Ik has payoff
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk(mk)+δL(δ)−tukk
With any deviation, Ik has payoff less than
(1−δ)pik(R )+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1ukk
3In the second equality, we use ρ˜ rather than ρ because τ is any integer between 0 and L(δ).
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There is no profitable one-shot deviation for Ik if, for all 0≤ t ≤ L(δ),
(1−δL(δ)−t)uk(mk)+δL(δ)−tukk ≥ (1−δ)pik(R )+δ(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)+1ukk
Since uk(mk)≤ pi(R )< ukk, the LHS of the above inequality is monotonically increasing in t. As
a result, to show that the above inequality holds for all 0≤ t ≤ L(δ), it is sufficient to show that it
holds for t = 0.
When t = 0, the above inequality is equivalent to
(1−δL(δ))uk(mk)+δL(δ)ukk ≥ uk(R )
By inequality (A.17), this is satisfied for δ suffifiently close to 1.
Lemma 22. Let µ = (ψ,{ξk}Kk=1) be a self-enforcing matching process, then uk(µ)≤ p̂ik for all
Ik ∈ I .
Proof. By the one-shot deviation principle, v j(µ(h))≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A , at every ex post history h.
So by Lemma 21, uk(µ(h))≤ p̂ik at every h ∈H . Therefore, as the discounted sum of per-period
utilities, uk(µ)≤ p̂ik as well.
Lemma 23. Let m = (φ,{ζl}Kl=1) be a static matching that satisfies v j(m)≥ 0 for all a j ∈ A . If
uk(m) = uk(φ(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
v j(Ik,φ(Ik)),
for some Ik ∈ I , then v j(m) = 0 for all a j ∈ φ(Ik).
Proof. For every a j ∈ φ(Ik), since v j(m) = v j(Ik,φ(Ik))+ζk j ≥ 0, we have −ζk j ≤ v j(Ik,φ(Ik)).
Suppose by contradiction that vi(m)> 0 for some ai ∈ φ(Ik), then −ζki < vi(Ik,φ(Ik)). It follows
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that
uk(m) = uk(φ(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
ζk j
= uk(φ(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ(Ik), j 6=i
ζk j +ζki
< uk(φ(Ik))+ ∑
a j∈φ(Ik)
v j(Ik,φ(Ik)),
a contradiction.
Lemma 24. Let M′ ⊆ M be a subset of stage-game matchings, and µ : H → M′ be a self-
enforcing matching process. Fix an institution Ik ∈ I . If for every m ∈ M′, Ik has a feasible
deviation (Amk ,ζ
m
k ) ∈ Dk(m) that satisfies uk([m,(Ik,Amk ,ζmk )])≥ uk, then
uk(µ)≥ uk
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that µ is a self-enforcing matching process, but uk(µ)< uk. I
will show that institution Ik has a feasible profitable deviation plan from µ, so µ must not be
self-enforcing. Consider the following deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) from µ: for every ex post history
h ∈H , define
d′k(h) = A
µ(h)
k and ξ
′
k(h) = ζ
µ
k
By assumption, µ(h)∈M′ for all h∈H , so (d′k,ξ′k) is well-defined and feasible. To see that (d′k,ξ′k)
is profitable, observe that at every ex post history h, institution Ik’s stage-game payoff from the
manipulated static assignment [µ(h),(Ik,d′k(h),ξ
′
k(h))] is uk([µ(h),(Ik,A
µ(h)
k ,ζ
µ(h)
k )])≥ uk > uk(µ).
Since this is true for every ex post history h, Ik’s total discounted payoff from the deviation plan
satisfies
uk([µ,(Ik,d′k,ξ
′
k)])> uk(µ).
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The deviation plan (d′k,ξ
′
k) is both feasible and profitable for institution Ik, which is a
contradiction to the self-enforcement of µ. So uk(µ)≥ uk.
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Appendix B
Proofs in Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 5. (⇒) First, we show that a nonseparable costly information representation
satisfies NIAS. Fix A ∈ D, piA ∈ argmaxpi∈ΠV (pi · fA,pi), and CA : Supp(piA)→ ∆(A) and a ∈
Supp(PA). By definition of a nonseparable costly information representation, we know that the
V (piA · fA,piA) is monotone in piA · fA and choices are optimal conditional on posteriors. Thus, if a
was chosen when γ was realized, then the expected utility must be weakly higher for these γ. For
γ such that CA(a | γ)> 0,
∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ(ω)u(b(ω)) ∀b ∈ A.
The proof now follows from arguments in Caplin and Dean 2015 that are reproduced here for
completeness. Recall that
γ(ω) =
µ(ω)piA(γ | ω)
∑ν∈Ω µ(ν)pi(γ | ν)
,
which can be substituted on both sides and the denominator cancels so
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)piA(γ | ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)piA(γ | ω)u(b(ω)) ∀b ∈ A.
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Therefore,
∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
CA(a | γ)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)piA(γ | ω)u(a(ω))
]
≥ ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
CA(a | γ)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)piA(γ | ω)u(b(ω))
]
∀b ∈ A
since CA(a | γ) are either zero or positive multiples of the earlier introduced inequalities. Next,
recall from data matching that PA(a | ω) = ∑γ∈Supp(piA)piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ). Therefore, we see that
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)u(a(ω))PA(a | ω) = ∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)u(a(ω))
[
∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
piA(γ | ω)CA(a | γ)
]
= ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
CA(a | γ)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)u(a(ω))piA(γ | ω)
]
≥ ∑
γ∈Supp(piA)
CA(a | γ)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)u(b(ω))piA(γ | ω)
]
= ∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)u(b(ω))PA(a | ω)
where the first set of equalities follows from substitutions, the inequality follows from optimality
conditional on γ, and the last equality follows from the same substitutions above. Rearranging
this inequality shows that NIAS is satisfied.
Next, we show that a nonseparable costly information representation implies GACI. Ob-
serve argmaxpiV (pi · fA,pi) =V (piA · fA,piA) by definition. We first establish that V (piA · fA,piA)>
−∞ for all A ∈ D. To see this, notice that for all A ∈ D, fA is a continuous function on the
compact set Γ, so fA achieves a minimum value cA. By non-triviality, there exists picA such that
V (cA,picA) > −∞. Observe picA · fA ≥ cA. By monotonicity, V (picA · fA,picA) ≥ V (cA,picA) > −∞.
Since piA is the optimal choice, we have V (piA · fA,piA)≥V (cA,picA)>−∞.
Suppose without loss of generality that p¯iAi · fAi ≤ p¯iAi · fAi+1 for i = {1, . . . ,k} (with
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addition modulo k). It follows that
V (piAi · fAi,piAi) =V (p¯iAi · fAi,piAi)
≤V (p¯iAi · fAi+1,piAi) (B.1)
≤V (piAi · fAi+1,piAi)≤V (piAi+1 · fAi+1,piAi+1)
Since V (p¯iAi · fAi,piAi) =V (piAi · fAi,piAi)>−∞ for all i, strict monotonicity in the first component
of V implies that the inequality in (B.1) is strict if p¯iAi · fAi < p¯iAi · fAi+1 . Suppose there is a strict
inequality in the sequence, then we obtain the contradiction V (piA1 · fA1,piA1)<V (piA1 · fA1,piA1).
Consequently, we must have p¯iAi · fAi = p¯iAi · fAi+1 for all i.
(⇐) The converse is a direct application of Afriat’s Theorem. Let αA,B =−p¯iA · ( fB− fA)
for all (A,B) ∈ D2. Observe that by GACI, the condition in Afriat’s Theorem is satisfied.
Conclude there is UA and λA > 0 such that for all (A,B) ∈ D2, UA ≤ UB− λBp¯iB · ( fA− fB).
Taking negatives and letting U˜A =−UA, we have
U˜B+λBp¯iB( fA− fB)≤ U˜A.
Most of the remaining construction follows Afriat’s theorem directly. Let C(Γ) be the set
of continuous, convex functions on Γ. Define U : C(Γ)→ R by
U( f ) = max
A∈D
U˜A+λAp¯iA · ( f − fA)
Clearly, U is convex, continuous, and monotone increasing1 (as the maximum of a finite number
of continuous affine functionals). For every A ∈D, U( fA) = U˜A by construction. Moreover, for
every A∈D , if p¯iA · f ≥ p¯iA · fA, then U( f )≥U( fA), which is also straightforward by construction.
Define V : R×Π→ R∪{−∞} by V (t,pi) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : pi · f ≥ t}. Observe that
1The functional U is monotone increasing in f if ( f −g)(γ)> 0 for all γ ∈ Γ, then U( f )>U(g).
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the monotonicity condition is trivially satisfied for fixed pi, since a greater t reduces the set of
f ∈C(Γ) satisfying the inequality.
The assumption that for each t ∈ R, there exists a pit ∈Π such that V (t,pit)>−∞ is also
satisfied. In fact, we will show V (t, p¯iA) > −∞ for any t ∈ R and A ∈ D. For any t ∈ R, let
Gt− = {g ∈C(Γ) |U(g)≤ t}. Gt− is closed and convex by the continuity and convexity of U(·).
The set of continuous functions on γ, of which C(Γ) is a subset, is the topological dual
to the set of signed Borel measures with bounded variation over Γ (Aliprantis and Border 2006
Theorem 14.15). Let M(Γ) be the set of such measures on Γ.
Fix Â ∈D . Note that for any f ∈ Gt− that
U˜Â+λÂp¯iÂ · ( f − fÂ)≤U( f ) = maxA∈D U˜A+λAp¯iA · ( f − fA)≤ t.
Rearranging the equation gives
sup
f∈Gt−
p¯iÂ · f ≤
t−U˜Â+λÂp¯iÂ fÂ
λÂ
Let K(t) =
t−U˜Â+λÂp¯iÂ fÂ
λÂ
. Note that the function K is monotonically increasing with domain
and range both spanning the reals. The function K−1 is well-defined and monotonic, with
K−1(x)>−∞ for all x ∈ R.
It follows that Gt− ⊆ { f | p¯iÂ · f ≤ K(t)}. Note that for all f such that p¯iÂ · f ≥ K(K−1(t))
it follows that, U( f )≥ U˜Â+λÂp¯iÂ · ( f − fÂ)≥ K−1(t). It follows by definition that for all t ∈ R
V (t, p¯iÂ) = inff∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) : p¯iÂ · f ≥ t} ≥ K−1(t)>−∞.
We now assert that for all A ∈D , p¯iA ∈ argmaxpi∈ΠV (pi · fA,pi). First, from the monotonic-
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ity property of the U function
V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA) = inf
f∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) : p¯iA · f ≥ p¯iA · fA}
=U( fA)
Second, for any pi ∈ Π, we have V (pi · fA,pi) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : pi · f ≥ pi · fA} ≤U( fA), since
pi · fA ≥ pi · fA. Therefore V (pi · fA,pi) ≤ V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA) for all pi ∈ Π. Therefore, the revealed
information structure is optimal for V .2
The function
V˜ (t,pi) =V (t,pi)−V (0,pi0)
satisfies Condition 3, Condition 4, and Condition 5 while maintaining the other properties above.
First, note that V˜ (0,pi0) =V (0,pi0)−V (0,pi0) = 0 so the normalization condition is satisfied.
Since the difference of V and V˜ is a constant, we can check quasiconcavity and weak
monotonicity of V . Next, we check weak monotonicity. If pi is a garbling of ρ, then
V (t,ρ) = inf
f∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) | ρ · f ≥ t}
≤ inf
f∈C(γ)
{U( f ) | pi · f ≥ t}
=V (t,pi)
since pi · f ≥ t implies that ρ · f ≥ t by Lemma 4 so the infimum is taken over a weakly smaller
set of functions. Thus, weak monotonicity in the second argument of V holds.
2We note that a version of Roy’s identity holds (Roy (1947)). Observe that by definition of V , if pi · fA ≥ w
implies U( fA)≥V (w,pi). We conclude that pi · fA ≥ p¯iA · fA implies U( fA)≥V (p¯iA · fA,pi). We have already shown
that U( fA) =V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA). Thus, if pi · fA ≥ p¯iA · fA, then V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA)≥V (p¯iA · fA,pi).
135
Lastly, we examine quasiconcavity of V . Let (t1,pi1),(t2,pi2) ∈ R×Π, then for λ ∈ [0,1]
V (λt1+(1−λ)t2,λpi1+(1−λ)pi2) = inf
f∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) | λpi1 · f +(1−λ)pi2 · f ≥ λt1+(1−λ)t2}.
Note that if λpi1 · f +(1−λ)pi2 · f ≥ λt1+(1−λ)t2, then either pi1 · f ≥ t1 or pi2 · f ≥ t2. Therefore,
for f ∈C(Γ) we have
{ f | λpi1 · f +(1−λ)pi2 · f ≥ λt1+(1−λ)t2} ⊆ { f | pi1 · f ≥ t1}∪{ f | pi2 · f ≥ t2}.
Therefore, the infimum of U over the first set,V (λt1+(1−λ)t2,λpi1+(1−λ)pi2), is greater than
or equal to the infimum of U over the second set, min{V (t1,pi1),V (t2,pi2)}. Thus, quasiconcavity
holds.
We now show data matching and choices are optimal by following Caplin and Dean 2015
and using NIAS. Next we show that there exists stochastic choice functions {CA : Supp(p¯iA)→
∆(A)}A∈D that satisfy optimality and matches data.
For each γ ∈ Supp(p¯iA), define:
CA(a | γ) =

PA(a)
∑{b∈A:γ¯bA=γ}
PA(b)
if γ¯aA = γ
0 otherwise
where PA(a) = ∑ω∈ΩPA(a | ω)µ(ω) is the unconditional probability of choosing action a from
decision problem A. Note the CA(a | γ)> 0 only if γ¯aA = γ. The NIAS condition implies that
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)PA(a | ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)PA(b | ω)u(b(ω))
⇒ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ¯aA(ω)u(a(ω))≥ ∑
ω∈Ω
γ¯aA(ω)u(b(ω))
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The second line follows by dividing both sides by PA(a). Thus, NIAS ensures that the choices are
optimal.
It remains to show that the data are matched. In other words, PA is generated from the
information structure p¯iA and choices CA. First, note that for any b,b′ ∈ A such that γ¯bA = γ¯b
′
A ,
implies that for any ω ∈Ω such that γ¯bA(ω)> 0, then
PA(b | ω)
PA(b′ | ω) =
PA(b)
PA(b′)
.
Thus, for every ω ∈Ω and a ∈ A such that PA(a)> 0, then
∑
γ∈Supp(p¯iA)
p¯iA(γ|ω)CA(a|γ) = p¯iA(γ¯aA|ω)CA(a|γ¯aA)
= ∑
{c∈A:γ¯cA=γ¯aA}
PA(c|ω) PA(a)∑{b∈A|γ¯bA=γ¯aA}PA(b)
= ∑
{c∈A|γ¯cA=γ¯aA}
PA(c|ω) PA(a|ω)∑{b∈A|γ¯bA=γ¯aA}PA(b|ω)
= PA(a|ω).
Therefore, the data are matched.
Proof of Theorem 7. We note that NIAS is equivalent to optimal choices and matched data.
Therefore, we focus on non-triviality and optimal information.
(⇒) Suppose the data is represented by a constrained costly information representation
and for all A ∈D that piA ∈ argmaxpi∈Πc pi · fA. Since the utility depends only on ex-ante payoff,
then piA · fA = p¯iA · fA ≥ piB · fA ≥ p¯iB · fA. The first equality follows from equivalent choices, the
next inequality follows from optimality, while the final inequality follows Lemma 4.
(⇐) Suppose BACI holds. Let Π¯c =⋃A∈D{p¯iA}. For D nonempty, Πc 6= /0.3 Moreover,
3If D = /0, then let Πc =Π.
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for any A,B ∈D , we have
p¯iA · fA ≥ p¯iB · fA.
In other words, for all A∈D we have p¯iA ∈ argmaxpi∈Π¯c pi · fA. Therefore nontriviality and optimal
information hold.
Let conv(Π¯c) = conv(
⋃
A∈D{p¯iA}). Here conv(·) represents the convex hull of informa-
tion structures. For all B ∈D let λB ∈ [0,1] such that ∑B∈D λB = 1. Now for fixed A ∈D
∑
B∈D
λBp¯iB · fA ≤ ∑
B∈D
λBp¯iA · fA = p¯iA · fA
where the inequality follows from BACI. The result holds for any fixed A and convex combination
so that p¯iA ∈ argmaxpi∈conv(Π¯c)pi · fA. Thus, the constraint set can be chosen convex without loss
of generality.
Proof of Theorem 6. We note that NIAS is equivalent to optimal choices and matched data.
Therefore, we focus on non-triviality and optimal information.
(⇒) We show that a multiplicatively costly information representation satisfies HACI. For
all A ∈D , let piA ∈ argmaxpi∈Π[R(pi)(pi · fA)].
First, we show for A ∈D \D0, that (pi · fA)> 0 for all information structures and R(piA)>
0. Let pi0 denote the non-informative information structure with pi0(µ) = 1. By assumption,
pi0 · fA > 0 for any A ∈ D\D0. Since fA is convex, pi · fA > 0 for all information structures. In
particular, let pi′ ∈ Π be an information structure such that R(pi′) > 0, then pi′ · fA > 0 as well.
Note that such a pi′ ∈Π with R(pi′)> 0 exists by nontriviality. For any A ∈D \D0 and for any
pi ∈Π, we have R(piA)(piA · fA)≥ R(pi′)(pi′ · fA)> 0 since piA is the optimal information structure.
Therefore, for all A ∈D\D0 we have R(piA)> 0.
138
Next, for any pair Ai,Ai+1 ∈D\D0, we have
R(piAi)(p¯iAi · fAi) = R(piAi)(piAi · fAi)
≥ R(piAi+1)(piAi+1 · fAi)
≥ R(piAi+1)(p¯iAi+1 · fAi)> 0
where the equality follows from equivalent choices, the first inequality follows from optimality,
the second inequality follows from Lemma 4, and the last term is greater than zero by the earlier
arguments. Rearranging the end terms of the inequalities,
R(piAi+1)(p¯iAi+1 · fAi)
R(piAi)(p¯iAi · fAi)
≤ 1.
We can now take any cycle A1, . . . ,Ak ∈D\D0 and take products to see that costs will be removed
so
k
∏
i=1
R(piAi+1)(p¯iAi+1 · fAi)
R(piAi)(p¯iAi · fAi)
=
k
∏
i=1
(p¯iAi+1 · fAi)
(p¯iAi · fAi)
≤ 1
where the indices are calculated with addition modulo k. Let σ : {1, . . . ,k,}→ {1, . . . ,k} where
σ(1) = 1,σ(2) = k,σ(3) = k−1, . . . ,σ(k) = 2.4 Therefore,
k
∏
i=1
p¯iAσ(i) · fAσ(i+1)
p¯iAσ(i) · fAσ(i)
≤ 1
and HACI is satisfied.
(⇐) Now we show from HACI that we can generate a non-trivial utility function. Follow-
ing Varian 1983a, for all A ∈D let UA be the maximum of
k−1
∏
i=1
p¯iAi · fAi+1
p¯iAi · fAi
(B.2)
4Note addition is still modulo k in the index so σ(k+1) = 1.
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where the maximization is taken over all finite sequences {Ai}k−1i=1 ⊆D \D0 with Ak = A. Note
that if A∈D0 then UA = 0. Since the number of menus inD\D0 is finite, the number of sequences
{Ai}k−1i=1 not containing cycles is also finite. Moreover by HACI, the presence of any cycles in a
sequence {Ai}k−1i=1 only decreases the value of (B.2). Therefore the maximum in (B.2) exists for
each A. Note that UA > 0 for all A ∈D \D0, and for all A,B ∈D
UB ≥UA p¯iA · fBp¯iA · fA (B.3)
by definition.5 Define
U( f ) =

maxA∈D
[
UA
p¯iA· f
p¯iA· fA
]
if f ∈C+(Γ)
+∞ otherwise
where C+(Γ) are nonnegative convex continuous functions on Γ. From the definition of U , it
is obvious that U(·) is homogenous of degree 1 (as the supremum of a finite number of linear
functionals), and U( f ) ≥ 0 for all f ∈ C(Γ). In addition, inequality (B.3) implies that for all
A ∈D that U( fA) =UA. It is also straightforward that U is convex, continuous, and monotone
increasing over C+(Γ). Finally, we have
U( f )≥U( fA) if p¯iA · f ≥ p¯iA · fA (B.4)
which is also straightforward by construction.
Let M+(Γ) be the set of non-negative Borel measures over Γ with bounded variation.
Define V : R+×M+(Γ)→ R+ by V (t,m) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : m · f ≥ t}. Now, we show that
5We define 0 ·∞= 0 as is standard in convex analysis.
140
V (·, ·) is indeed of the multiplicative form. By the definition of V , for any t > 0 we have
V (t,m) = inf
f∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) : m · f
t
≥ 1}
= inf
t f ′∈C(Γ)
{U(t f ′) : m · f ′ ≥ 1}
= inf
f ′∈C(Γ)
{U(t f ′) : m · f ′ ≥ 1}
= t inf
f ′∈C(Γ)
{U( f ′) : m · f ′ ≥ 1}
= tR¯(m)
where the first equality comes from rearrangement, the second equality comes from f ′ = f/t, the
third equality comes since any t f ′ can be expressed as a function, the fourth equality holds since
U is homogeneous degree 1, and the final equality holds by defining the function R¯ : M+(Γ)→R+
as R¯(m) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : m · f ≥ 1}.
Next, if t = 0 then V (t,m) = 0 which is consistent with the multiplicative form. To see
this, consider the constant function f0(γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ Γ and see that V (0,pi)≤U( f0) = 0. Let
R˜ : Π→ R+ be the restriction of R¯ to Π.
Since U( f )≥ 0 for all f ∈C(Γ), we have R˜(pi) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : pi · f ≥ 1} ≥ 0. More-
over, we show that R˜(pi) < ∞. Consider the constant function f1(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ so that
pi · f1 = 1. Therefore, we deduce
R˜(pi)≤max
A∈D
UA
p¯iA · fA < ∞.
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We also prove that there are pi ∈Π such that R˜ > 0. For an arbitrary A ∈D\D0, we have
R˜(p¯iA) =
V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA)
p¯iA · fA
=
inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : p¯iA · f ≥ p¯iA · fA}
p¯iA · fA
=
U( fA)
p¯iA · fA =
UA
p¯iA · fA > 0
where from definitions and p¯iA · fA > 0. Therefore, R˜(piA)> 0.
We note that if pi is a garbling of ρ then R˜(ρ) ≤ R˜(pi) since R˜(pi) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) |
pi · f ≥ 1} and pi · f ≥ 1 implies ρ · f ≥ 1 so the infimum is over a weakly larger set. Let pi0 as
the information structure with pi0(µ|ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω. Since Π is the set of information sets
consistent with Bayes’ Law, pi0 is a garbling of any pi ∈Π. Thus, for all pi ∈Π, R˜(pi0)≥ R˜(pi)> 0.
Lastly, rescale the function R˜(.) with 1/R˜(pi0), and define
R(pi) =
R˜(pi)
R˜(pi0)
.
We now assert that for all A ∈D , p¯iA ∈ argmaxm∈M+(Γ)V (pi · fA,pi). First, from inequality
(B.4) we have
V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA) = inf
f∈C(Γ)
{U( f ) : p¯iA · f ≥ p¯iA · fA}
=U( fA)
Second, for any m ∈M+(Γ), we have V (m · fA,m) = inf f∈C(Γ){U( f ) : m · f ≥ m · fA} ≤U( fA),
since m · fA ≥ m · fA. Therefore V (m · fA,m)≤V (p¯iA · fA, p¯iA) for all m ∈M+(Γ). From this, we
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have that
p¯iA ∈ argmax
pi∈Π
V (pi · fA,pi)
R˜(pi0)
= argmax
pi∈Π
R˜(pi)
R˜(pi0)
(pi · fA)
= argmax
pi∈Π
R(pi)(pi · fA)
where p¯iA is am optimizer since p¯iA is optimal for V over a larger set and this is a positive scaling
of V . Therefore piA is optimal for the rescaled V and has the multiplicative costly representation.
We note that the R was already shown to satisfy weak monotonicity in information and the
normalization property. The R˜(m) defined in Theorem 6 is homogenous of degree one, increasing
in m, and quasiconcave by the same arguments used in Theorem 5. By Theorem 1 in Prada 2011,
we have that R¯ is concave. Therefore, R˜ restricted to Π is the restriction of R¯ to a convex set and
is thus concave. Finally, R is concave as it is a positive re-scaling.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose there is a sequence (p¯iA1, fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) such that p¯iAi · fAi ≤
p¯iAi · fAi+1 for all i (with addition modulo k). Let σ : {1, . . . ,k,} → {1, . . . ,k} where σ(1) =
1,σ(2) = k,σ(3) = k− 1, . . . ,σ(k) = 2. Note that addition is still modulo k in the original
indexing so σ(k+1) = 1.
By NIAC, we have
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAσ(i) · fAσ(i) ≥
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAσ(i+1) · fAσ(i).
However, by since this is a potential GACI cycle we know that each p¯iAσ(i) · fAσ(i) ≤ p¯iAσ(i+1) · fAσ(i).
The only way both can hold simultaneously is if p¯iAi · fAi = p¯iAi · fAi+1 for i = 1, . . . ,k.
Proof of Proposition 2. To satisfy NIAC it is required that
p¯iA · fA+ p¯iB · fB ≥ p¯iA · fB+ p¯iB · fA
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or equivalently,
p¯iB · fA− p¯iA · fA ≤ p¯iB · fB− p¯iA · fB
However, since menu A provides a higher return to information than menu B and p¯iA is a garbling
of p¯iB, then
p¯iB · fA− p¯iA · fA > p¯iB · fB− p¯iA · fB
which violates NIAC.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that GACI is violated for a dataset of two menus if and only if
p¯iA · fA ≤ p¯iA fB and p¯iB · fB ≤ p¯iB fA
with one inequality strict. Since fA > fB, it follows that
p¯iA · fA > p¯iA fB
and there can be no violation of GACI. Since the dataset was assumed to satisfy NIAS, the data is
rationalized by a nonseparable costly information representation.
Proof of Proposition 4. For any sequence (p¯iA1 , fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) with Ai ∈D. Note that p¯iAi ·
fAi = p¯iAi · fA+ cmi and p¯iAi+1 · fAi = p¯iAi+1 · fA+ cmi for some mi ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. This implies that
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi · fAi =
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi · fA+ cmi =
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi+1 · fA+ cmi =
k
∑
i=1
p¯iAi+1 · fAi
where addition of the index is modulo k. Therefore, NIAC is satisfied in addition to NIAS and the
dataset is rationalized by the additive costly information representation.
Proof of Proposition 5. For any sequences (p¯iA1, fA1), . . . ,(p¯iAk , fAk) with Ai ∈D\D0. Note that
p¯iAi · fAi = cmi p¯iAi · fA and p¯iAi · fAi+1 = cmi+1 p¯iAi · fA for some mi,mi+1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. This implies
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that
k
∏
i=1
p¯iAi · fAi+1
p¯iAi · fAi
=
k
∏
i=1
cmi
cmi+1
= 1
since addition of the index is modulo k and each cmi term appears in the numerator and denom-
inator. Therefore, HACI is satisfied in addition to NIAS and the dataset is rationalized by the
multiplicative costly information representation.
145
